NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
SECOND DIVISION
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in addi
tion Referee Dudley E. Whiting when the award was rendered.
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 99, RAILWAY EMPLOYES'
DEPARTMENT, A. F. of L. (Carmen)
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY
DISPUTE: CLAIM OF EMPLOYES:
(1) That under the current agreement the following carmen
were improperly compensated at the straight time rate for service
performed on the dates as shown opposite their names:
Fred Jenkins -May 2, May 14, 1953
July 20, 1953
August 3, August 4, August 13, 1953
March 4, March 16, 1954
May 1, May 17, 1954
June 18, 1954
August 16, August 27, August 31, 1954
Hoyt King (Deceased)-May 18, 1953
June 1, 1953
A. Gugliemo -June 1, June 13, June 29, 1953
July 11, 1953
August 3, 1953
June 4, June 18, 1954
August 2, August 28, 1954
October 25, 1954
November 13, 1954
J. Kamedula -March 15, March 27, 1954
September 9, September 21, 1954
October 25, October 28, 1954
November 1, November 9, 1954
M. F. Connor -April 6, April 19, 1954
Ira White -September 3, September 21, 1954
November 12, 1954
December 1, December 5, December 9, 1954
(2) That accordingly the Carrier be ordered to compensate
the aforesaid Carmen additionally in the amount of four (4) hours
pay at the straight time rate for each of the above dates.
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For the above reasons, we dissent.
T. F. Purcell
M. E. Somerlott
D. H. Hicks
J. A. Anderson
R. P. Johnson"
In the findings in Award 1806, the Board, with Referee Carter, said:
"That there is a conflict between the schedule agreement and the vacation
agreement is self evident." Having determined that a conflict existed, rendering the contract ambiguous to the extent of the conflict, the Board should
have proceeded to resolve the conflict in accordance with the recognized
principles for the construction of contracts. Carrier has pointed out in
this submission that one of the accepted principles in the construction of
contracts is that a special provision of a contract, such as the Vacation Agreement in this case, takes precedence over a general provision, such as the
changing shifts rule. Had that principle been applied, the Board would have
reached a different conclusion in Awards 1806 and 1807.
The carrier members in their dissent to Awards 1806 and 1807 commented on the awards' holding that practice will not change an unambiguous
rule. The referee in effect held that the changing shifts rule was plain and
unambiguous and could not be altered by practice. Completely ignored was
the fact that Referee Morse's binding interpretation was likewise completely
plain and unambiguous and, if the Board was to perform properly its duty
to interpret agreements, had to be harmonized with the changing shift rule,
which the Board declared was in conflict with it. The Board failed in Awards
1806 and 1807 to apply a second recognized rule for the construction of
contracts, which is succinctly stated as follows in 12 Am. Jur., Contracts,
§ 249:
"Interpretation by Parties.-In the determination of the meaning of an indefifinite or ambiguous contract, the interpretation placed
upon the contract by the parties themselves is to be considered by
the court and is entitled to great, if not controlling, influence in
ascertaining their understanding of its terms. In fact the courts will
generally follow such practical interpretation of a doubtful contract.
It is to be assumed that parties to a contract know best what was
meant by its terms and are the least likely to be mistaken as to
its intention; that each party is alert to protect his own interests
and to insist on his rights; and that whatever is done by the parties
during the period of the performance of the contract is done under
its terms as they understood and intended it should be. Parties are
far less likely to have been mistaken as to the meaning of their
contract during the period when they are in harmony and practical
interpretation reflects that meaning than when subsequent diTfferences have impelled them to resort to law and one of them then
seeks an interpretation at variance with their practical interpretation
of its provisions . . . ."
It is clear that the mutual construction given by the parties to the
whole agreement, including the Vacation Agreement,.over a period of almost
twelve years should have been accepted by the Board as evidence of the
proper interpretation of the agreement. The findings of the Board in Awards
1806 and 1807 were fundamentally wrong and should not be followed as a
precedent.
There is no basis for the claim in this dispute, and it should be denied.
FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the
whole record and all the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this
dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934.
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96
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
The parties to this dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon.
Disposition of this claim is governed by our Award No. 2440 (Docket
No. 1996).
AWARD
Claim denied.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
ATTEST: Harry J. Sassaman
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 3rd day of June, 1957.
DISSENT OF LABOR MEMBERS TO AWARDS NOS. 2440, 2441,
2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452,
2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2504.
We are constrained to dissent from the majority findings in the aboveenumerated awards for the reasons set forth in our dissents to Awards Nos.
2083, 2084, 2197, 2205, 2250, and 2243.
It is our considered opinion that Awards Nos. 1514, 1806, and 1807
of the Second Division should have been followed and the overtime rates
embodied in the schedule agreements should have been applied.
R. W. Blake
Charles E. Goodlin
T. E. Losey
Edward W. Wiesner
James B. Zink