Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No. 8224
 SECOND DIVISION Docket No. 8042
 2-N&W-CM-'80



Parties to Dispute: ( (Carmen)

Dispute: Claim of Employes:




Findings:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and al.i the evidence, finds that:

 The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor _<',ct as approved June 21, 1934.

 This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

Claimant, William R. Cramer, a Car Inspector at the Carrier's Bellevue, Ohio facility was denied time off with pay and reimbursement for transportation costs incurred when, on August 2, 3.977, in his capacity as Local Chairman for the Organization, he represented another Carman before an investigatory hearing at Carrier's facil a.ty located at Muncie, Indiana.

 On August 1, 1977, Claimant requested of his General Foreman that Carrier make arrangements to furnish him free transportation from Bellevue, Ohio to i-.'funcie, Indiana rand return on August 2, 1977 for the purpose of attending the formal investigation. The Organization contends the General Foreman apprised Claimant Carrier would not furnish h1r, free trc:ncportation but that, as in past it tarces of similar nature, he would be paid for the ti-a spent at the investigation scheduled to take place coincidentally with Claimant's regularly assi=gned hours. On August 2, 197`11 , Clai-:-ant drove his nrivatel~,T rroorned autozrbbile to i.nd from the investigation travelling a total of four-hundred twelve (4,.2) highway miles. Carrier neither reimbursed Claimant for travel a penses on a per mile basis nor for the time spent representing a constituent at the formal investigation.
 Form 1 Award No. 8224
 Page 2 Docket No. 8042
 - 2-N&w-CM- t 8o

 The Organization alleges that in not reirbursing Claimant for time spent at the investigation and for travel costs incurred, Carrier is in violation of ides 32 and 34. respectively of the Controlling Agreement effective October 1, 1952. These Rules are cited in full as follows:

        Rule 32 - GRIEVANCES. "Should any employe subject to this agreement believe he has been unjustly dealt with or any of the provisions of this agreement have been violated, he shall have the right to take the matter up with his foreman in person or through the duly authorized local committee within ten days. If unable to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the foreman, the case may be taken to the highest local officials in the regular order, preferably in writing. If stenographic report of investigation is taken, the ccanmittee shall be furnished a copy. If the result still be unsatisfactory, the employe or the duly authorized general committee shall have the right of appeal, preferably in writing, 'Trrith the higher officials designated to handle such matters, in their respective order, and conference will be granted within ten days of application.


        Should the highest designated railroad official, or his duly authorized representative, and the duly authorized representative of the employes fail to agree, the case may then be handled in accordance with the Railway Labor Act.


        All conferences between the local officials and local committees to be held during regular working hours without loss of time to committeemen. Prior to assertion of grievances as herein provided and while questions are pending, there will neither be a shutdown by the employer nor a suspension of work by the employe."


        Rule 34. "The company will not discriminate against any committeemen who, from time to tire, represent other employes, and will grant them leave of absence and free transportation when delegated to represent other employes."


    Two key issues present themselves before this Board in the instant case:


        1(a) Is there a distinction to be made with regard to definition between the term "conference" as it is used in R-ale 32 and other forums in which committeemen represent other employees as referred to in Rule 342


        1(b) If such a distinction exists, what effect, if any, does this have on compensation for conBnitteemen attending investigatory hearings?


        2 What is the meaning and intent of the term "free transportation" as it is used in Rule 34?


The positions of the parties on both these issues are diametrically opposed. With regard to issue number 1(a) and 1(b), the Organization contends the definition of "conference" is of such an all inclusive nature that it encompasses such other forums of representation as investigatory hearings - that forum which is under
 Form 1 Award No. 8224
 page 3 Docket No. 8042

                                            2-N&w-cm-t8o


consideration in the instant case. That being so, the Organization asserts that Rule 32 is clear and unambiguous with respect to compensation of committeemen for time spent in conferences; Rule 32 in relevant part reads:

        "A11 conferences between the local officials and local committees to be held during regular working hours without loss of time to committeemen."


The Organization argues that since investigatory hearings are in reality ;just another type of conference, the Claimant is therefore, under the pertinent language of Rule 32 cited above, entitled to receive payment for the tune he spent at the investigation held in Muncie, Indiana on August 2, 1977. The Organization supports their position based on the following evidence of record:

        (a) That in many instances over many past years the Carrier has compensated the Claimant when he had to forego his regularly assigned position to represent an employ ee in a formal investigation Zch:d,11Zd by the Carrier.


