Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No. 01017
SECOND DIVISION Docket No.
8;03
2-L&.N-CM- `82
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Gilbert H. Vernon when award was rendered.
( Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States
Parties to Dispute: ( and Canada
( Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
1. That the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, improperly removed
Committeemen R. Wells and J. D. Loftin from Carriers payroll and/or
"docked" them four (4) hours for attending a formal investigation as
Committeemen representatives, while representing a fellow employe
(Carman G. B. Reed) during regular assigned working hours, March 28,
1979.
2.(a) Accordingly, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, should be
ordered to compensate Carmen R. Wells and J. D. Loftin four (4) hours
each at the straight time rate or that which was deducted from their
payroll for attending the investigation held March 28,
1979,
and
(b) That the Carrier should be instructed to return to its former practice
of compensating the on duty Committeemen for attending the investigation
of its employes during on duty hours.
Findings:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all
the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute
are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act
as approved June
21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
This Claim involves the interpretation and application of Rules
32
(b) and
36.
They read as follows:
"Rule
32
(b) All conferences between local officials and
local committees will be held during regular working hours
without loss of time to committeemen or employes represented."
"Rule
36
The Company will not discriminate against any
committeemen who are delegated to represent other
employees and will grant them leave of absence and free
transportation subject to the provisions of Rule
4+."
Form 1 Award No. 9017
Page 2 Docket No.
8963
2-I&N-CM-' 82
On March 28,
1979,
the Railroad Company held an investigation. The employee
under investigation was accompanied by local chairman T. F. Polley and the
Claimants, who are the other members of the local committee. The investigation
was held during the working hours of the Claimants. Subsequent to the hearing,
the Carrier "docked" the pay of the Claimants for the time they spent at the
hearing. It is noteworthy that it is undisputed that the local chairman was paid
for this time the same as if he had worked on his regular job that day. The
claim represents an attempt to recover the wages lost as a result of the reduction
in pay for the Claimants.
The Organization makes a number of arguments in support of their position
that the Claimants are entitled to pay for attending the investigation. First,
they note that Rule
32
and Rule
36
refer to "committeemen". They contend the
term is used in the plural sense, therefore, it is proper that each member of the
local committee of three, which includes the local chairman and the claimants, is
entitled to be paid for attending the investigation. Second, they argued that
there is a long standing practice of paying members of the local committee who
attend investigations during working hours. In this regard they submit eighteen
affidavits from various local union officials and a statement from a former
General Chairman. In addition they direct our attention to a situation which
occurred August
18, 1978,
where the Carrier did pay two members of a local
committee for attending an investigation.
It is the Carrier's position that the payment requested by the Organization
is unwarranted. They contend that the portion of the Agreement at issue must be
read in light of the fact that the entire agreement is between the Carrier and five
different shop craft unions. The Agreement of which Rule
32
and
36
are part of
is signed and applicable to not only the Carmen but to the Electricians, the
Machinists, the Sheet Metal Workers and the Boilermakers Organizations. In this
respect the Carrier says:
"The word 'committee' as mentioned in the above two rules
means a group comprised of a representative from each of
these five crafts and is not to be construed in the manner
advanced by the Carmen in this dispute that it means a
group of elected officers of the Carmen's protective
committee."
In other words, the Carrier suggests the term "committee" or "committeemen"
refers not to a committee of several committeemen of a single organization but
to the committee comprised of one representative from each of the crafts that
negotiated the multi-craft contract. Therefore, as we see it, the Carrier would
have us conclude that the rule doesn't mandate payment to more than one member
of each craft (namely the local chairman) who comprises the multi-craft committee.
The Organization's interpretation, the Carrier suggests, would have them paying
for all persons who may be members of the Carmen's local committee while attending
investigations. This is not supported by the rule, they contend. Moreover, the
Carrier points out that only one other craft signatory to the Agreement has
progressed a similar claim and they failed to progress it beyond the declination
by the Carrier's Director of Labor Relations. They also noted the other crafts
have never progressed such claims. Next, the Carrier argues that the Agreement
Form 1 Award No. 9017
Page
3
Docket No.
8963
2-I&N-CM-'82
is unambiguous and that no amount of past practice can be thought to prevail as
a result. They cite us to a number of awards which hold that past practice
cannot nullify clear and unambiguous provisions of a contract. In respect to
the letter of the former General Chairman, they produce a letter from a former
Labor Relations official who contends the Carrier is not obligated to make the
payments demanded by the organization.
The Carrier also argues that the best evidence that the Rules do not support
their contention is that on September
15, 1980,
the organization filed a Section
6
notice seeking to modify the Agreement. The modification they were seeking,
asserts the Carrier, is conclusive acknowledgement that they now do not have a
rule to provide the remedy they are seeking before the Board. They direct our
attention to the following portion of the Section
6
notice:
"All investigations shall be held during the first shift
without loss of time to committeemen, or employes attending
as witnesses. Employes charged and their duly authorized
representatives shall have the right to be present throughout
the entire hearing, and shall be permitted to examine and
cross-examine all witnesses."
