Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJLE TMENT BOARD Award No. 7064
SECOND DIVISION Docket No.
6910
2-C&O-CM-'76
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Louis Norris when award was rendered.
( System Federation No. 4, Railway Employes'
( Department, A. F. of L. - C. I. 0.
Parties to Dispute: ( (Carmen)
( Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
1. That Carman, W. 0. Hicks, regularly assigned second shift
transportation yards, work week Saturday through Wednesday, rest
days, Thursday and Friday, was unjustly removed from service on
September
15, 1973
without being afforded a fair hearing as set
forth in Rule
37
of the Shop Crafts Controlling Agreement. Hicks
was removed from service in a very discriminatory manner.
2. Accordingly, Carman W. 0. Hicks is entitled to be restored to
service with seniority rights unimpaired, made whole for all
vacation rights, for all health and welfare and insurance benefits,
for pension benefits including Railroad Retirement and Unemployment
Insurance and paid for all time lost, plus
6%
interest per annum,
commencing September
15, 1973
until such time he is restored to
service.
Findings:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record
and all the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this
dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the
Railway Labor Act as approved June
21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
At the time of the various incidents giving rise to this dispute,
Claimant was regularly assigned as Carman at Carrier's transportation yards,
Columbus, Ohio. His vacation time in
1973
extended from June
2
to June
6.
It appears that while on vacation in Florida, Claimant became ill and was
hospitalized there. June
7
and
8
were Claimant's rest days. On June
9
and 10 Claimant marked off sick. He reported to work on June 11. Carrier
asserts that it did not know at this time the exact nature of Claimant's
illness, and that shortly thereafter it learned ,that Claimant's illness
involved onsets of convulsions and periods of unconsciousness. Carrier
decided, therefore, to have Claimant "medically evaluated".
Form 1 Award No. 7064
Page 2 Docket No.
6910
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76
Accordingly, on July
6, 1973
Carrier notified Claimant by letter to
report on July 11 for physical examination by Dr. Obetz, a neurologist.
Claimant protested in writing "this unexplained attack" and as a result
Dr. Obetz did not examine him.
On July
13, 1973,
Carrier responded to Claimant's "protest" and advised
him that another examination had been arranged for July 17 with its Dr.
Davies. Claimant was also instructed to have his medical records sent to
Carrier's Medical Department and to execute a medical release form. After
this examination Claimant returned to work. However, because of a dispute
as to payment of Claimant's hospital bill in Florida, he failed to give
Carrier the requested medical records. Carrier asserts that in the absence
of these records, it could not complete its medical evaluation of Claimant.
Accordingly, on September
15, 1973
Claimant was verbally notified that
he was medically disqualified from service until he submitted satisfactory
evidence of his complete recovery from illness.
Thereafter, Carrier wrote to Claimant on November
6, 1973
scheduling
a neurological examination on November 14 with Dr. McSweeney in Cincinnati.
It appears that this examination actually took place for Carrier received
that doctor's report "early in December,
1973".
Thereupon, Carrier's
physician evaluated the report and released Claimant for service but
stipulated recheck examination at ninety day intervals.
Prior thereto, on November
8
and
9, 1973,
Claimant requested Carrier's
physician to complete sickness benefit forms for benefits dated from
September
15, 1973.
This request was complied with. Assumedly, he received
such benefits.
Petitioner contends that Carrier violated the controlling Agreement
in that Claimant was unjustly removed from service without being afforded
a fair hearing as provided by Rule
37.
Additionally, it is demanded that
Claimant "be restored to service" with payment for all time loss and
restoration of various benefits set forth in the claim. It appears, however,
that Claimant was in fact restored to service and that he was actually
"held out of service" from September
15, 1973
through December 12,
1973.
This is the period, therefore, applicable to the wage loss claim.
Carrier responds that Rule
37
is inapplicable since it relates primarily
to discipline cases; that Claimant was withheld from service not for
disciplinary reasons but for medical reasons. Consequently, that the "fair
hearing" required under Rule
37
does not come into play for no discipline
was here involved nor was any disciplinary penalty assessed.
Based upon our analysis of the many prior Awards cited as precedent
by Carrier and Organization, we find the following established principles
controlling upon the facts of this dispute. As paraphrased below, these
principles are supported by the weight of authority in this Division.
Form 1 Award No. 7064
Page 3 Docket No. 6910
2-C&O-CM-'76
Firstly, Carrier has the managerial right where evidence of physical
disability is present to require an employe to submit to physical examination
as a condition precedent to return to duty, and Carrier is justified in
requiring that such medical examination be evaluated by its physician.
See Awards 6569 and 6700 (both cited as precedent by Carrier and
Organization) as well as Awards 839, 1703, 2788, 3749, 4158, 4700, 5652,
6207 and 6278.
Secondly, where an adverse medical report is present, Carrier is not
in violation of the Agreement when it exercises its management prerogative
to hold an employe out of service pending proof of improvement of a physical
disability condition justifying restoration to service.