        (b) Affidavits, totalling twenty (20) in number, solicited from former and present local committeemen throughout the Carrier's system, and covering a time period beginning with calendar year 1946 and extending through 1978, all attest to the practice of Carrier's compensating them for time spent at investigations held at a time coincidental with their regular working hours.


        (c) Previous cases cited by the Organization, specifically Second Division Awards 3845, 4615 and 5044 in which the Board has sustained claim oz employees in past cases involving the same situation and application of the same x^ales.


The Carrier on the other hand, takes the position that a "conference" and an "investigation" are not, as the organization contends, one and the same. In delineating the two forums, the Carrier asserts that "conference" as used in Rule 32 refers to an informal :meeting of all interested parties to discuss a pending grievance; while an "investigation" refers to a fozs-ral proceeding conducted to ascertain the facts relating to a specific charge, wherein witnesses for the Carrier and for the charged employee testify and are cross-examined, and wherein objections and rulings are made. Rule 32, the Carrier notes, is conspicuously rry devoid of any reference, either express or implied, re-arding payment for atte;-?i investigations for either charged. employees ox their authorized representatives. The Carrier cites Second Division Awards 3260, 4363, 53+2, 5371 , 6151, and 671`3, 'in support of its position, wherein the thrust of these cases distinguish the difference between conferences and investigations, and in each, the Board found the Carrier ~-ras not contractually obligated to compensate coitteemen or local chairmen fox time spent attending investigations. In addition, Carrier asserts that according to Section 2 Fourth of the Railm-.y Labor Act, it is unlawful for a carrier to reLaLurse a "union representative" for attending an invealtik-;atoZ7 hearing. This Section of the Act reads in relevant part as follows:

        "-it shall be unlawful for any carrier XXx to use the funds of the carrier '.*,n maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining ."

Form 1 Award No. X224
 Page $ Docket No. 8042
 2-N&W-CM-'80

 Carrier denies the allegation by the Organization that Carrier has allowed a past practice of many years in the making to develop with regard to compensating representatives when attending investigatory hearings. However, even if such a, past practice was reality, the Carrier argues it is not bound by it based on the following two contentions:

        (a) If any such payments were ever made by local officials, it was through error, contrary to the provisions of the current agreement, and withcrat the knowledge or sanction of the Carrier's officer authorized to interpret the agreement. Thus, such payments are erroneous and therefore not binding.


        (b) Since Rules 32 and 34 are clear, precise and unambiguous, no amount of misapplied past practice can mend the explicit and precise language of these provisions.


    With regard to issue number 2, the Parties invoke all the foregoing argments

a'Licable to the first issue. In addition, however, the Carrier takes the o ition
 pp. p s
 that the term "free transportation" has a historical meaning and intent. Carrier
 notes that the term "free transportation" also appears in Section 2 Fourth of the
 Railway Labor Act and argues that these words were written at a time in history
 when rail passenger service was at its peak. In relevant part, Section 2 Fourth
 of the Act reads as follows:

        "That nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit a carrier

        from furnishing free transportation to its employees while

        engaged in the business of a labor organization."


The Carrier believes the authors of the Act did not have in mind any mode of travel other than rail and certainly did not anticipate a carrier reimIursi---g a labor representative for money spent for gas and related expenses incurred by reason

                                    4

of using his automobile for labor organization busness. Carrier therefore asserts, that "free transportation" as used in Rule 34 means on transportation under the control of the Carrier. The Carrier argues that in the instant case, it had no such transportation under its control to provide the Claimant. According to t1:e Carrier, the only time an employee is allowed re`mbursable expenses for auto=or)ile mileage is during performance of Company business and only when authorized by a proper officer of the Carrier.

 In answer to issue rnunber 1(a) and 1(b) posed above, although Rules 32 and. 34 are both a -oart of the Grievance -Procedure under the Controlling Agreement, effective October 1, 1952 as subsequently amended, ire nevertheless find a difference in definition as well as in concept between a "conference" and an "investigatory hearing". And it is clear to this Board that there is a corresponding diffe_ence in the language between "without loss of time to conzaitteemen" appearing in Rule 32 with reference to attending conferences, and "will grant them leave of absence" appearing in Rule 34 with reference to committeemen attending investigations. As the language of both Rules is clear and =a~mbiguous, we rnzst turn to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in our determination of the issue before us. C1 eaxl~yr, the phrase, `vrithout loss of time to cormilittee-n=en" in Rule 32 means, that co=~Ltteemen will. be compensated for th°_ir time spent in "conferences" attempting to resolve grievances. On the other hand, the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase, "will grant them a leave of absence" as used in Rule 34 normally denotes that time
 Form 1 Page 5

