CARRIER MSS' DISSENT TO AWARD N0.
7926 -
DOCKET PtO. 7$1$ - REFEREE LARNFY
The decision reached by the majority in Award No.
2926
is palpably
erroneous and cannot be accepted as a precedential Award.
Regardless of the fancy rhetorical footwork displayed by the author
of the Award and adopted by the majority of the Division, the fact remains that
there is no wrecking crew - as such - at Washington, Indiana, and there has not
been a wrecking crew at that location since the removal of the wreck derrick and
attendant equipment in
192.
The majority has apparently accepted the fact and premise that:
"(1) A derrick of the 150 ton steam variety is the .
central piece of equipment comprising a 'wreck outfit' arid without a derrick there can be no 'wreck
outfit';. and
"(2) A 'wreck outfit' presupposes a 'wreck crew' and
the two are so inextricably bound together, that where
no wreck outfit exists there can be no wreck crew;"
However., they go on to say:
"nevertheless, there still remains the fact that wreck
crew assignments are bulletined positions and as such
are subject to the abolishment procedures set forth
in Article III, Rule 24(h) of the June
5, 1962
National
Agreement. The Board notes that such wrecking crew positions apparently were never formally abolished at Washington, Indiana in accordance with Article III, Rule 24(h)
either at the time the derrick was reassigned in 1972
nor any time subsequent- to the removal of the derrick,
"The Hoard finds that the mere removal of the derrick
from Washington, Indiana is the instant case, did not
simultaneously automatically cause the elimination of
the wrecking crew positions. Abolition of said assignments could have been accomplished by complying with
Article III., Rule 24(h) of the June
5, 1962
National
Agreement. In so finding, the Board is in agreement
with the Organization's position that a wrecking crew
does exist at Washington, Indiana. * * *o"
-~' !'
-
Yet,
nowhere in the handling of this case on the property is there
any reference to be found relative to either Rule 24 or Article III of the
June 5, 1962
relational Agreement. These two items appeared for the first tire
during the panel discussion of this case when the labor member of the panel
made reference to
them.
The t'usual manner" of handling claims and grievances as mandated by
both Section
3,
First (i) of the
Railway Labor
Act and Circular No. 1 of this
Board requires - no, demands - that the
applicable
Rules of the Agreement which
are
allegedly
violated be clearly and specifically identified during the handling of the claim or grievance on the property. This Board cannot properly
consider any
citation of
Rules which were allegedly violated which citation is
advanced for the first time before the Board.
A few of the plethora of Awards in this regard:
"Second Division Award No.
6303
(Cole):
"Since the Employes are the moving party, they are
charged with citing what rule or rules of the Agreement were violated. See Second Division Awards
185,
X166, 5526
and Third Division Awards
15835, 16663,
1212, 1886+.
'~ * '~ . "
(Underscore ours
Second Division Award No.
6321
(Harr):
"The claim is premised on the assertion that 'the applicable rules of our controlling Agreement have been
violated'. However, during the handling of the case
on the property, the
Employes
did not cite a single
rule the Carrier allegedly violated. In their submission to this Board,
the Employes
for the first
time refer to Rule 90 as being violated. This should
have been raised on the property, not before this
Board.
"This Board has held that the Organization must prove
every element of its claim and failure to identify a
specific rule is fatal to its claim. ~ ~' *."
Second Division Award No.
'T153
(Sickles):
"The notification of intention to file
ex pane sub
mission in this case asserted a violation of Rule
36
and 26. It did not claim a violation of Rule
35,
and
accordingly that assertion is not properly before us."
_ 3 _
Third Division Award No.
21441
(McBreart
"* * * The Employes have the responsibility and bur
den to cite the-rules and agreement language relied
upon during handling on
the property
. This, of course,
is a fundamental
due
process right of the other party,
and where the rules are not
cited;
discussed, _or _in
some way stated _on the property the omitted rules
cannot be supplied for the first time _in _the submission
_of
claim
to this Board. It is the intent of the Rail
way Labor Act that issues in a dispute before this Board,
shall have been framed by the parties in conference on
the property.
