Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No.
8725
SECOND DIVISION Docket No.
8575
2-B&O-CM-'
81
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee David P. Twomey when award was rendered.
( Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States
Parties to Dispute: ( and Canada
~ Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
No. 1. That carrier violated the terms of the controlling agreement when
Manager of Labor Relations, Mr. Swann, did not make reply to the
Organization's appeal dated October 10,
1978,
until December
15, 1978,
which is (61) days after date said claim was filed.
No. 2. That under the controlling Agreement, the provisions were violated
on the date of June 2,
1978,
when the Carrier utilized the services
of an outside contractor, Donahue Brothers, to perform rerailing and
wrecking work at Boulder, W. Va., thus permitting said contractor to
use it's own ground forces in lieu of utilizing the service of it's
own Cowen "assigned wrecking crew", who were in fact, reasonably
accessible and available.
No.
3.
That accordingly, the Carrier be ordered to compensate the following
Claimants, members of the Cowen, West Virginia, "assigned wrecking
crew", as follows:
Claimant, H. T. Bragg, for twenty-two and one-half hours pay at the
time and one-half rate and eight hours pay at the doub letime
rate; D. Greenleaf, C. L. Bean Jr., and C. H. Groves for
fourteen and one-half hours pay each at the time and one-half rate and eight hours pay each at the doubletime rate;
T. G. Taylor, J. F. Carpenter, J. Lewis, for sixteen hours
pay each at the time and one-half rate and nine hours pay
each at the doubletime rate, account of this violation of
Article VII of the December 4,
1975
Agreement.
Findings:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all
the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute
are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act
as approved June 21,
1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
r' 4
Form 1 Award No.
8725
Page 2 Docket
No.
8575
2-B&O-CM-'81
Part 1 of the Organization's claim states that:
WSW
"1. That carrier violated the terms of the controlling
agreement when Manager of Labor Relations, Mr. Swann,
did not make reply to the Organization's appeal dated
October 10, 1978, until December 15, 1978, which is (61)
days after date said claim was filed."
The Organization filed the instant claim by letter dated July 10, 1978, which
claim the Carrier's Division Manager of the Car Department stated was received on
July 17, 1978. The claim was declined by letter dated September 8, 1978. The
claim was appealed by the Organization by letter dated October 10, 1978, which
letter was date stamped as received by the Carrier's Labor Relations Department,
Baltimore, Maryland on October 16, 1978. The appeal was declined by Carrier's
letter dated December
15,
1978, which was received by the Organization on December
19, 1978. The Organization responded by letter dated December 20, 1978, which
letter was date stamped as received by the Carrier on December 27, 1978.
The Organization contends that the sixty (60) day time limit found in Carrier's
Proposal
No.
7, Article V of the August 21, 1954 Agreement, which became Rule 33
of the Schedule Agreement, was violated when the Organization's letter of October 10,
1978, received by the Carrier on October 16, 1978, was not answered until December
15, 1978, and received by the Organization until December 19, 1978. The Organization
states that beginning with October 16, 1978, through December 15, 1978, is 61 days.
The Organization states that by the Carrier's own admission, it agrees that it
posted its letter on December
15,
1978, which was not received by the Organization V,rr'
until December 19, 1978, some 65 days after receipt by the Carrier of the October
letter. The Organization contends that the Carrier's attempt to exclude counting
the first day is in error, and the Organization asserts that such is not true
anywhere throughout the railroad industry. The Organization states the first day
is always counted.
The Carrier contends that the date of receipt of a claim or appeal by the
Carrier determines the start of the 60-day time limit, which
commences to
run from
that date; and that the Carrier stops the running of the time limit by mailing or
posting within the 60-day period. The Carrier states that the general rule of law
is that the time within Which an act is done is to be computed by excluding the
first day and including the last day. The Carrier contends that the appeal, being
received on October 16, 1978, and excluding that date, the 60th day from receipt
was December
15,
1978, the date on which the Carrier mailed its reply, declining
the appeal. The Carrier states that such denial was within the time limits.
In Third Division Award No. 14695, it was stated:
"The National Disputes
lone :. ,16,
dated
March 17, 1965, incorporated into Award 13780, held that
the claim should be considered 'filed' on the date
received by the Carrier. Consequently, the date of
receipt determines the 60 day time limit which commences to
run from that date. Subsequently, Awards have held that the
Carrier must stop running of the time limit by mialing or
Form 1 Award No.
8725
.Page
3
Docket No.
8575
2-B&o-CM-'81
" ostin the notice required within the 60 days of the date
that the claim was received. Award
11575
and Second Division
3 5.'