Award No. 8'24

Docket No. 8042

2-NaW-Cry- · 8o


spent on such a leave will not b e compensated unless otherwise specified to the contrary. However, even though the framers of the Controlling Agreement may have intended a clear distinction between activities of a committeeman which were and were not to be compensable, the Parties, through their consistent and long-standing aprlication of 'b,;=th :;:°,..`ie~: have obliterated these distinctions between the compensable and non-compens able activities of cc~.L.itteemen and in so doing have amended the clear and unambiguous language of their collective bargaining agreement. The Parties' application of Rules 32 and 34 go well beyond the concept of mere past practice and therefore this Board cannot., in a17. good conscience, invoke the general principle developed by us in other cases that no amount of misapplied past practice can amiend the explicit and precise language of contract provisions. The evidence before us is overorhelming, shoring that the practice of pairing coitteemen for attending investigations is system-wide on this Carrier's railroad and we cannot, in the face of the evidence, abide by Carrier's assertion that these payments made at the various local properties were, have been, and still are, unlmown to the appropriate Carrier officials. We reach this conclusion based on the record, which reflects that subsequent to the filing of this instant claim, Claimant attended another irnrestigation in his capacity of committeeman and was paid for his time spent at the hearing. The Carrier cannot sustain a basis of serious contention. on this issue nor should it press for an alternate interpretation of Rules 32 and 3LL before this Board when, by its ongoing and continuous practice, it has changed in part, the apparent original meaning of both these Rules.

 With regard to issue number 2 above, the Board recognizes and lends credence to the historical interpretation of the term "free transportation'", noting that there obviously is a difference between "free trans portati on" and "paid transportation". As there was nothing in the record of a substantial nature to indicate Carrier has paid for travel expenses within the sane context as they have compensated committeemen for time spent at investigatory hearings, we mast conclude that such expenses are non-reimbursable.

 A W A R D

 Claim sustained in part: Claimant is to be compensated for time spent at the investigatory hearing held on August 2, 1977 in the same manner as has become the custom. Claim denied in part: Claimant shall not be reimbursed for his travel expenses incurred as a result of his attending the investigation.

NATIOPRL RA=ROAD ADJUST= DO,ARD

By Order of Second Division


Attest: Executive Secretary
 National Railroad Ad~ustment Board

 By / -O-L-e-

---''G~ ._


o emarie Brasch - Administrative Assistant

 Dated' at Chicago, Illinois, this 16th day of January 1980.
        CAF== ..~'.S' DISSMIT TO :WARD N0. 3224 - DOC= NO. 80#2

        (REF= uRNEY) _


The aajerity in this Award bifurcated the Statement of Claim as presented to the Hoard thusly:

            "Two key issues present themselves before this Hoard in the instant case:


                "1(a) Is there a distinction to be made with regard to definition between the term 'conference' as it is used in Rule 32 and other forums in which committeemen represent other employes as referred to in Rule 347


                "1(b) If such a distinction exists, what effect, if any, does this have on compensation for committeemen attending investigatory hearings'


            "2. What is the meaning and intent of the term 'free

                transportation' as it is used in Rule 347"


Their conclusion relative to issue numbered 2 was correctly and properly reached and no ex cention is ken terewith.

 However, the conclusion expressed and the decision reached concerning issues numbered 1(a) and 1(b) are palpably erroneous 3.n _at least three (3) major areas and it is toward these mistaken conclusions that this Dissent is directed.

        Award No. 8224 correctlyconcluded that:


            " * we nevertheless find a difference in definition as well as in concept between a 'conference' and an 'investigatory hearing'. * * *'."


