.4wsss Award No. 5319
Docket No. 5059
2-B&M-MA-'67





The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in

addition Referee Howard A. Johnson when award was rendered.


PARTIES TO DISPUTE:










EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: Denis McGillicuddy, hereinafter called the claimant, is employed as a Machinist by the Boston and Maine Railroad, .hereinafter called the carrier. At the time of the occurrence of this dispute, the Claimant was assigned to the 7:00 A. M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, Tuesday through Saturday with Sunday and Monday as rest days.


The Claimant performed eight hours' work on Monday, February 22, 1965, which was his assigned rest day, also a legal holiday (Washington's Birthday). The carrier paid the Claimant for eight hours at time and one-half rate for working his rest day (see Exhibit A), but refused to pay him eight hours' pay at time and one-half rate for working the Holiday.


This dispute was properly handled with all Carrier officers authorized to handle such disputes.


The Agreement effective April 1, 1937, as subsequently amended and reprinted January 1, 1963, is controlling.


POSITION OF EMPLOYES: The Claimant was paid 8 hours at time and one-half rate for working 8 hours on his rest day (February 22, 1965) as provided for in Rule 1, Section (1) (page 6 of the Agreement) captioned "Service on Rest Days," reading as follows:

BY MR. SCHOENE:


A. You are talking about the clerks?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.








In view of the foregoing and the Petitioner's acceptance and recognized historical application of the Agreement, the instant claim is without merit and should be denied.

All data and arguments herein contained have been presented to the Organization in conference and/or correspondence.





FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.



5319

This claim is in all essentials the same as those in Awards 5317 and 5318, although it is between different parties and under a different current Agreement, and the holiday involved is Washington's Birthday rather than Christmas or Labor Day.


The first paragraph of Rule 1 is essentially the same as Rule 2 in those cases and provides that eight hours shall constitute a day's work and that except as otherwise provided all employes shall be paid on the hourly basis.


The second paragraph of subsection (1) of Rule 1, which is applicable to this claim, provides as follows:



Thus it provides that "Service rendered by an employe on his rest day, * * * will be paid for at overtime rate," and in that respect its purpose is to make the overtime rate applicable to work performed, although it also provides a minimum of eight hours to be paid for at that rate.


Rule 130 prescribes the pro rata, or minimum, rates of pay for the various crafts and classes of employes.


Rule 3(c) provides that service rendered on legal holidays "shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half," in which it is practically synonymous with the fourth paragraph of Rule 4 in the two awards mentioned above. Like that rule, these Rules 1(1) and 3(c) are not pay provisions, but pay rate provisions. They merely apply the time and one-half rate to the work for which employes are entitled to pay under the first paragraph of Rule 1.


Rules 1(j), 1(k), 3(a), 4(a), 4f(1), 4f(2), 4f(3), 4(g), 6(a), 6(b), 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(e), 7(h), 9(a), 9(e), 10(a), 11(a), 11(b), 11(c), 11(d), 11(e), 11(g) and others, likewise prescribe the rates at which work is to be paid for under various circumstances, some at straight rate, some at time and one-half rate, and some at double rate. In that respect Rules 1(1) and 3(c) are no different from Rule 4 in the awards mentioned above; they are not pay rules, but pay rate rules applicable to work performed, and if more than one of them apply to work done on any one day, they do not authorize double or multiple days' pay, but still merely specify the rate at which work is to be paid for.





5319 7





Thus admittedly this is the first such claim made, or even suggested by the Organization's officers, until the preceding month.

What has been said in the first award mentioned above is applicable here,, and the claim must be denied.






ATTEST: Charles C. McCarthy
Executive Secretary

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 26th day of October, 1967.



The majority is in fundamental and harmful error in Awards 5317, 5318 and 5319. In laying down their foundation for their final decision, they state: among other things:







5319 8


The statement, "The Carrier has not bound itself to pay compensation under two separate rules," is an unsupported conclusion on the part .of the majority and to say the least, is a theoretical error. However, when coupled with the following additional mistakes, it becomes harmful and prejudicial to the claimants' entire case.


The Shop Craft rules have a long historical background which gives weight and meaning to their application, even in the present amended agreement state. It is not in the same posture or premise that it must be governed by common law principles which control private contracts between two private parties. Therefore, to resort to highly technical or irrational legal gymnastics is improper here.


