The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in ad
dition Referee Edward F. Carter when the award was rendered.
SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 97, RAILWAY EMPLOYES'
DEPARTMENT, A. F. of L. (Machinists)
THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY-(Coast Lines)
DISPUTE: CLAIM OF EMPLOYES: 1. That under the current agreement other than Machinists were improperly used to repair Ford V-8 Station Wagon, License No. N-58713, on or about March 20, 1952.
2. That accordingly the Carrier be ordered to additionally compensate Machinists C. R. Grant and M. L. Starr each in the amount of twenty-four (24) hours' pay at the applicable rate.
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: At the San Bernardino shops the carrier maintains a complete and well equipped automobile and truck repair department. This repair department is equipped to perform engine exchanges and rear end overhaul. Station Wagon Ford V-8, License No. N-58713, was placed in the San Bernardino shops for repairs on March 18 and 19, 1952, but no one was assigned to work on it. It was moved from the shop on the evening of March 19, 1952 without any work being performed. It was again placed in the San Bernardino shops on March 27, 1952 for painting and rewiring, which work was performed. While it was being painted and rewired it was noted that the work of overhauling the rear end and exchanging engine had been performed elsewhere since the time it was placed in the San Bernardino shops on March 18 and 19, 1952. An investigation developed that repairs involved in this dispute had been made by the GarnerMuth Company of San Bernardino, California. Machinists C. R. Grant and M. L. Starr, hereinafter referred to as the claimants, are regularly employed as such in the motor car shops, doing work similar in nature to that in question, were available to perform the work in dispute. The claimants are assigned to the 7:00 A. M.-12:00 Noon, 12:30 P. M. to 3:30 P. M. shift, Monday through Friday, with rest days of Saturday and Sunday.
The carrier has declined to settle this dispute on an acceptable basis to the employes.
The agreement effective August 1, 1945, as subsequently amended, is controlling.
Since it is clear from the facts and circumstances in the case that the claim is without merit or support of the agreement, it should be declined.
California. Carrier maintains a well equipped and complete automobile and truck repair department at this point. The overhaul required an engine exchange and rear end transmission repairs. Claimants (machinists) claim the work.
It is the contention of the organization that Rule 52, current agreement (classification of work rule) controls. The rule states:
The foregoing rule describes specifically the work within its scope. It will be noted that the repair of trucks and automobiles is not specifically mentioned in this rule unless it is included in "all other work generally recognized as machinists' work." The carrier contends that during the negotiation of the current agreement effective August 1, 1945, no discussion was had concerning the repair of automobiles and trucks although the organization knew how such work was being handled.
The carrier states that the number of automobiles and trucks used have progressively increased over the years. There is a variety of types and makes used which are assigned to the operating, engineering, maintenance of way, stores and other departments of the carrier. Throughout the past, mechanical work on such equipment has been performed partly by carrier employes and partly by garages and other outside concerns. The carrier does not stock repairs for these vehicles except as to small items common to all. Carrier asserts that for more than thirty years this practice has existed without complaint by the employes until the present dispute arose. It is not work generally recognized as nmachinists' work exclusively on this carrier.
The organization cites Section 27, Appendix "B" to the agreement effective August 1, 1945, which states:
We fail to see how Section 27 is helpful in resolving the present dispute. It recognizes past practice in contracting construction and repair to its motive power and rolling stock only. It likewise permits the contracting of minor repair work at points where mechanical forces are not employed. It contains nothing helpful as to the overhauling and repair of motor vehicles.
The automobile here involved was assigned to the operating department. We find nothing in the agreement with the Machinists which gives them exclusive right to maintenance work in connection with the vehicular equip- 1808-12 90
ment of other departments. It is true that mechanical department employes have performed some of this work but it does not appear that any practice existed under which they performed it exclusively. The record shows the practice to be to the contrary,-part has been performed by them and part farmed out for more than thirty years. Under such circumstances the mechanical forces are in no position to claim an exclusive right to perform the work. Awards 1110, 1556. Mechanical forces have the exclusive right only to the work embraced in their scope rule and other work exclusively performed by them under an established practice. The claim is not sustainable under either contingency.
First, Rule 52, Classification of Work Rule, covers the work in questionthe rule reads in part:
Award No. 170 of this Division, without a referee, interpreted this language to mean that it covered the maintenance of gas engines or gasoline motors that were involved in that dispute and, again in Award No. 726 of this Division, with the assistance of a referee, this same question of maintenance of gas engines being machinists' work, was upheld.
Second, the majority admit Section 27, Appendix "B" of the current agreement would apply except at points where no mechanical forces are employed and they also admit that at San Bernardino, California, where this dispute originated, the carrier maintains a well equipped and complete automobile and truck repair department with competent mechanics employed therein to perform the work. The Board should have held that Section 27, Appendix "B" applied in this case and the claim should have been sustained.