Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No.
8942
SECOND DIVISION Docket No.
8836
2 -EJ&E -CM- 182
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Elliott M. Abramson when award was rendered.
( Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States
Parties to Dispute: ( and Canada
(
( Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
4
1. That the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company unjustlysuspended
Carman Everett Lenoir from service for a sixty (60) day period
commencing September
30, 1979
through November 28,
1979
as a result
of an investigation held on September 20,
1979.
Said suspension is
in violation of Rule 100 of the current Agreement as well as being
arbitrary, capricious, unfair, unreasonable and unjust.
2. That the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company be ordered to
compensate Carman Everett Lenoir for all working days lost during the
suspension period including pay for holidays lost during this
suspension period.
Findings:
The Second
Division
of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all
the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute
are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act
as approved June 21,
1934.
This
Division
of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
This case arose out of the following underlying facts. On August
27, 1979
a Division General Car Foreman had written a letter to Claimant which criticized
Claimant for, on August 22,
1979,
after inspecting cars omitting to report a
certain bad ordered car. (He did report three other bad ordered cars.)
On
September
6, 1979,
at approximately
7:30
A.M., Claimant and an Organization
representative entered the office of the Foreman who had written this letter
seeking to discuss it. In the course of the Foreman's explanations, Claimant
allegedly began interrupting, talking loudly, becoming argumentative and,
finally, allegedly began to pound on the Foreman's desk. The Foreman, then,
allegedly requested Claimant to leave his office, advising the organization
representative to handle any grievances Claimant might have, through normal
appeal channels. Allegedly, Claimant did not honor this request to leave the
Foreman's office or subsequent ones to do so. Only, allegedly, after the
Foreman advised Claimant and the Organization representative that he had
called the railroad police to have them remove Claimant from his office did the
two men ~g*ve.
Form 1 Award No.
8942
Page 2 Docket No.
8836
2-EJ&E -CM-' 82
In a letter dated September 12,
1979
Carrier advised Claimant to report for
an investigation, on September 20,
1979,
for the purpose of developing "all
facts, and to determine your responsibility, if any, in connection with your
allegedly being loud, argumentative, belligerent and threatening in your
behavior ... at approximately
7:30
a.m., September
6, 1979.
You were also
allegedly insubordinate when you failed to leave the office promptly...°'
Pursuant to the results of such investigative hearing Carrier advised Claimant,
in a letter dated September 28,
1979,
that Claimant would be suspended from service
for a sixty day period, September
30, 1979
through November
28, 1979.
The Organization contends that Claimant was suspended in violation of Rule
100 because he did not receive the fair hearing required by that rule and because
he was not "apprised of the precise charge against him" as stipulated in the Rule.
The Organization founds this last assertion on the fact that the letter of
charge accused Claimant of being loud, argumentative, belligerent, threatening
and insubordinate while the letter assessing discipline, pursuant to the findings
of the investigative hearing, mentioned violations of Rules F and 0 of the General
Regulations. The Organization contends that since there is no mention of these
rules in the letter of charge Claimant and his representative could not "properly
defend against these additional hidden tharges. The Claimant was not apprised'oF
the precise charge:" However, Carriers September 28th letter
od
discipline
states: "In ... investigation it was developed that you were responsible as
charged above (allegedly being loud, argumentative, beLligerant and threatening
...) with the one exception, that of threatening ... aid thereby you are in
violation of Rule F and the second paragraph of Rule 0 of the General Regulations
Coverning Maintenance of Equilnment Employees." (Emphasis added) Rule F states,
in part: "Civil, courteous and socially acceptable conduct is required of all
employees in their dealings with each other. Boisterous ... or abusive language
is forbidden .... Employees who are insubordinate ®.. quarrelsome, or otherwise
vicious ... will not be retained in the service." Paragraph 2 of Rule 0 states,
in part: "Employees must ... comply with the instructions issued by the
supervising official on duty." Thus the discipline letter, in effect stated
that Claimant was found to have violated Rules F and 0 because those charges
(excepting one) which had been clearly stated in the letter advising him to report
to the investigation had been substantiated at the investigation. Thus, the references
to Rules F and 0 did not unfairly surprise Claimant as they were simply rules
summing up the nature of those actions in which Claimant had been clearly charged
with improperly participating. In other words, if Claimant had been successful
in defending against the allegations, as to which he was clearly apprised, that
he had been loud, argumentative, etc. he would not have been found in violation
of Rules F and 0 (Note the word "thereby'", as quoted above, in the letter of
discipline.) In connection with this finding that:t.here is no substance in
Organization's contention that Claimant was not precisely apprised of the
charges against him or its assertion that he was sanctioned for an offense as
to which tie was not precisely charged, it is interesting to note that Claimant's
service record indicates that at least on two previous occasions he'd received
discipline (dismissal later reduced to suspension, as well as a suspenoion) involving
infractions of Rule F (The second suspension also mentions Rule 0).