"This fundamental principle cannot be evaded by Peti=
tioner using the scatter-dun approach _on the property
'or any other applicable rules _of the October 1, 143
Agreement.' The 'applicable rules' must be clear
identified."
Underscore ours)
Third Division Award No.
21331
(Zumas):
"During the handling on the property the Organization
contended that two specific provisions of the agreement were violated when Carrier failed to call Claimant to perform the work involved.
~r~.
~r ~ ~ ~
"In its submissions before this Board, the Organization
asserted additionally that Article
5,
Rule 6(1) was also
violated. Whether or not Article
5,
Rule 6(1) has merit
cannot be determined by this Board. There are numerous
awards of this Board that have consistently held that
failure to cite specific rules violations during the
handling on the property precludes consideration at the
Hoard level."
Third Division Award No.
20255
(Blackwell):
"The Carrier objects to Board consideration of Rules
34
and
4$
(a) on the ground that they were not raised on
the property. Rule
33,
standing alone, does not support
the claim and Carrier'a.objection to consideration of
Rules
34
and
48
(a) is well taken. The Employes were
expressly challenged on the property to cite any additional rules that would support the claim. The Emroloyes
4
"failed to do so and the infection of additional rules
for the first time before this Board comes too late.
Award
18246.
We shall deny the claim, on the ground
that it is not supported by Rule
33."
Third Division Award No. 20166 (Sickles):
"*
* * On the praperty, Claimant originally asserted a
violation of the Scope Rules and stressed Rule 47. In
one documents Claimant asserted that Carrier's action
violated Rules 1, 2..
39(b), 47
and
4
b . However,
during the handling on the property the Carrier was
not advised on the nature of the alleged Rule 4g(b)
violation.
"In the documents presented to this Boards the Organization relies heavily upon the Scope Rule and
49(b).
While Rule
49(b)
was mentioned during the
handling on the property, the alleged facts of position
abolition and resultant theories of violation were not.
While the Board might, in individual cases, be persuaded
to focus its attention solely upon the alleged violation
of the Scope Rule (which Tmas urged on the property) under
this record we are precluded from doing so. In its Reply
to Carrier's Submission, the Organization states:
f`'Furthermore., the Organization only relied on
the Scope Rule to identify the
positions of
..-Time Desk Clerk as coming under the scope of
the Clerk's Agreement., for the ose of
ap-
plying
the governing R e o ...
Mub' e.C~underscor3.ng supp.tie
(Emphasis supplied in ori
ginal)
Third Division Award No. 20064 (Blackwell):
"The foregoing shows that the rules mentioned on the
property were Rules 12 and 22 (f). However, in the
claim presented to the Board, Rules 12 and 22 (f) are
not mentioned and instead the claim is now predicated
on Carrier's violation of Rules 2(a), (f),
3
(a),
6 (a)
and
57.
On these facts there can be no doubt that the
claim as presented to the Board is not the same claim
that was handled on the property ands consequently
there is no proper claim before the Board for its consideration. The employees have the responsibility and
burden to cite the rules and agreement language relied
upon during handling on the property. This, of course
5
"is a fundamental due process right of the other party,
and where the rules are not cited, discussed, or in some
way stated on the property, the omitted rules cannot be
supplied for the first time in the submission of claim
to this Board. We conclude therefore that the claim as
stated is not properly before
the Board
ands accordingly..
we shall issue a dismissal Award.
~"~ *."
Third
Division
Award No. 20043 (Sickles:
"During the
handling
of the matter on the property, the
employees alleged a violation of `seniority and related
rules.' Although Carrier advised the Organization that
it had not cited any rule or agreement, the Organization
failed to further identify the
`violation.'
"The same basic issue, concerning the same parties was
recently decided by this Referee. A failure
to
assert
a specific
rule violation while the matter is handled
on the property is
fatal
to the employees` case, and
citation of a specific rule in the Submission to this
Hoard does not cure the earlier procecural defect.