The majority also correctly concluded that:

            "* * * the language of both Rules is clear and unambiguous, * * *."


and went on to detail the ordinary meaning of the language in those clear and unambiguous Rules as it .correctly applies to the separate circum-stauces; i.e.
 Rule 32 means: s "
          · * '1' * that cor..nitteemen gill be COT?penac°..t8d lOr -.heir time


spent in 'conferences' aLtemp-tsng to resolve grievances. * * *" mad that 'I" * * the phrase, ';mill grant them a leave of absence' as used in Rule 34 normally denotes that time szent on such a leave will tot be cc-ipensatpd unless other wise Specified _to i:he contrary.' '~ '`~ ('Underocore ours) 'these =-,er conclusions, derived -om the record before the Rc.rd and from the 1.n.uage of tile properly negotiated.-Rules,, should 'nave resulted in a total denial oz issues 1(a) and 1(b).
              - 3 -


_any instru~-^ent by a tribunal such as ours v Ill only
 lead to confusion and -mcertainty nr:d ultimately to
 injustice and hardship to both e:r3lo,re and carrier.
 Far better for all concerned is a course or procedure
 which adheres to the elemental rule, leaving it uv to
 the parties by negotiation or other Droner procedure
 to matte certain that which has been uncert-ain.'T
 Underscore ours

 Second Division Award No. 1164 (Thaxter) (1946)_:

 "The rules in this instance speak for themselves. They are perfectly clear. District maintainers have no regularly assigned hours and are paid~on a monthly basis for all services rendered regardless of the number of hours worked or the time of day when the work is done. This is the agreement the parties made.

 "It may be true that the monthly rate-of pay was fixed in the belief that over a month or a year the average work day would not exceed eight hours. But the employes subject to the provisions of Rule 8 took their chances on that. The ag=ent which they have made before this Division is a veer rsrsuasive one for a _canq:e in tre rule. But we cannot change rules. Vur Jurisdiction is only to interpret them." (Underscore ours)

 Second Division A~rarri No. 5686 (Johnson)
"The trouble is that this Board has no mower to add a
 word to the agreement a:. set down by the parties and thus
 materially change its meaning; that it has not the power
 of a coin-°t of equity to reform an a --reeaent so a:, to ' l make
 it stas~e vnat either party contends vas actual ,
                                          -

d but not stated; that the contention vas denied and was not proven by evidence; and that practice cannot be used to interpret an uaambiguous provision as meaning something else." (Underscore ours) Second Division. Award No. 3807 (Johnson):

 in the absence of errors or omissions a written contract is conclusively presumed to constitute the entire agreement, and therefore leaves no room for ir:nlied.undsrstandin s. * * *. Underscore ours)
 Second Division A-ward No.
      the Board is this case is not free to apply the

rationale expressed in Second Division A-.card No. 4361.
 That award is based on the reasoning that as as instru
 ment of industrial and social peace a labor agreement is
 flexible. It say be applied broadly and liberally to ac
 complish its evident aim and purpose. Rather than to
 limit litigation and to promote industrial h2xr:oz~y, flexi
 bility resulting is different applications of the same
 Rules and provisions of a labor agreement may create aon
 Pusioa and uncertainty leading to chaos which would negate
 the result of conditions earned °y both sides through
 negotiations. The dissenting opinion of the Labor Members
 expresses a more exacting but sounder approach, to wit:
 'The relations are to be governed not by the arbitrary
 will or whim of the management or the men, but by written
 rules and re~.zla.tic:2s Muti:ally agreed upon and equally
 binding on both.'

 "Unfortunately for the claimant, this fundamental aTmroach to the problem does not provide the equitable relief which he might other~zise obtain. Underscore ours)

 Second Division Awerd :30. 698 (Lieberman):

 "* * * He desires the Board in its Award to correct this inequity. Unfortunately, much as Claimant's meal may have the clerk of righting injustice, this Board cannot deal in await-_ `one validity of Agreements cannot be challenged is this forum. Our function is to crake sure that the Agreements are ap-c?led 2s vritten and in this instance it appears that zhe Agreements were meticulously adhered to by Carrier. There is no contract violation established by Petitioner. As Carrier points out, this Board's function is li.::4ted, under the Railway Labor Act, to adjudicating dismu±es Pra-.ring out of the interpretation or a ~-olica.t=o^ of azr2ements, we cannot change or amend agreements, which is the thrust of the remedy sought is this dispute." (Underscore ours)

 Second Division Award No. 7032 (` nromey):

      It is not with;n our authority to allocate work

based on our own sense e-f consistency or equity. 'We are
 empowered only to interpret the Agreement of the parties. We have no authority to add to or alter the Agreement is any 57ay. * *
          ~E yr


(Underscore ours)
            "It is hornbook that this Board may not enlarge upon or diminish the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. If either party finds the terms of such an agreement not to its liking it must seek a remedy through collective bargaining. MAY Section 5."


