Form 1 NATIONAL RAIIROAD ADJUSTMENT 130ARD Award No.
89~
SECOND DIVISION Docket No. 88
I~.S
?_-CR-TaW-' i;2
The Second Divis i.on crnlsisrEd of flue regular members and Cn
addition Referee Elliott M. Abramson when award was rendered.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Parties, to Dispute
( Consolidated Rail Corporation
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
1. That the Consolidated Rail Corporation (ConRail) was arbitrary,
capricious and unjust in their action of removing Electrician M. W.
Oswald from service on July
3, 1979
in violation of Rule 6-a-1.
2. That the Consolidated Rail Corporation (ConRail) was arbitrary,
capricious in their subsequent action of dismissal from service of
Electrician M. W. Oswald on July 28,
1979·
3.
That accordingly the Consolidated Rail Corporation (ConRail) be
ordered to restore Electrician M. W. Oswald to service with com
pensation for all wages lost along with seniority rights, insurance,
vacation and all other benefits unimpaired as outlined in the controlling
Agreement.
Findings:
The Second Division of' the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all
the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute
are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act
as approved June 21,
193+.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
Claimant, an electrician, was alleged, by an undercover police officer, to
have been drinking alcoholic beverages while on duty on June 25th and June 26th,
1979,
in violation of Rule 4002 of Maintenance of Equipment Safety Rules. Claimant
was removed from service on July 5,
1979
and dismissed on July 28,
1979
as the
result of an investigative hearing conductsid into the matter on July
19, 1979·
It was alleged by the Organisation that since the incident in question
o6eurred on June 25th, while Claimant was not removed from service until July 5,
1979,
and since Rule 6-A-1-(b) provides: "When a major offense has been committed,
an employee
...
may be held out of service
...
only if their retention in service
could be detrimental...," it was implicitly acknowledged by Carrier that Claimant
had not committed a major offense and was not a detrimental influence in the work
situation.
~,.f-
Form 1 Award No. 8903
Page 2 Docket No. 885+
2-CR-EW-182
However, this rule speaks in permissive rather than mandatory terms. It
says "TM
be held out of service..." rather than "must be held out of service".
Thus an employee might commit a major offense but the Carrier might elect not to
hold the employee out of service. Such election therefore, ought not to be
considered an acknowledgement that the offense is not major or does not indicate
that the employee is a detrimental influence in the work situation. Other
motivations for not immediately removing the employee may be present. That may
well have been the case here as there are indications that because of the
considerable number of employees being disciplined, at the same time that Claimant
was being so disciplined, Carrier, before removing from service such employees,
had to arrange for replacements for them.
In any event there is authority to support the position that Rule 6-A-1-(b)
permits a holding out of service, when major offenses have been committed, rather
than requires it. Award No. 1 of Public Taw Board No.
2613
states:
"Rule 6-A -1-(b) provides that an employee 'may' be held out
of service at the time that the alleged offense is committed;
it does not mandate such immediate action, provided that
inordinate delay does not ensue or there is not clear evidence
of actions by Carrier in the interim which might be interpreted
as a commitment of exculpation."
Carrier alleges that there is direct evidence from the testifying police
officer to the effect that he physically observed Claimant consuming alcoholic
beverages at the times in question and that self-serving denials by Claimant are
not sufficient to impair the credibility of this officer. Carrier contends it
has only to prove its case by substantial evidenee.and the decision of the
carrier officers to credit the testimony of this offer, in preference to such
self-serving denials, is not reviewable by the Board. Tile Carrier points out
that the Board has often held that where there is a conflict in testimony, at
a disciplinary proceeding, the Carrier, as the trier of facts, has the prerogative
of resolving such conflict, and that the Board, in its appellate capacity, may
not disturb such findings as long as they are based on competent and credible
testimony. For example, Award No.
1809,
Second Division, states: "There was
direct conflict in the evidence. The board is in no position to resolve conflicts
in the evidence." Also, Award No.
6372,
Second Division states: "Prior Awards of
this Division have made it clear that it is not the function of this Board to
substitute its judgment where there is conflicting testimony so long as there is
substantial evidence to support the result of the hearing."
However, it seems reasonable to guage the substantiality of the evidence,
asserted as carrying Carrier's burden of proof, in the context of the total
evidence in the record. There is strong evidence in this record which detracts
from a finding of guilt, on the part of this particular Claimant, in this situation.
Much in the record erodes the sense that enough secure evidence has been complied
against this Claimant, to these particular circumm:ance;-z, to confidently warrant
s finding that the charges have been adequately prt-yied.
The undercover officer's observation that the rlaitiiant was imbibing alcoholic
beverages was based, in each instance, (one on June 25tb and two on June 26th) on
Form 1 Award No. 890 ?j
Page 3 rocket No. 885+
2-CR-EW-182
the appearance of the can from which Claimant was drinking. And, in only one of
these instances, (the second one of June 26th)
did the officer see the brand name
of a beer on the can from which Claimant was drinking. The officer never obtained
any of the cans he saw in use nor did he smell or taste the contents of any of
them.
Nevertheless, the fact that the officer, who had experience regarding
alcoholic detection, was able to directly observe the brand name of a beer in
one of these instances might be sufficient to establish
substantial
evidence of
Claimant's guilt absent other problematical factors in his testimony. However,
the evidence does suggest that there is reason to believe that the officer may
have been mistaken in identifying Claimant as the beverage consuming
individual
at the times in question. For example, one of the characteristics the officer
said he remembered about Claimant was that he was wearing a gray hat bearing dark
vertic4 pin stripes. But this is certainly a most common hat amongst railroad
employees. Indeed by the officer's own admission, it is worn by "a lot of
railroaders". Additionally, and perhaps raising even more doubt, that the
hat factor, about the officer's identification of Claimant, the officer testified
that he believed Claimant, at the time of the incidents at issue, to be wearing
coveralls. (But he admitted that he could not remember their color.) Yet
Claimant prqented strong evidence to the effect that he could not have been
wearing coveralls on June 25th and June 26th. He testified that when he was
given the notice to the effect that he was being held out of service his work
clothes were to be found in his locker but that no coveralls were amongst them.
The Claimant denied wearing either &;.'hat or coveralls on June 25th and June 26th
and asserted that he never wore coveralls in June, although he would wear them
in the winter months. Additionally, a co-worker of Claimant stated, at the
investigation, that claimant did not wear coveralls or, June 25th and June 26th and
asserted that this matter involves s case of mistaken identity.
Even putting aside Claimant's self-nerving denials that he did not consume
alcoholic beverages on June 25th or June 26th and that he never saw, an June
26*, the officer who testified that he x.ras facing Claimant, with only a four
feet distance between them, there is con;~iderable evidence which raises the
possibility that the identifying officer may have pointed out the wrong man to
be withheld from service.
In this context, of the conjectural nature of the accuracy of the officer's
identification of Claimant as the offending party, it is not clear that the
charge against Claimant has been made out by substantial evidence. For a similar
view see
Awar&ff0.
1 of Public Law Board No. 2613 respecting the charge that
Claimant, in that case, imbibed alcoholic beverages.
Claim sustained, Claimant to be reinstated to service and compensated for
wages lost since he was held out of service on July
3, 1979,
minus any wages he
has otherwise earned since then and to be made whole regarding all loss of
seniority rights, insurance, vacation and other benefits, since that time.
Form l Award No. 890
Page
4
Docket No. 8851+
2-CR-EW-182
A W A R D
Claim sustained in accordance with the Findings
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
Attest: Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
By
:marie Brasch - Admini trative Assistant
Dated It Chicago, Illinois, this
10th day of February,
1982.