Emphasis added
Second Division Award No.
3656
focused on the Carrier's receipt of an appeal
through the mails as the start of the sixty-day time limit. Second Division Award
7626
recognized that a Carrier complies with time limits provisions when it gives
up control of a letter by dispatching it in the U.S. Mails or other method of
communication authorized by the Organization within the time limits.
In Second Division Award
3545
it was stated that:
"The general rule (in law) is that the time within which
an act is to be done is to be computed by excluding the
first day and including the last, that is, the day on
which the act is to be done
" 86
Corpus Juris
Sectamdtmm
13(1).
The words 'from' and 'after' are frequently
employed as adverbs of time, and when used with reference
to time are generally treated as having the same meaning.
Ibid,
13(3).
Thus, if something is to be done 'within'
a specified time 'from' or 'after' a given date or a
certain day, the generally recognized rule is that the
period of time is computed by excluding the given date
or the certain day and including the last day of the
period, and similarly, if something is to be done
'within' a specified time 'from' or 'after' a preceding
event, or the day an act was done, the day of the
preceding event or on which the act was done must be
excluded from the count. Ibid,
13(7)."
We are compelled to find that the Carrier did timely deny the appeal within
the 60-day time limits of Rule
33.
The appeal was received by the Carrier on
October 16,
1978,
and the denial letter was posted in the U.S. Mail on December
15,
1978,
which was the 60th day, and just within the time limits of Rule
33.
We
have followed the general rule set forth in Second Division Award No.
3545
wl:iich
excludes the first day of the period and includes the last day of the period.
In doing so, we, have rejected the Organization's position that the first day is
always counted. No proof is offered by the Organization to support the contention
relative to time limits, and the cited awards before the Board are clearly to the
Contrary. The Organization positions that time limits should run from the date
it mails the appeal and/or in the alternative time limits should rum to the date
the Organization receives the denial letter are contrary to the cited Awards of
this and other Divisions of the Board.
This Board understands the organization's concern that it took six days for
the appeal letter dated October 10,
1978,
to get to the Carrier on October 16,
1978.
The Organization states that perhaps four days would be normal. The record
indicates that the claim filed on July 10,
1978,
was not received by the Carrier's
Division Manager until July
17, 1978;
and the Organisation's letter dated December
20, 1978
was not received by the Carrier until December
27, 1978.
These dates are
not in dispute, but do indicate a possible problem. The Organization may choose
:For
1 Award No. 8725
Page 4 Docket No. 18575
2-B&o-CM- 81
to discuss this apparent problem with the Carrier and the Postal Service. And,
the organization may well choose to send its letters by registered mail return
receipt requested. All parties may choose to keep post-marked envelopes.
Based on the record before this Board, we find that part 1 of the Employees'
Claim must be denied.
On June 2,
1978,
at approximately 12:55 a.m., 30 cars in Train 51 derailed at
Boulder, West Virginia. The Grafton wreck train and czv~.Was called at 1:30 a.m.
to clear the derailment, and an outside contractor, Donahue Brothers Emergency
Service was contacted at 4:05 a.m. The Grafton wreck train arrived at 6:15 a.m.
on June 2,
1978.
Donahue Brothers Co. arrived with their off-track equipment
at between 1:30 and 2:30 P.m. on June 2, 1978. The derailment was cleared as of
3:20 p.m. on June 3, 1978, where Donahue Brothers Co. was released and the Grafton
wreck train an-1 crew departed the scene and was relieved at 11:00 p.m. on that
date. Donahue Brothers utilized their own equipment consisting of three dozers,
one loader and three operators, as well as six of their own groundmen. The
organization's claim is based on the contractor's use of its own ground forces
instead of utilizing the services of the Carrier's own Cowen assigned wrecking
crew. The Organization contends that such violated Article VII of the December
4, 1975 Agreement and Rule 142 of the controlling Agreement.
Rule 142 was not violated since neither the Cowen wreck crew nor outfit was
called. We find that the Carrier was in compliance with Article VII of the
December 4, 1975 Agreement. The Carrier's assigned wrecking crew at Grafton was
called and used to work with the outside forces. There is no requirement in
Article VII as such applies to the facts of this case that more than one Carrier
wrecking crew be called or that the Carrier's forces be actually commingled with
the contractor's forces while working at the derailment site. Please see Second
Division Award No. 8106. We are compelled to deny this claim.
A W A R D
Claim denied.
NATIONAL RAIIROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
Attest: Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
By
emarie Brasch - Administrative Assistant
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 3rd day of June,
1981.