discipline; and that the discipline administered was rendered in good faith and was not tainted with bias. Consequently, this Division should not superimpose its judgment upon that of management and remove the discipline administered. The claim covered by this docket should be denied in its entirety.

FINDINGS: The Second Division of. the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

The parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon.

Claimant was charged with the failure to properly perform maintenance duties on his assigned territory. He was suspended on October 7, 1954, by

The carrier contends that the present Rules 36 and 37 have no application for the reason that they became effective on November 1, 1954, after the events took place which resulted in the 60 day suspension on October 7, 1954. There is no merit to this contention. Matters of procedure convey no vested rights and changes in procedure become effective with the date of the agree- ;P ment providing the procedural change. An investigation given after November 1, 1954, must be in compliance with the procedures provided for in the agreement of November 1, 1954. Rule 37(a) provides that a decision in writing will be rendered by the carrier within 15 calendar days after the completion of the investigation hearing. The organization contends this was not done.

The record shows that on December 3, 1954, Chairman E. E. Potter of the Electrical Workers wrote the Superintendent of Communications and inquired whether or not claimants suspension consisted of 60 actual working days. On the sane day, December 3, 1954, the carrier's Superintendent of Communications advised the chairman that claimant's suspension was for 60 compensated days beginning October 7, 1954. Carrier asserts this was a decision on the investigation. On the face of the letters it is shown that it was not such a decision. It was merely an answer to the chairman's inquiry as to whether the suspension was on a calendar or actual working day basis. The letter which is claimed to be a decision was nothing more than an answer to the chairman's inquiry. It is evident that no decision was made by the carrier within 15 days as required by Rule 37(a). This being true, we are required to find that no decision was made in writing within 15 days as required by the rule.

The failure to make a decision in writing in 15 days is equivalent to a finding that the charges were not sustained upon the investigation and the claim dismissed. Rule 37(e). We have examined Awards 1497 and 1513 cited by the carrier. We do not disagree with the reasoning therein set forth. We point out, however, that~t is the decision in writing of the carrier from which this employe charged may appeal. He is entitled to a finding on the evidence adduced. No decision having been made in writing as to the merits of the case as presented at the investigation, an appeal to this Board has been denied him and the suspension has been imposed contrary to Rule 37(e). (It cannot be said that such handling was not prejudicial to the rights of the claimant under the agreement. '`. We are obliged to say that the suspension of 60 days was improperly imposed.

The suspension is therefore held to be improper, claimant's seniority and vacation rights will be restored, and claimant will be paid for all time lost resulting from the suspension less what he may have earned in other employment in accordance with Rule 37(d). No expenses can properly be allowed.

AWARD