Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No.
8863
SECOND DIVISION Docket No. 8675
2-IHB-MA-182
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Thomas F. Corey when award was rendered.
( International Association of Machinists and
Parties to Dispute: ( Aerospace Workers
( Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company
Dispute: Claim of Employee;
1. The Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company violated Rules 35 and 39 of the
controlling Agreement.
2, That, accordingly, Machinist Daniel E. Spriggs be compensated for July
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26, 1978 at the prevailing machinist
rate of pay.
3. That the five (5) day record suspension be removed from his record.
Findings:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all
the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employs or employee involved in this dispute
are respectively carrier and employs within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act
as approved June 21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
The record indicates that the claimant entered the employment of the Carrier
on June 23, 1976, and on the date involved in this dispute, July 15, 1978, he held
position of temporary Machinist at Gibson Enginehouse, Gibson, Indiana, tour of duty,
3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.
As a result of alleged insubordinate conduct toward Assistant General Foreman
Forrest Blaker during his tour of duty on July 15, 1978, the Claimant was removed
from service by Mr. Blaker.
Following the investigation held on July 19, 1978, the Carrier notified the
Claimant that:
"It is the decision of management that you be assessed with a
ten (10) day actual and a five (5) day record suspension. Your
actual suspension will be served July 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 1978. You may return to work on July 29, 1978."
The Employees charge the Carrier violated Rule 35 of the controlling Agreement
when "they refused the claimant to settle a grievance under this procedure". The
Form 1 Award No.
8863
Page 2 Docket No. 8675
2-IHB-MA-182
Employees contend the machinist that was involved ki the work that was alleged
to be unsafe. did not have to go to the supervisor personally, ere he reported
it
to
his committeeman. The Employees assert the Claimanc was a committeeman acting on
behalf of the Employee involved. The Employees argue Mr. Blaker, Assistant General
Foreman, was aware of the fact that the Claimant was a committeeman.
The Employees also claim the Carrier violated Rule 39 of the controlling
Agreement when Mr, Blaker, Assistant General Foreman took the Claimant out of
servCce while he was notifying his Uwa1 Chairman, of the incident. The rule
reads;
"The Company will not discriminate against any committeeman
who from time to time represents other employees covered
by this agreement."
The Employees report the whole incident transpired in a matter of three or four
minutes, when Mr. Blaker took the claimant's time card out of the rack (or wherever),
and walked up to the Claimant and removed him from service without any reason given.
The Employees maintain that the Claimant did not refuse to return to work or do
his Job. The Employees argue the only thing he did was return to his area and make
a phone call to his local chairman, which was common practice at this point, when a
Committeeman could not resolve a grievance that, in his judgement, was against the
agreement and Company safety rules and Company policy.
Carrier asserts that the transcript of the investigation contains substantial
evCdence which proves Claimant's guilt of the charge an which he was investigated;
that the discipline of a ten day actual suspension and a five day record suspension
assessed against the Claimant was not unreasonable; and that no change in the
Carrier's decision is warranted.
The record of the hearing indicates that Claimant Spriggs, who was a local,
committeeman, after a discussion with fellow employee Mr, Bicanic, common icated, to
the foreman the complaint that it was unsafe for certain men to work "on engine
without pl.P°;Lornis". The Assistant General Foreman in his testimony reported that
the Clad pant charged:
"That I had ordered men to perform an unsafe task. I stated
to Mr. Spriggs that he didn't know what he was talking about
and told Mr. Spriggs to rE.turn to his job. Mr. Spriggs turned
from the office, started in the direction of his assigned work
area and never reached the 71 (8871), but turned and went
immediately to the phone. I waited approximately 3, 4 minutes,
picked up Mr. Spriggs' card, walked to the telephone, and I
instructed Mr. Spriggs that he was out of service for
insubordination and would be notified by Certified Mail. At
no time had Mr. Bicanic had any conversation with me concerning
an unsafe condition."
The Assistant General Foreman by his own admission, acknowledged that he was
aware of the Claimant's position with the Union. Apparently this was not the f=irst
instance in which the two men had discussed conditions in the work areas. The
Claimant was identified by the Union as the "Assistant Local Chairman - 2nd Trick".
Effective July 29, 1978, he was also recognized by the Carrier as the newly ins;tolled
Vice President of the Local.
Form 1 Award No. 886:,
Page .'3 Docket No. 8675
2-IHB-MA-'82
The pivotal question in dispute in the instant case is whether or not the
Claimant's actions constitute insubordination. The record is clear that the
Claimant, in his role as a local Committeeman reported a condition, alleged by t .
Employees to be unsafe, to the foreman who told him "to return to his job". The
Claimant admits he went to the telephone to report the incident to the Union.