Third Division Award No. 19970 (Roadley):
"A thorough review of the record before us shows that,
during the handling of this dipuste on the property,
the Organization
did not
identify which Rules in the
Agreement had allegedly been violated but merely asserted '...a violation of the provisions of the seniority and other related rules.' It is a long established principle of this
Board that
failure to assert the specific Rule, or Rules, allegedly violated
while the matter is being handled on the property is
fatal to the claim when presented to this Hoard. See
Awards 14754, 13282, 137+7., 14118, 14772 and many others.
We will accordingly dismiss the claim on the basis of
the procedural defect."
Third Division Award No. 1969 (Roadley):
r
"In its submission to the Bird Petitioner cited Rules
1, Scope; 2, Seniority; 15 (k), Work on Unassigned Days;
17 (c), Overtime; and 18 (a), Calls; and 26 (a) and (b),
Classification of Work. However, a careful review of the
"record of handling on the property, as shown by
the
correspondence between the parties, indicates that the
only rule violations advanced in behalf of Claimants
were Rules 1, 17, and 26, (per General Chairman's appeal letter of May 22, 1971 and Superintendent's reply
thereto, dated June
18, 1971).
We
Twill
therefore limit
our consideration to the partisan positions as argued
on the property for it is a well established principle
of this Board that the parties are barred from raising
issues for the first time before the Board.
'~ ~ *."
Third Division Award No.
19831
(Roadley):
"The Petitioner, in handling this claim on the property,
cited 'particularly Rule 1 and others' in support of its
position. Rule 1 is the Scope Rule of the Agreement.
y * * * *
"In its submission to this Board, Petitioner relied on
the language of Rule 42(f), re Work on Unassigned Days,
as also supportive of their position. However, a thorough review of the record before use including the exchange of correspondence between the parties prior to
their respective submissions to this Board, shows that
this Rule was not cited by Petitioner during the handling on the property.
11* * * * *
"We * * * find that Petitioner=s introduction of Rule
42(f) in-its submission to this Board was an effort 'to
mend its hold' and is, therefore, not properly before
us.
Third Division Award No. 19773 (Bitter):
"*
* * The awards are abundant to the effect that the
Organization can not prevail before the Board on the
basis of rules that were not cited or discussed during
usual handling on the property. * * *o"
- 7 -
Third Division Award No.
18964
(Dugan):
"This Boards in a long continuous line of Awards has
repeatedly held that it is too late to supply the
specifics for the first time in the submission to this
Board because (1) it in effect raises new-issues not
the subject of conference on the property; and (2) _it
_is the intent _of the Railway Labor Act that issues in
_a dispute before this Board shall have been framed
'off
the parties in conference _on the prapertt~.
Underscflre ours
Third Division Award No. 17328 _(Devine):
"In its
submission
to this Board the Petitioner also
cites and relies upon Rule 30--Absorbing Overtime. Carrier contends that the application of Rule 30 was not
raised during the handling of the dispute on the property.
A review of the correspondence
covering
the handling on
the property bears out the contention of the Carrier in
this respect. It-is well settled that issues and contentions not raised in the handling of disputes on the
property may not be raised for the first time before
the Board."
"Third Division Award No. 15700 (Dorsey):
"The issue is whether Petitioner to perfect its case
had the burden of specifying the rules) allegedly violated. When confronted with the same issues we have held
that Petitioner had the burden. For reasons stated in
Award~Nos. 13741P 1081 and 14T72., we will dismiss the
instant Claim."
"Third Division Award No.
1'~741
(Dorsey):
"We are of the opinion that when, on the property, a claim
is made stating that as agreement has been violated without
specifying the rules) allegedly violated and Carrier responds
that it is not aware of arty rule prohibiting the action complained of the burden shifts to the Organization_ta particularize the rule(s)o
"It is axiomatic theta (1) the parties to an agreement are
conclusively presw-ned to have knowledge of its terms, and
(2) a party claiming a violation has the burden of proof.
- g _
"When a respondent denies a general allegation that
the agreement has been violated for the given reason
that it is not aware of any rule which supports the
alleged violation, the movant, in the perfection of
its case on the property, is put to supplying specifics.
It is too late to supply the specifics, for the first
time, in the Submission to this Board--this because (1)
it in effect raises new issues not the subject of conference on the property; and (2) it is the intent of the
Act that issues in a dispute, before this Board, shall
have been framed by the parties in conference on the
property."