In respect to the Section
6
argument the Employees registered an objection
with'the Board that the Section
6
notice submitted by the Carrier was not discussed
on the property in the handling of this grievance and therefore it is in violation
of Circular No. 1 and cannot be considered as evidence.
In defining the critical issue to be decided we note that there is no
argument in this record whether an investigation is a conference within the
meaning of the rule or that the local chairman is entitled to pay. The issue is;
and therefore our decision is limited to what is meant by the term "committee"
and "committeemen" and whether the Carrier must pay the Claimants for attending
investigations.
The Carrier argues that the term committee or committeemen is unambiguous.
They contend that it is clear that the language refers to the Carmen's committee:
but to the committee of the five shop craft unions. The Board disagrees that
the contract language is unambiguous. We believe it is obvious that there is
considerable ambiguity surrounding the words. While the Carrier's interpretation
of the critical words is plausible and deserving of consideration, we believe treat
the Organization's interpretation is also tenable. The terms are subject to at
least two meaningful interpretations in the context of this case and therefore
we cannot conclude that they are unambiguous. In this regard, we must rely on
past practice to determine what the parties intended the language to mean. It
is a well established axiom of contract interpretation that undisputed past
practice will be taken as evidence of the intent of the parties and the meaning of
ambiguous agreement language.
In this case, the past practice of both parties overwhelmingly supports the:
position of the Organization. The 18 affidavits presented by the Organization
purport that members of the local carmen committees at various locations have
never been docked from attending investigations. Some of the statements purported
Form 1 Award No. 9017
Page 4 Docket No.
8963
2-h&N-CM-'82
the practice to exist as far back as the effective date of the Agreement which
was September 1,
1943.
The Carrier fundamentally doesn't dispute the existence
of the practice. As a matter of fact the record contains the aforementioned letter
from the former Carrier official which among other contentions did admit that
"for many years" ... "Committeemen were permitted to accompany local Chairmen
at investigations without loss of time from their assignments when investigation
was conducted during their working hours." Further, he stated:
"Insofar as shopcraft employees were concerned, I know that
for many years and up to the time of my retirement in many
instances one and sometimes two committeemen did accompany
the local chairman at investigations during their working
hours and so far as I know they were uniformly permitted to
do so without loss of time (money)." -
The Carrier and the letter from the former official does however dispute
that the past practice is controlling and further contend that its discontinuance
did not violate the Agreement as the language is unambiguous. They, as mentioned
previously, rely on the arbitral principle that past practice no matter how well
established cannot outweigh clear and unambiguous language. We have no quarrel
with this principle and in fact endorse it where applicable. However, in light
of our finding that the language is surrounded by considerable ambiguity the
principle relied upon by the Carrier is not applicable. In absence of clear
language, we have only past practice to rely on. If the framers of the Agreement
intended the language to make a
reference to only one.committeeman from each
craft and not to extend payment to committeemen other than the local chairman,
it is not apparent. If the distinction, which the Carrier argues is clear, was
intended to be applicable it has been obliterated by long standing uncontroverted
past practice to the contrary. There is little doubt that the parties have for
many years applied the rules, in their ambiguity, so to provide for the compensation of one or two committeemen in addition to the local chairman
when attending
investigations. While this practice is a burden to the Carrier, it is a practice
that in the face of ambiguous language they have acquiesced to for a very long
time. We find the past practice to be controlling. If the Carrier no longer
wishes to follow the long standing practice and wishes to abolish it, they should
do so through negotiations (See Third Division Award
4086).
In arriving at our conclusion, we have given no weight to the Section
6
notice introduced by the Carrier. There is no evidence that the Section
6
notice
or the arguments surrounding section
6
notices, were a matter of record in the
handling of this dispute. The Rules contained in Circular No. 1 are well
established and fundamentally sound. We cannot consider evidence which was not
handled between the parties during the handling of the case. To consider evidence
that the parties themselves have not exchanged or considered not only would be
prejudicial but chaotic in that it would reverse a well-entrenched principle.
We must display great deference and give controlling weight to this time-honored
axiom of this Board.
In conclusion, it is our finding that the Organization has shown, in the face
of ambiguous language, that there is overwhelming past practice which indicates
the claim for these members of this Organization is warranted. Our decision
Form 1 Award No. °017
Page
5
Docket No.
8963
2-L8N-CM-'82
turns on the basis of this uncontroverted historical practice.
A W A R D
Claim sustained.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
Attest: Acting Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
B
Y
2
o emarie Brasch - Administrative Assistant
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 14th day of April,
1982.