NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
SECOND DIVISION
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Sidney St. F. Thaxter when award was rendered.
SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 22, RAILWAY EMPLOYEES'
DEPARTMENT, A. F. OF L. (MACHINISTS
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY
(ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY)
DISPUTE: CLAIM OF EMPLOYES: 1-That about twenty months' service rights of Third Class Machinist M. F. Owens at Sherman, Texas, was unjustly revoked within the meaning of the controlling agreement, particularly Rule 26, by the carrier on November 18, 1943.
2.-That the carrier be ordered to reinstate Third Class Machinist M. F. Owens with all service rights restored and compensate him for all time lost retroactive to November 18, 1943.
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: The carrier employed M. F. Owens about May 19, 1942, as a third class machinist at Sherman, Texas, and he continuously remained in the service as such until November 18, 1943.
Third Class Machinist Owens was subjected to stand an investigation on November 13, 1943, on charges by the carrier of neglect of duty while the machinist he was assigned to help was working alone in another part of the roundhouse at about 11 A.M. on November 4, 1943, and this employe was discharged from the service on November 18, 1943.
The reinstatement of Third Class Machinist M. F. Owens has been handled with the highest designated carrier officer to whom such matters are subject to be appealed in accordance with the provisions of the controlling agreement dated October 1, 1937, with the result that such officer of the carrier has refused to adjust this claim.
POSITION OF EMPLOYES: It is submitted that within the meaning of Rule 26, in applicable part reading-
that Third Class Machinist (hereinafter referred to as machinist helper) M. F. Owens (hereinafter referred to as the claimant) was unjustly discharged, as will be found to be fully substantiated by the transcript of investigation conducted by the carrier on November 13, 1943, copy of which is submitted and identified as Exhibit A.
the less bound by the terms of the agreement. He was given a hearing on charges of neglect of duty on November 4, 1943. The organization would not defend him as he was a non-member and he employed counsel. On November 18 the official who heard the case found him guilty and ordered him discharged. The attorneys appealed to the superintendent of motive power who affirmed the decision. This appeal was supplemented by a later appeal of the claimant himself to the superintendent of motive power and a further one to H. L. Worman, chief operating officer of the railroad. On April 24, 1944, the employes' organization elected to withdraw from the Frisco Board of Adjustment No. 1. From then on the National Railroad Adjustment Board took over its duties at least so far as this employe was concerned, whose case was from then on handled by the employes' organization of which he had become a member.
The question is not one of jurisdiction between the old Board of Adjustment and this, but rather whether the claimant delayed too long in taking his appeal. Conceding that appeals should be prosecuted promptly, particularly in view of the penalty provisions of the rule in question, we do not think that in the light of the peculiar facts here involved the delay in question was unreasonable. The carrier calls attention to the fact that the old Board met January 18, 1944. Whether that was the last meeting does not appear, but presumably the carrier argues that the appeal should have been presented at that time. In view of the fact that the claimant was taking the matter up with the railroad officials during the month of December, the time was certainly short to expect him to present the matter before January 18 on penalty of losing his rights. We do not think that laches sufficient to bar the claimant can under all the cimcumstances be attributed to him.
The neglect of duty consisted in the claimant being in the cab of a locomo tive during working hours where he had no right to be. At best he seems to have stopped there for but a few minutes during a lull in his work. Had he been a consistent offender in this respect the discipline imposed might have been justified. But no such penalty seems to have been imposed on others who had similarly offended. This Board is loathe to interfere in cases of discipline if there is any reasonable ground on which it can be justified. Where the record as here indicates that the penalty is beyond all reason, this Board has not hesitated to interfere.