            Third Division Award No. 23.703 (yischen)


            "From the foregoing it is apparent that the parties argued over the meaning of a Rule which has not been in effect for some twenty-five (25) years. ~' * * Are we to be bound

- by the mistakes of parties and interpret a non-existent
            Rule while ignoring the clear language of the existing

            contract? We thin:: not. We deem it self-evident that we

            must refuse to perpetuate this comedy of errors. The Agree

            ment we interflret and abply must be the existing Agreement

            including the amendment of Rule 4-E-2. '~

            (Underscore ours)


            Third Division Award No. 21966 (Sickles):


            "This Beard may not attempt to adjudicate disputes on some basis of 'ecuity, °aia-^ess or hardship.' Rather, it is clear that we are restricted and confined to the int°rpretation and application of collectively bargained agreements. * * *." (Underscore ours)


            -Third Division Award No. 2?_3? 0 (Lieber-an):


                                      .w "While the Board recognizes the equitable request irnlicit

            in this Claim, .°Ou? ty r1.3 not within our pl_u-rieTw in dealing

            with : ales disputes such as ':his; we spy only interpret the


            agreement of the pasties as literally as possible. * + Since the Board has no authority to remake agreements when

            conditions have changed, or otherwise, the Claim has no

            basis in the rules and must be denied."

            (Underscore ours)


This litany could go on and on, but these should suffice to show that the majority in this case has seriously erred. They si=ly do not _nossess tree authority or the right to attempt to re-write clear and unambiguous negotiated rules under the guise of "good conscience".
 Second Division Award No. 6581 (Lieberman):

 "When the terms of an Agreement are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look beyond it.

 Second Division Award No.

 Twome

 "* * * Awards of this division have repeatedly held that a practice cannot overcome the definite and unambiguous provisions of a rule. We concur in this lire of Awards, and conclude that the Carrier's contentions about a contrary practice cannot be controlling in this case in view of the clear and unambiguous language of the rule that existed prior to merger and indeed the rule that exists after the merger."

 Second Division Award No. 718? (1·larx):

 "Past practice, however ingrained and tolerated bZ. the parties, cannot be used as a defense to defeat clear and precise language of a collective bargaining agreement.

 (Underscore ours)

 Second Ditrisi on Award 710- 7498 ( r'aL3.ace )
"It follows that past practice cannot be invaked to modify or amend what is seemingly unambiguous. See Award 1898 (Stone).

 Second Division Award No. 7610 (Lieberman):
"It has long been held in this industry that no hiatus or past practice can bar the enforcement of clear and unambiguous rights under an agreement. In Award 6025, this Board said:

    " ....It should be named that a conflicting past practice, no matter how fang endured, does not serve to alter o: sulliTf clew and unambiguous contract language."' (Underscore ours)


Third Division Award No. 18fl64 (Quinn):
"As to the past practice arguments, the Board has consistently held that where provisions of an Agreement are

 clearly unambiguous, they shall prevail over conflicting
 practices, and either rartY to the Ac',reement may insist
 U 'Don its ri::nts thereu.:%°r am any tiM-e.
 (Underscore ours
                        - 11 _


            ~~the enforcement of that right or result in its loss. Arbitrators may consider laches when searching for a remedy or determining a dispute. An Arbitrator might rule that if a party has 'slept or. its claizaeed rights' for too long a time, it might therefore have lost all its claims to those rights.


            "However, ·ahile recognizing the legitimacy of the above doctrine in the arbitral forum, this Board is also conscious of numerous prior awards to the effect that either party to a valid contract may insist upon its rights th ereunder at anytime, no-,;,withstanding a uractice or custom of long duration See Second Division Award 273; Fourth Divi sion 2985, 2952, and 1224; Third Division Awards 20899, 20711, 19552, --8064 and 14599). We so hold here, recog nizing that all the parties :!eve scrething to gain -from continuity in the Board's decisions . ' Underscore ours)


            Airard No. 5 - Public Law Board No. 131 (Daugherty)


            "As to (2) above, it is clear that the practice had been abrogated before claim dates. t·~,-re important, however, such practice., even if not abrogated, could not have taken precedence over the clear Rules. In the absence of written agreement to the contrary approved at properly high levels, the written aqreem ant must always rrevail in such situations. This is a set-tied rule o?' contract constructio:a. " Underscore ours)


            Award No. 9 - Public Law Board No. 1790 (Dolnick):


            "*' * * Whatever may have been the practice for 12 years, if any did exist, it may not supersede and vitiate the clear and express language of Rule 20(a).


