In Third Division Award 6828, Referee Messmore, it was held that:

"The authority of this Division is limited to interpreting and applying the rules agreed upon by the parties. If inequities among employes arise by reason thereof, this Division is without authority to correct them as it has not been given equity powers. In other words, we cannot make a rule or modify existing rules to prevent inequities thus created. Renegotiation thereof is the manner provided by the Railway Labor Act, which is the proper source of authority for that purpose. See Award 5703. See, also, Awards 4439, 5864, 2491.

`The burden of establishing facts sufficient to require or permit the allowance of a claim is upon him who seeks its allowance.' See Awards 3523, 6018, 5040, 5976."

In Second Division Award 3453, Referee Murphy, the Board held:

" * * * This Board lacks authority to direct a carrier as to how it shall conduct its operation; we only have authority to interpret and apply the agreements of these employes of which the Railway Labor Act gives us jurisdiction."

Thus, in view of the limitation placed on the board, it is without authority to do what is demanded in part 2 of the claim, i.e., order the terminal company to change its operation or operations of owner or tenant lines.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the terminal company submits it has shown that:

(a) The current agreement was not violated and the monetary claims are not supported by it. Employes of the terminal company have the right to perform only such work as the terminal company has to offer.

(b) The point here at issue has long since been conceded by carmen and their representatives.

(c) The Board is without authority to do what is demanded in part 2 of the claim, i.e., order the terminal company to change its operation.

On the record, the Board cannot do other than make a denial award.

FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

Parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon.

The Carrier, the Atlanta Terminal Company, is jointly owned and jointly used by the Southern Railway Company, the Central of Georgia Railway Company, and the Atlanta and West Point Railroad Company under a tenancy

agreement. At the time the complaint was filed, 24 inbound trains and 23 outbound trains used the Carrier's facilities daily.

The Carrier does not own or operate locomotives, cars or trains; nor does it conduct switching operations for tenant lines.

From April 28, 1962, through June 16, 1962, certain Carmen's duties were performed at the Atlanta Terminal Company by Carmen employed by the tenant lines.

The Organization contends that it has a contractual right to perform all work recognized or classified as Carmen's work within the facilities of the Atlanta Terminal Company.

The Carrier contends that it "can offer to its carmen only such work as its owner and tenant lines authorize or permit to be performed by the terminal company". The Carrier further contends that "Throughout all the years" (prior to having a labor agreement with the Organization) "owner and tenant lines have had full access to and use of the terminal company's facilities, and have inspected, serviced and repaired cars at the station at their discretion".

The Labor Agreement dated March 16, 1945, is controlling in this dispute.

We have studied and evaluated Second Division Award No. 4567 -which involves the same Parties and facts nearly identical with the instant case.

In Award 4567, the Board held, in part, as follows:

"We are told by the Terminal Company that Carmen's duties at the Terminal consist of routine inspection of passenger and express trains, applying ground steam connections; and as necessity arises and time permits, the making of light, limited or minor repairs to passenger train cars.

But if it is true, as argued by the Terminal Company, that it has no jurisdiction or control to grant Carmen work on the owner and tenant carriers' equipment, how does this above mentioned work inure to the Carmen employed by the Terminal Company?

The answer supplied by the Terminal Company is that the practice, both prior to and after the controlling agreement was executed, was to permit the owner and tenant lines employes to come on the Terminal property and perform work at their discretion.

We do not feel that the controlling agreement may be so lightly or capriciously treated as to provide only a tentative source of employment rights, dependent upon the wishes of parties outside the agreement. The Terminal Company could have and should have negotiated the agreement with the past practice in mind. Indeed, it is presumed that the execution of a written contract embodies the full understanding of the parties, and that any previous agreement or practices are considered merged in the understanding enunciated in the written instrument.

Rule 41 of the controlling agreement, relied upon by the Carrier reserves work to the crafts who are parties to the agreement and has

Aio application to work performed by others alien to the particular agreement.

We are not to be understoood as saying that necessary work detected at the Terminal cannot be taken from there to the particular Carrier's facilities, nor do we understand the Claimants as having made any such contention. But when Carmen's work, reserved to them under the controlling agreement is performed at the Terminal's facility, it is the work of the Carmen employed by the Terminal Company under the terms of that agreement."

The Board is convinced that Award No. 4567 is well reasoned and sound. Therefore, it should be followed.

This Board, however, has no authority to grant the injunctive relief sought by the Organization in a portion of Part 2 of the claim. Accordingly, we sustain Part 1 of the claim and deny that portion of Part 2 of the claim wherein injunctive relief is sought.

Regarding the penalty aspects of Claim 2 - the compensation sought shall be at the pro rata rate but only for the actual work time involved in performing the claimed work.

AWARD