Third Division Award No. 12178 (Stack):
"It is true the Claimant contended Carrier violated 'the
Agreement . . . particularly Rule 3-C-2'. Thus technically
_a violation _of each and ever-f rule _of the Agreement was
claimed. But these sections referred to above were never
specifically identified on the property. On the uraverty
,
the entire discussion related to
-3
C-2 and it was not until
the filing of the Ex Parte Submission that the subject of
these other Rules were raised. We _do not believe that a_
claim can be one thing _on the property and something different before this Board."
Underscore ours
There are many more Awards from other learned Referees which have
made similar rulings. These are sufficient to make thewpoint that the Petitioner must cite the specific rule or rules _on the property which have a1legedly been violated.. That was not done in this case. Only Article VII of
the December
4, 1975
Agreement was cited on the property. Only Article VII
of the December
4, 1975
Agreement was properly before this Board for consideration.
Even if the majority in this Award chose to ignore the case law of
our Board as cited above, they are - at the very least - required to consdier
the correct rule. In this case the labor member of the panel cited
Rule 24(h).
The Referee in his Award makes four
(4)
separate -references to Rule 24(h),
Rule
24(h) of the
applicable Rules Agreement reads as follows:
"(h) When positions are abolished, the employes
affected will have the privilege of exercising
their rights to any job that ray be preferable
to them according to their seniority."
It was paragraph (b) of Rule 24 that was amended by Article III
of the June
5,
1952 National Agreement. That Article III of the National
Agreement merely changed the
'4
working days' notice" which was in Rule
24(b) to "five
(5)
working days" - nothing more. Apparently the majority
in making their deliberations on this case did not read the Rules which
were belatedly mentioned.
While it is true that the wreck assignments at this location prior
to 192 - -when there was a bona fide wreck crew assigned at Washington., Indiana
were bulletined, the "wreck crew assi_Qnment" was secondary or ancillary to the
concurrently bulletined "carmaxt" assignment. The employes so assigned were.
carmen first and on a full time basis. They were members of the wreck crew
only when the wreck force was needed. When there ceased to be a need for a
wreck crew in 192 it would have been totally illogical to "abolish" the assignments because the primary carman portion of the assignments continued to
exist. That is exactly why, as carmen who had been assigned to the wreck crew
att-rited, their "carman" positions were filled by bulletin, but - as Carrier
pointed out in their submission - "The former members have not been replaced
and no wrecking crew positions have been assigned, advertised or awarded."
It is impossible to believe that the organization representatives at this
location would have permitted bona fide unbulletined "vacancies" to exist
without complaint.
When the correct language of Rule 24(h) as quoted above is examined,
the absence of logic in abolishing the ancillary wreck crew assignments becomes
more apparent. That language presupposes that the affected employe will have
a right to exercise his seniority to some other position. If there were only
It
carman" jobs in the first place - some with .added responsibility of being a
wreck crew member - and only the "wreck crew" portion is -removed., that leaves
only the "carman" portion of the,assigumeat. There was no logical reason or
agreement requ3xement to abolish the "carrJan" positions when the wreck train
equipment was removed from Washington, Indiana in 19'2 and only full time car"carman" positions remained.
For all of the above reasons, we disse .
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G. . Yernon
5-12-Z9
Form 1
Parties to Dispute:
Dispute: Claim of
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No. 7819
SECOND DIVISION
( Wayne McKinney, et al., Petitioners
(
( Southern Railway Company
Docket No. 7771-T
2-SOU-T-
t
79
Whether ox not Respondent breached their agreement with the
Petitioners regarding employment and advancement.
Statement:
The above question eras submitted to the Second Division of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board by the above ,referred to organization in ex
paxte foam, hearing thereon was waived and the Division is now in receipt
of a request from the employes that the case be withdrawn.
A W A R D
Claim dismissed.
Attest: Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTME17T BOARD
By Order of Second Division
BY .~'`
os marie Bxasch - Administrative Assistant
Dated a Chicago Illinois, this 24th day of January., 1g7g.