This is but a sampling of the plethora of case law on this vital point. The great multitude of clearly reasoned Awards on this issue which, incidentally, have ruled against the Carrier as well as for the Carrier, cannot be overcome by this one lonely mistaken conclusion. The sound logic as expressed in Fourth Division Award 'No. 3478, ·.;hick said

            "* * * all the oarties have something to gain from continuity in the Board's decisions."


applies here and effectively renders these errcneous conclusions a nullity.
Ii these two areas of gross error were not enough to render Award :To. 8224 null and void, then the third error - standing alone - would surely accomplish that end.
 See also:

            First Division Award No. 18372 (Sembower):


' "The Division often has stated that to ask for a rule
            change is one of the best ways to indicate in the party's

            own estimation that it is needed to supply the authority

            to do what the proposed language covers. See Awards 128};8

            13528, 15536, 1568+, 16302. * * *."


            Second Division Award No. 3638 (Watrous):


            "Claimants Schae~er and Fugue argue that they are due compensation for 42 hours according to agreement rule 4(d) cvnseauent to their service as carrier ·aitnesses on off-duty hours attending an investigation in which they had no personal interest.


            n* * 1E 9E


            "The carrier extends protection against loss in regular

            compensation to the employes in the instance of attending

            investigations. It is therefore persuasive, ccunled with

            evidence that the or^anization has atte::rotad tv n;rtotiate

            a sbecific rule cvveri.n.-, CcT.mens2 ticn for at tendir? in

            vestigations , th _,_t ;,he A.-_ eenent dce.s not renuire tne

            payment of cvmm_ ensativn in the circu::a Lances of this dis

            pute."

            n erscore ours)


            Second Division A-.card No. 632+ (F.arr )


            "The Carrier points out, in its Submission to the Board., that on September 1, 1970, the Organization served a Sec tion 6 Notice upon the Carrier requesting `hat the Carmen's Classification of Work Rule be amended to opecifically provide that Wrecking service was reserved exclusively to Carmen. They also asked to amend Rule 128 to provide for a penalty payment when other trap members of wrecking crews performed wrecking service.


            "We believe that the serving of the Section 6 Notice was recognition by the Organization-that-the existing rules did not give Careen the exclusive right to wrecking service.

              - 15 -


Third Division Award No. 17985 (Devine):
"* * * We also cannot ignore the attempt of the Organization to obtain a revision of the rule which would have granted the handling of train lineups and other cunication work to eirployes covered by the Agreement. The Board has previously held that to ask for a chance in the rule indicates that it does not corer that Tqhich it seeks to secure b the change. Awards 1 59 (Dorsey), 1539 Ti£amilton and 15466 (Zumas) . " (Underscore ours)

 Fourth Division Award No. 1114 (Johnson):

 'The Organization seems to have recognized that there was no provision under the contract of August 21, 1954, for the type of compensation requested herein, by its action on November 12, 195'+, where notice was served upon the Carrier for changes in wages and conditions in six particulars, including 'one extra day's pay ii' a holiday falls during a Vacation Period.' As a result of negotiations the arties hereto entered into an A:zreement dated March 26, 19~hich included a provision of pay for holidays occurring on rest days during the vacation period." (Underscore ours)

 Fourth Division Award No. 1225 (Coburn):

 "* * # It is noteworthy that the Notice of Intent to sub mit this claim to the Eoard is dated June 22, 1957, because at that time if the Union believed, as it now contends, that the failure to recall claimant was a violation of the seniority provisions of the agreement, then why did it find it nececsaxR~ on Julv 7, 195,7, to negotiate a new rule covcrin? those, erm'loves who had been recalled bat whose seniority ~iEnis T.rere not recognized a-t~ the tilde of recall.

 .,* * * * *

 "It is well established that the Board is limited to an interpretation of the terms and conditions ox' the applicable agreement and that so long as its provisions are clear end exoli ci t we may not ycr`/ or modify them by imnlication. It is also well established that to they extent the contract does not expressly limit or rest:ict management's rights and prerogatives, it is free to exercise fully the usual and customary managerial f uactions. " (Underscore ours)
    IMason


0 -4 GOt1m8' '.~Ll

 P. E. Lavosse

 Be Ke Tuciier

 P e V e Va._rga