The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Don J. Harr when award was rendered.
SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 106, RAILWAY EMPLOYES'
DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO (Carmen)
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: J. A. Miller, hereinafter referred to as the claimant is employed as a car repairman with the Washington Terminal Company, hereinafter referred to as the carrier. On April 18, 1969 carrier's master mechanic, Mr. McCabe, served notice to claimant that he was notified to appear at Room 220, Union Station, at 9:00 A. M., Tuesday, April 22, 1969 for a hearing, at which time he would be charged with:
The hearing was held on schedule. On May 15, 1969 carrier's master mechanic notified claimant that he had been found guilty as charged and that he was suspended for a period of ten (10) days commencing Friday, June 6, 1969. Claimant's case was appealed and handled in accordance with the col-
submits, that the appeal challenged both the merits of the case and the severity of the discipline assessed. On this basis, the carrier's decision of June 17, 1969, addressed itself to both matters. The claim as to the merits was denied.
As to the severity of the discipline, the determination of whether excessive or unnecessary discipline was assessed under all the circumstances, including the claimant's record, and whether, if so, some modification of the discipline was warranted, was the proper function of the appeal officer. This function leas historically been recognized as proper on review-regardless of what, exactly, a particular organization representative might or might not argue on an individual's behalf. It is submitted that, under the time limit rule, the reviewing officer's authority is not limited by what the organization's general chairman may, for good or ill, put forward on behalf of the claimant. It's the reviewing officer's responsibility to act in the broader interest of the company, the individual employe, and of all other employes. Mitigation of discipline is a common and necessary function for an appeal officer re-ardless of whether specificallly asked for by an organization.
In First Division Award 17402, T. v. Ga. RR., Referee Wy ck itf, claim denied, it was said ". . . the authority to dismiss by necessary implication carries with it the authority to assess lesser penalties." Certainly, it Cannot be denied that the authority of a subordinate official to assess dismissal or other punishment by necessary implication presupposes authority or, tho par;, of the appeal officer to modify such discipline. The national time limit rules do not divest the carrier appeal officers of that authority.
Finally, to recap and conclude: Assume only for the sake of argument that in the appeal on the property of the present case, the organization general chairman somehow confined the carrier's response only to one of either setting aside the discipline assessed or to confirming the discipline. If this were the case, the carrier's decision in reducing the discipline to a reprimand-regardless of whether considered an effort to "compromise" the claim-can reasonably be considered only as a rejection of the black-or-white appeal-demand, ~vbica the organization relies on here. The organization general chairman did not get what 'fie wanted. If the carrier made by this any kind of a "compromise" off-'2_r to him, he didn't accept it. His rejection killed the offer. In any event, the exact claim the organization put forward was disallowed. The reason for the disallowance was stated. The time limit rule was complied with. If the general chairman did not want to accept the disallowance, he could and should have appealed the case to the Second Division on the merits, on `h-, s?verity of the discipline, or both.
The time-limit-default argument the petitioner has here put forward is a srecious one. It should be rejected. Like in Second Division Aword 33&1, the situation bare did not call for a categorical denial of the organiza-tin's claim because that position was implicit in the carrier's decision.
FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, .rpoli the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning o" the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.
This is an erroneous Award. Certainly the National rule is violated if no reason for declination is given or where no~ decision is rendered, or for failure to meet the time requirements. None of these violations occurred here. Accordingly, the Division erred in its findings that the Carrier violated the Agreement.
The majority states that the facts in this case are similar to those involved in Award No. 5512. A perusal of Award No. 5512 will indicate very clearly that the facts in that case are not analogous to those involved in this case.
It was pointed out that the facts in this case are similar to those involved in Award No. 3$84 and copy was furnished the neutral. The Carrier definitely complied with Article V of the August 21, 1954 Agreement in its reply of June 17, 1969 to the organization, as the reasons were contained therein for the action of the Carrier.
The majority has misinterpreted the meaning of Article V and for that reason we dissent.