It will be noted the doctor's release was dated Tuesday, June 3, 1958, and stated that Mr. Wanek "may return to work as of this date." This obviously did not qualify the claimant for returning to work the day previous, Monday, June 2, as he contends. In other words, the doctor's statement, when finally obtained, supported the carrier in holding him off work Monday afternoon.

The requirement of a doctor's statement was a simple one. No physical examination was requested. Neither was any particular doctor's statement required, such as that of the company physician. It was known Mr. Wanek was in the hospital, and that he must have been under some doctor's care. The written statement of his own physician, Dr. Foss, was surely not an unreasonable requirement in these circumstances.

In conclusion, the carrier asserts:

"1. The claim for the holiday, Friday, May 30th and Monday, June 2nd, must fall because claimant did not report for work until %ths of the working day had already elapsed. The Carrier was under no obligation to let him work for only 3 hours on Monday.

2. The claim for Tuesday, June 3rd, must fall since the claimant's loss of 5 hours' pay that day was solely because of his refusal to obtain a written statement from his doctor. This was not an unreasonable requirement in view of all the circumstances."

The claims presented herein must be denied.

FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this. dispute are respectively carrier and ernploye within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

Parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon.

Memorial Day 1958, fell on Friday, a workday of Claimant's workweek; he worked the day preceding and would normally have worked on Monday, June 2, 1958, the workday immediately following. But he chose to use the holiday weekend for a voluntary physical examination, which was not completed in time

for him to report for work at 7:00 A. M. the start of his shift. He therefore sent word that he would be late but would report by noon.

He reported at 12:30 P. M., three hours before the end of his shift, and was informed that he could not expect to return to work for three hours and receive pay for the preceding holiday. But he remained at the shop and was later told that he must have a release from his doctor before resuming work.

He reported at the opening of his shift on Tuesday morning, June 3, 1958, without his doctor's release, but was not permitted to work until 12:30 P. M., after he had obtained it.

The Carrier's contentions are, first, that it is not required to permit an employe to work when he reports for the last three hours of his shift; and second, that it was proper to demand a written statement from the doctor before letting Claimant resume work.

The Carrier's first contention must be sustained. No rule, binding established practice, nor award is cited to the contrary.

Eight hours constitute a work day (Rule 1); and there is no rule which entitles an employe to report for less than his full shift as a matter of right. Rule 19(a) provides that an employe detained from work shall notify his foreman as early as possible; but it does not provide that he shall be entitled to work for the remainder of his shift, perhaps because the Carrier should be free to call a substitute if necessary and available. Rule 19(b) provides that an employe returning to work shall report on the day previous to his resumption of work. The latter provision is not applicable here, but indicates the importance of the full work day and of early notice to permit orderly planning of employment and work.

The fact that the Carrier permitted Claimant to work the final three hours on the next day, after he had obtained the release, does not mean that such action was mandatory, either with or without the release.

And since the Carrier was not under a legal duty to permit Claimant to work the last three hours on Monday, it was entitled to impose any ordinary condition precedent, such as the doctor's release.

But on Tuesday he reported for work at the start of his regularly assigned shift, and the requirement of the doctor's release presents a different question. The Carrier maintains that it has been a consistent practice to require doctor's releases after hospitalization, and cites sixteen previous instances between 1943 and 1958 in which Claimant obtained such releases before returning to work. But Carrier also states that in all such instances he had been off duty because of illness, which tends to confirm the Organization's contention that under the established practice such releases are obtained only by employes who have been off because of serious illness or injury, but not when they have merely gone for a physical check-up.

The Carrier does not cite any instance in which a doctor's release has been required on an employe's return from a voluntary physical check-up not resulting from illness, but contends that it was reasonable in this instance because of Claimant's record of sixteen illnesses in sixteen years, the last of which ended only six weeks before this incident. But the fact remains that claimant produced a doctor's release after the last illness; and there is no

suggestion in the record that his condition had since changed. We find nothing in the record to justify the requirement.

The Carrier cites Award 3561. But in it this Division said:

"Where a change in the employe's condition has occurred which is obvious and likely to subject the employe or his fellow workers to hazard, the carrier, acting in good faith, has a duty to determine if his condition is such as to render his continued employment in that capacity hazardous."

But this is not such an instance, as above stated.

AWARD