The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Howard A. Johnson when award was rendered.
RAILROAD DIVISION, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, A. F. of L. - C. I. O.
THE PITTSBURGH & LAKE ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY AND
THE LAKE ERIE & EASTERN RAILROAD COMPANY
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: This case arose at Youngstown, Ohio and is known as Case Y-130.
That according to Foreman Fitzpatrick in his testimony at the investigation admitted that J. C. Parker had not refused to release the hand brakes all he asked for was proper protection.
That the organization does have a rule that requires protection when employes do any kind of work on cars. Rule 36.
That it was the General Foreman R. D. Redding who gave the final orders that J. C. Parker release the hand brakes without any protection whatsoever.
That General Foreman Redding admitted he gave the final orders to J. C. Parker as to releasing hand brakes and if he did not do so to go home. He then gave J. C. Parker a notice to appear at an investigation.
Carrier has shown that the evidence developed at the investigation conclusively established that Inspector Parker was guilty of the charge of insubordination which was placed against him and also that his refusal to obey the orders of his foreman was not denied by the organization.
Carrier therefore, submits that the request of the organization that carrier rescind the sentence given Inspector Parker and that he be compensated for all time lost plus four (4) hours for attending the investigation is completely without merit and should be denied.
FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.
The evidence clearly shows that claimant was supended for refusing to work in violation of Rule 36. Although that rule is headed "Protection for Repairmen," it requires daytime blue flag protection for cars being inspected or repaired, by the placing of flags in the center of inspection or repair tracks, and expressly makes it the duty of foremen, inspectors and repairmen at work to know personally that cars being inspected or repaired are thus protected.
The hypertechnical objection is made that the rule did not apply because the inspection had been completed before claimant was ordered to release the brakes. But claimant's inspection duties were not completed by merely finding brakes applied and doing nothing about them; that is why the Carrier found him insubordinate for refusing to release them. Consequently, by proceeding with his work without the protection required he would have violated the rule, for which employes have been disciplined on this property.
Claimant was ordered to "knock the brakes off or be cut off from service," without blue flag or other protection. But the work was done by another inspector after, according to the foreman's testimony "I told the yardmaster to stay off the track until he heard from me." He testified further that the yardmaster seldom gave notice before putting additional cars on the track. The record shows that additional cars were being placed on the track during the period involved in this claim.
He should also be permitted to decline a task which would force him to imperil the lives and limbs of others in clear violation of a safety rule for which he can and should be disciplined.
Under the facts of that award it was held that in doubtful cases the employe should point out the danger and then perform his work as ordered.
1~_,BUt there is no doubt about the danger of inspecting cars without protection, as the parties recognized by adopting Rule 36.
In its submission the Carrier admits that without blue flag protection there is some hazard, but says that the movement of cars being worked on by car inspectors is the exception rather than the rule, and that the hazard must be accepted as part of a car inspector's job. Rule 36 was obviously adopted to make those exceptions as few as possible, and to minimize the necessary hazards.
Under the circumstances Claimant was not guilty of insubordination. He did not attempt to substitute his judgment for that of Carrier's management. He merely insisted upon the protection mutually agreed upon by Carrier and Organization.
There is no rule provision for claimant's payment for attending his investigation. 4023-i6 329
Claimant is entitled to recision of the discipline order and compensation for the seven working days lost during the ten calendar days' suspension, but not for the time spent at the investigation on a rest day.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF LABOR MEMBERS
TO AWARD 4023
We dissent from the Findings that the claimant is not entitled to four hours' compensation for attending the investigation on his regular scheduled rest day. The remedial procedure is provided in the collective bargaining agreement for processing a grievance (see Rule 38 of the agreement). Grievant's attendance at a hearing either within his regular working hours or outside his regular working hours constitute service within the scope of the collective agreement. Since the carrier elected to hold the instant hearing outside grievant's regular working hours he has been unjustly dealt with unless he is compensated in accordance with Rule 3 (k) of the agreement.