See Awards 839, 2147, 2788, 3108 and 4524, among others.
Thirdly, Carrier's determination of medical disqualification must be
supported by probative evidence and not merely by suspicion or inference.
See Awards 3108, 5943 and 7033 among others.
Fourthly, that the Organization has the burden or proof that Carrier's
action in holding Claimant out of service was arbitrary, capricious or
discriminatory.
"The setting up of standards of physical fitness is a
responsibility of Management, and may not be challenged
. by us in the absence of evidence of bad faith or abuse."
See Awards 3749 (citing 1st Div. Award 17154), and Awards 2147, 3108
and 4158 among others.
Fifthly, where Carrier elects to have such physical examination of an
employe, it must act with reasonable dispatch and an employe cannot be
penalized for Carrier's delay or for factors beyond his control. Moreover,
in the absence of unusual circumstances, a period of five days has been
held "reasonably sufficient time" for scheduling the examination.
See Awards 6569 and 6700, supra, as well as Awards 6206, 6207, 6278
and 7033, among others.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant dispute we reach the
following findings and conclusions:
1. Rule 37, which relates primarily to disciplinary procedures is
not applicable here. Carrier held Claimant out of service solely for medical
reasons; no discipline was here involved nor was any disciplinary penalty
assessed. Additionally, Carrier's managerial decision to so hold Claimant
out of service is clearly supported by the weight of authority cited above.
Form 1 Award No. 7064
Page 4 Docket No. 6910
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Nor do Awards 6738, 17072 (3rd Div.) and 19565 (3rd Div.), cited by Petitioner,
hold to the contrary. Each of these cases relates solely to disciplinary
procedures and penalties and are not germane to this dispute.
2. There is substantial probative evidence in the record warranting
Carrier's medical disqualification of Claimant and justifying its request
for medical examination and prior medical records - before restoring him
to service. Thus, for example, the statement of Dr. Newfield, Claimant's
"attending physician", dated June 14, 1973, indicates a diagnosis of
"convulsions, etiology unknown" and in response to the question whether
"Patient ever had same or similar conditions", the doctor states "approx:
6
years ago". The record further indicates that Claimant has a record
of attacks of unconsciousness and convulsions. In these circumstances,
plus the fact of Claimant's accident and hospitalization while on vacation,
Carrier was warranted in holding Claimant out of service "for medical
reasons" pending medical reevaluation.
3.
We have set forth in detail the various procedures relating to
scheduling of the medical examination to show that initially Carrier acted
with reasonable dispatch in scheduling the various requested physical
examinations within five day periods. However, in scheduling the neurological
examination with Dr. McSweeney on November 14, 1973, Carrier states:
"The neurological specialist needed in this case had a
full schedule, so an examination was not possible
until November 14, 1973." (Emphasis added
Moreover, that "Carrier did not receive Dr. McSweeney's report on
Claimant until early December, 1973."
These two aspects of delay - the two month period in scheduling the
examination and the delay in receiving the report - are not attributable to
any fault on the part of Claimant nor are they due to any factors within
his control. The choice of physicians was Carrier's and the resultant
delay is directly attributable to such choice.
Under the controlling principles and supporting precedent cited above,
therefore, we cannot sustain Carrier's position in charging Claimant with
loss of wages during such extended period of time approximately three months
duration. Based on the established "reasonable time" principle, and bearing
in mind the particular circumstances of this case, we find that a period of
twelve days is the maximum time chargeable to Claimant fox conducting the
examination (five days), receipt of the report (five days) and its evaluation
by Carrier's physician (two days).
We do not intend to establish a twelve day period as precedent for
scheduling medical examinations. We apply it here in view of the potentially .
serious nature of Claimant's physical condition.and the fact that a
neurological examination and medical evaluation were warranted under the
Form 1 Award No. 7064
Page
5
Docket No.
6910
2-C&O-CM-'76
facts detailed above. We limit the twelve day period, therefore, to the
specific facts and circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, on the basis of the entire record and controlling authority,
we will sustain the claim in the following manner:
a) Claimant was actually held out of service from September
15
through December
12, 1973.
He is entitled to be reimbursed for all such
time held out of service, less twelve days.
b) Carrier is entitled to an of'f'set against such amount to the
extent of all sick benefit payments actually received by Claimant during
this period.
c) With respect to the various other demands detailed in the Statement
of Claim including the demand for interest, same are denied. There is no
Rule in the Agreement supporting such claims, nor are they supported by the
overwhelming weight of authority.
See, for example, Awards
2675, 6574, 6758, 6830
and
7046;
Third
Division Awards
13478, 18433, 20014, 20547
and
20919;
First Division Awards
12989
and
13098;
and Fourth Division Award
2368;
among a host of others.
A W A R D
Claim sustained in accordance with above findings.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
' By Order of Second Division
Attest: Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
By
osemarie Brasch - Administrative Assistant
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 4th day of June, 1976.