This point is supported by the U. S. Supreme Court Decision TCEU v. Union Pacific Railroad, 12/5/66, when Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the court and stated among other things:




We have shown here the evident lack of consideration or perhaps knowledge of the background of these rules on the part of the referee and Carrier members when they state in pertinent part:




This is a standard rule appearing in all shop craft agreements differing only in some instances in number for identification. When this rule stands alone, it only binds the Carrier and Employe to what its unambiguous language factually says -that is, the establishment of hours of service and rest days. This historical rule was amended in 1949, in order to establish the 40 hour work week. Prior to that time, even as far back as the old national agree ment in 1919, it set out the 8 hour day.


5319 9



























5319 10

tions thereof, or to perform relief work on certain days and such types of other work on other days as may be assigned.


Assignments for regular relief positions may on different days include different starting times, duties and work locations for employes of the same class in the same seniority district, provided they take the starting time, duties, and work locations of the employe or employes whom they are relieving.




If in positions or work extending over a period of five days per week, an operational problem arises which the carrier contends cannot be met under the provisions of Rule 2-A, paragraph (b) above, and requires that some of such employes work Tuesday to Saturday instead of Monday to Friday, and the employes contend the contrary, and if the parties fail to agree thereon, then if the carrier nevertheless puts such assignments into effect, the dispute may be processed as a grievance or claim under the rules agreement.




The typical work week is to be one with two consecutive days off, and it is the carrier's obligation to grant this. Therefore, when an operating problem is met which may affect the consecutiveness of the rest days of positions or assignments covered by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), the following procedure shall be used.












5319 11









Clearly, this is an hours of service rule, not a pay rule or a rate of pay rule. To attempt to implicate this rule into the specific overtime rules or holiday rules is wrong.

The Third Division Awards previously cited and relied upon by the employes clearly laid down the proper principles and application of the rules applicable in this instant dispute. Such precedents should have held here.







5319 12


The foregoing citation from the Employes' record, and the Referee and Carrier Members' conclusion of this situation, to say the least, is unreasonable double-talk. For example, there is no bar in the entire agreement, four square, which would prevent the Employes from filing a grievance at any time that they so choose to do so. To misconstrue and to give such false weight and meaning to the Employes' statement, merely reflects a prejudiced and eager attitude to defeat the claimants' original dispute.


A further glaring reflection, as to a calculated misunderstanding of Rule 4 itself, is when the majority with full knoweldge of Rule 4 and all its subsequent amendments, attempts to lead the public to believe that Rule 4 has been in existence for 15 years in its original Agreement state. This is not so. The majority certainly lacked prudent judicial restraint in this statement.


Rule 4, 15 years ago, merely provided for seven legal holidays. In the event an individual worked on these legal holidays, he would be paid time and one-half pro rata rate. However, if a holiday fell on his work week and he did not work, he was just out that day's pay. This rule was amended in 1954 on the theory of a keep-whole-take-home pay basis. It was again amended in 1960 and further amended in December 1964 and February 1965, inclusive.


Based on this fact alone, it is unreasonable to conclude or even expect the public to believe that both parties had the same understanding or application of Rule 4 for a 15 year period. Even if they had, it is irrelevant to this instant claim. The majority has created its own conclusion without supporting facts or substantive evidence to establish or fortify this conclusion.


Further, Article V, of the August 21, 1954 (Grievance Procedure Rule) Agreement, specifically stipulates the time limits for filing grievances on particular episodes or alleged violations, and further states that a continuing violation may be filed at any time. It merely provides the maximum retroactivity allowed.


Keeping these foregoing facts in mind, which we contend are certainly the best evidence before this Division insofar as the amended rules are concerned in the specific dispute and the grievance procedure rules, this Division has certainly gone beyond its authority of attempting to rule on what inuividuale may or may not have thought on the property. Such pure assumptions and interpretations of thought are never considered to be evidence, valid or of substance, under contract law or any place else, other than in an intersanctum or Extra Sensory Perception seances. The Railway Labor Act nor this Agreement does not provide for this type of participation and judgment.


Further, this Division with and without a Referee recognized the facts in Awards No. 5218, 5259 through 5296 and 5326, with quote as follows (only holiday changes in Award findings):




5319 13

This shows that payment for a day worked, holiday pay and birthday pay could be all inclusive in one day's pay, and that each of the payments was made

under a separate rule providing specifically for that pay.

In face of these sound principles, the Referee and Carrier Members" conclusions to these three awards are a complete reversal of our own determinations. It is a discarding of sound, uniform principles, in favor of ambiguity and absurd conclusions, completely lacking in substance, projecting merely obvious, deliberate error.









                      O. L. Wertz


                      D. S. Anderson


Keenan Printing Co., Chicago, Ill. Printed in U.S.A
5319 14