The Organization also contended that the investigative hearing itself was
Form 1 Award No.
8942
Page
3
Docket No.
8836
2-EJ8E-CM-'82
conducted defectively from the perspective of affording Claimant a fair hearing.
The first aspect of the hearing which Organ.zation asserts as unfair
relates to the Hearing Officer allegedly permitting the Interrogating Officer, in
his questions, to stray from the letter of the actual charges and also to lead
witnesses. A review of the record indicates that such straying from the actual
charges even assuming it is acknowledged that any occurred, was extremely minimal
and in no way prejudiced Claimant's and/or his representative's ability to defend
against and refute, the actual charges lodged a:-,ainst him.
A review of the transcript of the investigative hearing can lead to an
interpretation that on infrequent occasion the Interrogating Officer, by the form
of his questions, may have led a witness to give evidence that the Interrogating
Officer pre3upposed. However, given the infrequency with which this seems to have
happened, and the purposes which it achieved, as revealed by a review of the
record, it zannot be said that Claimant's ability to establish a defense to the
offenses with which he was charged was in any significant way, whatsoever,
impaired, as a result of such possible occurrences.
Another point raised by organization, in support of its contentions that
the hearing was unfairly conducted, relates to several of Carrier's witnesses
1,eing permitted to read prepared statements into the record without such statements being made available for inspection to Claimant, and/or his representative
or attached to the transcript of the investigative hearing as exhibits. The
Organization points out that the Hearing Officer, upon being requested to do so
by the Organization representative, had at first agreed to furnish copies of
such statements to Claimant's representative, but had reneged upon objection fran
one of the Foreman, who was a Carri3r witness and who had read from such a
statement. Pages
6
and 7 of the transcript reveal this last description to be
a factually accurate account. Page 22 of the transcript also reveals another
instance where an Organization requast to see a statement being read by a Foreman,
who was a Carrier witness, was refused by the Hearing Officer. However, as
pointed out by the Hearing Officer -:he only evidence which counts against
Claimant is that which becomes part of the record. In this case that would only
be that part of the written statement which the witnesses chose to enunciate -which, of course, would then be heard by Claimant and his representatives.
Similarly, anything on the written statements but not actually audibly articulated
into the record by witnesses in no way counts against Claimant in the sense of
contributing to carrying that burden of proof which Carrier must meet to prove
the charges against Claimant. Thus, while having an opportunity to examine the
written statements might have minimally assisted Claimant and his representatives
in cross-examining Carrier witnesses, perhaps, e.g., regarding attacking their
credibility, failure to have access to the statements does not, seriously
prejudice Claimant from the point of view of, in any way, short circuiting
Carrier's considerable responsibility of carrying the burden of actually proving,
by substantial evidence, Claimant's commission of the offenses charged.
Moving to the substantive question of whether the charges were, indeed,
adequately proved we find the following. While there is conflicting testimony
on several exact facts, such as precise times, places, et. and
while
certain
of the statements of Carrier's witnesses seem to have been somewhat impeached
Form 1 Award No.
8942
Page 4 Docket No.
8836
2--FJ&E-.CM-'8
3
under cross examination, by Claimant and/or his representatives, a basic factual
scenario seems
to
emerge from a consideration of the record as a whole. Claimant
and an Organization representative sought to appeal to Foreman Reed regarding
a letter of reprimand Claimant had received respecting negligence in the exercise
of his duties. Reed tried to explain the basis of the letter
but
Claimant did
not accept his explanation and began asserting the justice of his position
in
a
vigorous and involved manner. (There axe indications that Claimant felt racial
prejudice had played a part in the reprimand.) As things heated up in this way
Reed told Claimant and the organization representative that he did not have time
to further discuss the matter at that time and that they might seek to arrange
for an appointment for a discussion by a formal request through letter or that
they might seek to formally pursue the matter as a grievance. Clain-ant seemed
to take offense that Reed would listen to no more of Claimant's side of the
story, right at that point, and more or less continued asserting the justice of
his objections to the letter of reprimand. Subsequently, at several points,
Reed indicated that he would have nothing further to do with the matter at the
current time and that Claimant should leave the Car Department office. At some
point, by his own admission, as well as that of his representative, Claimant
pounded on a table while arguing his position, and Claimant and his organization
representative did not immediately respond to one or more of Reed's indications
that they should leave his office. Reed advised that if they did not leave he
would call the police and he had to resort to doing so before they in fact left.
From the sum and substance of this account it can be seen that it might well
be fairly thought that Claimant's loudness, argumentativeness, belligerence and
insubordinate response to a foreman's indication that he should leave the latter's
office have been made out by the production of substantial evidence to such
effect. (Carrier's letter of suspension
acknowledged, in effect, that the charge
of "threatening" had not been established by the evidence adduced at the hearing.)
