NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
SECOND DIVISION
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee John J. McGovern when award was renderd.
SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 95, RAILWAY EMPLOYES'
DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO
(Electrical Workers)
CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: Electrician Gerald Robertson, hereinafter referred to as the claimant, is employed by the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, hereinafter referred to as the carrier, at carrier's Aurora Shops, Aurora, Illinois.
On May 16, 1967, Aurora Shop Superintendent C. R. Bignell addressed a letter to the claimant informing him that he was being removed from carrier service for insubordination account of alleged failure to sign a form pertaining to employe automobiles that are, or are not, parked on carrier property.
Upon receipt of carrier's letter of May 16, 1967, the claimant on May 18, 1967 directed a letter to Shop Superintendent Bignell wherein he requested an investigation for being dismissed from carrier service in accord with the provisions of Rule 31 (a) of the current agreement.
carrier acknowledged claimant's request for an investigation on May 22, 1967 and proposed the same be held at 10:00 A.M. May 26, 1967. However, due to the short period of time left to make preparations for the case by the claimant's representatives, the local chairman on May 24, 1967 requested that the investigation be held on May 31, 1967. In a letter dated May 25, 1967, the carrier agreed that it would be satisfactory to hold the investigation on May 31, 1967.
Subsequently, the investigation was held in the office of Superintendent of Shops, Aurora, Illinois.
The claimant's negative responses to the investigating officers questions concerning insubordination amount to nothing more than an irrational attempt to absolve himself from any responsibility for his conduct. Again the claimant draws a picture of himself as an individual, who shall decide for himself what company policies he will comply with.
If the claimant had some reason which he felt important enough to warrant not signing the appropriate forms, he should have come forth with it. Perhaps, then, his actions would not dramatize so well his stubborn insubordinate conduct. This board has held in the past that, within reason, employes have an obligation to obey orders and directives from superior officers. Then, if employes feel that these orders and directives were not worthy of compliance, they have the option to file grievances. The business world cannot long exist if employes are permitted to decide what directives they will or will not follow. Referee Dudley E. Whiting stated this principle in Second Division Award 4782:
Of the 243 employes at the Aurora Shops under the Supervision of Supt. Bignell the claimant in this case stood alone in his failure to comply with company parking policy.
FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.
This is a disciplinary case. Claimant, from the evidence of record, refused to sign certain company forms required for parking on company property. Without going into great detail, we are singularly impressed with the apparent stubborn attitude of the claimant in refusing to submit completed forms to management. Eventually, after having been afforded several opportunities to do so, he did sign the required forms, but they were turned in late to the Carrier official. Carrier thereupon charged him with insubordination. An investigation was held, as a result of which Claimant was dismissed from service and later reinstated, losing a total of 18 days work.
Claimant has been an employe of the Carrier for a period of 19 years and during this period of time was never the subject of disciplinary action. His record was unblemished.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the Carrier's decision was too severe in this case. It is our judgment that a loss of one day's pay would be more appropriate. Carrier, therefore, should compensate Claimant for 17 day's pay and it is so ordered.