Tlt-1
action on his part, of telephoning rather than resuming his work, in the Carrier'w
view constitutes insubordination.
The foreman in his testimony stated:
"Mr. Cook: Did Mr. Spriggs tell you he refused to go back on
his job?
Mr. Blaker: He didn't comply with my instructions.
Mr. Cook: Did he tell you, 'I refuse to go back on my job?'
Mr. Blaker: As I said prior, he didn't tell me anything. He
just didn't return to his job.
Mr. Cook: You seem to have trouble, Mr. Blaker, answering
questions. I asked you, did Mr. Spriggs tell you
verbally, 'I refuse to go back on my job'.
Mr. Blaker: Verbally he did not. He was insubordinate to me.
He failed to comply with my instructions."
It is unrefuted that the Claimant was the local committeeman on the shift. The
Claimant testified under cross examination:
"Mr. Magliah: Did you return to your work area?
nr. Spriggs: Yes sir, I did. I went uo the 8871, back on my job,
then I went and borrowed a dime from an electrician
that was by my job and wont directly to the telephone
and called Mr. Cook."
Mr. Cook was the Local Chairman of Lodge 327. The Carrier acknowledges that
had the Claimant requested permission from his superior to make the phone call in his
role as a Local Committeeman, this could have been granted.
The failure of the Claimant to inform his Foreman that, as the shift committeeman, he was going to pursue the Union's claim of an unsafe condition with the Chairman
of the Local is critical in the instant case. Had he so informed his supervisor of hi. :_
intent, his rights as a Union official operating under the Agreement could have been
protected. Instead he acted on his own, contrary to the instruction that he
"return to work". In so doing, he failed to follow his supervisor's instructions
and subjected himself to a sustainable charge of insubordination albeit on somewhat
technical grounds.
This Board in Second Divit;ion Award 1389 (Referee I?, B. Chappell) found:
Form 1 Award No.
8863
Page 4 Docket No. 8675
2-IHB-MA-182
"The primary question presented for decision is whether or not
such action of the Carrier was arbitrary, unreasonable or
unjust. Being a discipline case, it is elementary that
the Division can not substitute its judgement for that of
the Carrier unless it was so tainted with one or more of
such three elements of injustice."
While the Carrier's charge of insubordination is supported by the record, note
must also be made of Third Division Award 21763 (Referee James Scearce) who observed:
"The Carrier would argue that this is a case primarily of an
employee refusing to follow a direct order from appropriate
management. We find it not that simple. We find that the
claimant was in the process of carrying out her responsibility
as a duly authorized 1W ion representative. It should be
remembered that tlte MussenKer sought her out for his own
reasons and asked her assistance. The carrier suggests no
grievance existed-merely a minor work dispute. That is not
for the Carrier to decide. If an employee feels an action
or impending one effects his wages, hours or working
conditions, he has a right to raise it within the scope of
the collective bargaining agreement. The messenger did
precisely this. At his behest, the Claimant represented his
interest. Her communication was with the proper person-his
immediate supervisor. Whether the issue was resolved or not
would clearly rest with the two individuals who were dealing
with the matter first hand. A relationship in collective
bargaining depends upon the ability of individuals who must
deal with problems having the opportunity to do so. It illservea collective bargaining to put a stop watch on such
activities. The line of demarcation between when an
employee is performing Union business and when not is not so
easily defined. In this case, perhaps another minute or so
would have resolved the matter."
A similar fact pattern exists in the instant case. His role as a Committeeman
does not excuse the Claimant from his responsibility to follow the instructions
of his supervisor. However, while technically guilty of insubordination, after an
investigation found to be proper, there exists the mitigating circumstance that the
Claimant was performing a function he perceived appropriate, and is appropriate to
his role of local committeeman, that is, reporting a claim of an alleged unsafe
working condition to his Union.
Further, there is the acknowledgement of the Carrier's witness that the Claimant
did not actually refuse to go back to work and also that his decision in calling the
Union, could have been permitted, had he made such a request.
Given such mitigating circumstances, and only one unrelated prior offense,
the penalty of ten (10) days actual suspension and a five (5) day record suspension,
for this particular offense, is deemed "unreasonable", and not justified from the
record before us, and thus excessive both in light of the circumstances surrounding
the incident and the nature of the incident itself.
Form 1 Award No.
8863
Page 5 Docket No. 8675
2-IHB-MA-182
Accordingly, the penalty is reduced to the five (5) day record suspension with
the Claimant being reinstated with his seniority rights unimpaired and compen.sa:~ion
for net wage lose, if any, resulting from the ten (10) days suspension being restored.
A W A R D
Claim sustained to the degree and limits specified above.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
Attest: Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
_> !.
B W
y __
,~semarie Brasch - Administrative Assistant
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 13th day of January,
1982,