However, it should be recognized, as is intimated by the scenario ,lust referred
to, that claimant and his representative sought to speak to Foreman Reed
respecting a matter about which Claimant was highly indignant.
It can be appreciated how
his sense of righteous indignation would intensify when his desire to fully air
a matter in which he thought he had been dealt with unjustly was one as to which
Foreman Reed could devote no more than a few minutes and one as to which the
latter, at that time, sought to shut off discussion by Claimant. As the Claimant
became more exercised in his emotional involvement in what he regarded as the
justice of his cause, insult was added to injury when the Foreman told Claimant
to leave his office. It can be appreciated how this would only accentuate
Claimant's argumentativeness, induce sharp testiness toward the Foreman anal only
exacerbate any aspects of Claimant's behavior which might, already, be fairly
characterized as belligerent.
Because the uncivil conduct of Claimant rosy
bd,
viewed as mitigated by the
types of factors just mentioned and his deep emotional immersion in the situation,
in general, the question of the appropriateness of the 60 day suspension is
raised.
Carrier, however, contends for the appropriateness of the discipline assessed
by pointing, in particular, to several instances in Claimant's past disciplinary
Form 1 Award No.
8942
Page
5
Docket No.
8837
2-EJ&E-CM-' 82
record. For example, it cites the following: 1) An August
15., 1978
warning
Letter regarding an improper freight car inspection; 2) a September
8, 1978
warning letter respecting Claimant having been observed lying prone on a bench in
the Car Inspector's locker room;
3)
a dismissal from service on October
19, 1978
in connection with a charge of threatening a Foreman; (a November
24, 1978
letter
advised C1aLmant that this dismissal was reduced to a wsspension ending November
26, 1978);
4) a June
4, 1979 15
day suspension in connection with Claimant's
failure to follow instructions issued to him by a Foreman. it is Carrier's
position that in light of this past disciplinary background dismissal would have
been warranted
in
this case bezause of, what Carrier alleges as, the demonstration
of Claimant's abusive and insubordinate attitude. In any event, asserts Carrier,
a sixty day suspension was assessed against Claimant, in the hope that the
imposition of mort: severe disciplinary action than had, in the past, been
exercised a,ainst Claimant would induce, in the latter, an appropriate, on the
job, behavi3ral attitude.
Carriec further asserts that the Board may not substitute its judgment for
that of the Carrier with respect to the discipline imposed unless it can be
demonstrated that such discipline is excessive, arbitrary or represents an abuse
of managerial discretion. In support of this posture Carrier calls attention to
an Award such as No.
1787,
in which a Machinist Helper, with a previously
unblemished ten year work record was suspended for fifty days for failure to
execute a work order issued by
a
Foreman, The Board did not set aside, change
or modify this discipline in any way. (It might be pointed out, however, that the
instant case may be considered distinguishable from the facts in Award No.
1787,
at least to the extent that no order regarding the performance of work was given
here by Foreman Reed, to Claimant. There is also some ambiguity as to how to
exactly characterize (order?, request?, demand?) Reed's indication that Claimant
should leave the Car Department office.)
We are thus left with two competing approaches to an analysis of the
appropriateness of the discipline assessed in this case. Claimant has been
disciplined in the past and has been disciplined, in particular, respecting
charges closely related to the type of offense with which he was here charged.
This suggests the appropriateness of the rather heavy degree of discipline which
Carrier assessed in this instance. On the other hand, Claimant seems to have
sincerely felt that a glaring injusi:ice had been done him, involving, perhaps,
racial. prejudice, had an urgent need to give his side of the story, seems to have:
become greatly agitated when it was indicated that Foreman Reed had no further
time, at the point at which Claimani: sought to make his case, to listen to that
side of the story and, all in all, .seems to have been so emotionally wrought up
in cVnvincingly detailing why he beLieved an injustice had been done him that he
became intensely ,:xercised to the pint of being loud, argumentative and belligerent
in his actions. Phe Board feels that the assessment of a sixty day suspension against
Claimant represents excessive discipline in these premises. Taking into account the
mitigating factors, as detailed, which motivated Claimant's actions the Board finds
that a thirty day suspension would have been adequate discipline to achieve the
objective of deterring such behavioral attitudes on the job, on the part of Claimant
in the future.
AEVm.l Award No. 8942
Page 6 Docket No. 8836
2-EJ&E-CM-'82
AW A R D
Claim sustained to the extent that the sixty daffy suspension assessed is.modified to
a thirty day suspension.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJ JSTMENT BOARD
By Ora'~r of Second Division
Attest: Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
BY ,.-
,,F;i's~arie Branch - Administrative Assistant
Dated a/t Chicago, Illinois, this 3rd day of March, 1982.