Form I NATmNAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No. 9415
SECOND DIVISION Docket No.
8945
2-ICG-CM-'83
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee John Phillip Lien when award was rendered.
( Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States ~and Canada
Parties to Dispute:
( Illinois Central Gulf Railroad
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
1. That Cayman R. B. Mixon was unjustly removed from his position as
truck driver on September
4, 1979,
Johnston Car Shop, Memphis, TN.
2. That Cayman R. B. Mixon was unjustly suspended from the service of the
Illinois Central Gulf Railroad for a period of thirty (30) calendar
days beginning September
26, 1979.
3.
That the investigation held an September 11,
1979
was unfair, unnecessary,
and without good and sufficient reason.
4.
That accordingly, the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad be ordered to:
(a) Compensate Carman R. B. Mixon for all lost time including
all overtime that he was deprived of beginning on September
4,
1979,
account being removed from the truck job, up to September
26, 1979·
(b) Compensate Cayman R. B. Mixon for eight
(8)
hours each day
at the pro rata rate beginning on September
26, 1979
including
all over-time that he would have been entitled to during his
suspension, up to Friday, October
26, 1979,
at which time he was
to return to service.
Findings:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all
the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute
are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act
as approved June 21,
1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
Claimant R. B. Mixon has been employed by the Carrier for approximately
twenty-seven years. On the date giving rise to the instant claim, Claimant was
employed as a truck driver.
Form I Award No.9415
Page 2 Docket No. 8945
2-ICG-CM-183
By letter dated September
4, 1979
Claimant was advised of a formal investiga
tion to be held on September 11,
1979
to determine whether Claimant had reported
an accident to the truck (m4016) he was assigned to drive on August
31, 1979
and
whether he left that truck unattended without proper clearance of the Piggyback
Lead. After the investigation, Claimant was advised by letter dated September
26,
1979
that he had been found guilty of the charges and, consequently, was
suspended from service for a period of thirty calendar days without pay beginning
September 26,
1979.
Believing the discipline assessed to be unjust and a violation of the
controlling Agreement, the Organization processed a claim through the appeal and
conference procedures, and ultimately to this Board.
It is the position of the Organization that the evidence adduced in the hearing
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Claimant was guilty of the charges
resulting in his removal from the truck job and suspension from service for thirty
calendar days. The Carrier's conduct, it is asserted, violated Rule
39
of the
existing Agreement, which reads:
"No employe shall be disciplined without a fair hearing by a
designated officer of the Carrier. Suspension in proper
cases pending hearing, which shall be prompt, shall not be
deemed a violation of this rule. At a reasonable time prior
to the hearing, such employe shall be apprised of the precise
charge against him. The employe shall have the right to be ·.r0
there represented by the authorized committee. If it is
found that an employe has been unjustly suspended or dismissed
from the service, such employe shall be reinstated with his
seniority rights unimpaired, and compensated for the wage loss,
if any, resulting from such suspension or dismissal."
It is the Organization's contention that the Carrier's Hearing Officer at
the investigation hearing expanded the charges set forth in the charging letter
by including "failing to fill out properly executed accident form," and raising
Rules 638 and 638(g) of the Safety Rules.
The referenced safety rules read as follows:
"638.
If you are involved in an accident, no matter how
trivial the accident or damage may appear, you are
required to stop at once. If necessary, protect the area
by placing warning signals about the vehicle."
"638(g). Report the accident as soon as possible to your
immediate supervisor and complete the necessary report forms.
Remember that any accident, no matter how trivial, must be
reported. Where damage exceeds the limit set by state law
concerning reporting accidents, proper report is to be made
to the appropriate state law enforcement agency."
Form 1
Award No. 9415
Page 3 Docket No. 895
2-ICG-CM-183
The Organization asserts that the language of these Safety Rules are clear
in referring to accident forms involving highway accidents, which forms would be
totally irrelevant in the instant accident occurring on Company property and in
the train yard. The Carrier contends that the safety rules have application when
an accident occurs anywhere.
Rule
23
of the Superintendent's Bulletin reads:
"Employe whose duties include operating Company vehicles
must exercise precaution to prevent accidents or damage
to vehicle. State and local traffic laws must be obeyed."
The Organization contends that this Rule
23
was improperly introduced at the
hearing by the Hearing Officer, expanding the charges against Claimant and failing
to afford him a fair and impartial hearing. At the same time, the Organization
contends that Claimant did exercise precaution to prevent damage to the vehicle
and that the accident did not involve state or local laws under Rule
23.
Assistant Master Mechanic W. C. Campbell offered the charging letter, served
as the Hearing Officer at the investigation, and signed the letter imposing the
disciplinary suspension upon Claimant. The record also reveals that it was
Campbell, as Hearing Officer, who first questioned concerning whether Claimant
had made a written report of the damage to vehicle ND4016 and referenced Safety
Rules
638
and
638(b)
and Rule
23
of the Superintendent's Bulletin. However, it
is the conclusion of the Board that this conduct by Campbell did not expand the
charges against Claimant, but was intended to establish the duty of Claimant to
make report of the accident incurred to the vehicle he was driving on August
31,
19790
The conclusion of Mr. Campbell that Claimant was found guilty of both charges
against him and, accordingly, should suffer a thirty-calendar day suspension without
pay is not supported in the record of this case. Clearly, the evidence pertaining
to the charge of leaving the truck unattended without proper clearance of the
Piggyback head is not sufficient. Claimant and Carman Shelton, who was assisting
Claimant on the day in question, both testified that Claimant did not get out of
the truck and both were of the opinion that there was enough clearance. There was
no eyewitness to this alleged incident. The only other testimony concerning it
came from General Car Foreman H. Z. Smith, as follows:
"Q. Mr. Smith, was Mr. Mixon in the truck when this accident
occurred?
A. Well, on Monday morning I called Mr. Mixon into the office
to talk to him about the accident when I found out the
truck had been damaged and I asked him how it happened
and he stated the he was coming from between the 'A'
Yard lead at the 'Hump' and the 'C' Yard lead at the
'Hump' where there is a little crossing for trucks to
cross and wanted to get across the switching lead before
a cut there had him blocked into the train yard because
he had another job that he wanted to go to and so there
Form 1 Award No, 9415
Page
4
Docket No. 89+5
2-ICG-CM-183
IWO
was a cut on the Piggyback Ramp lead and he had to cross
the 'C' Yard switching lead and pulled up close to this car
in an effort to try to clear between the two tracks and he
said he had gotten out of the truck. I am not sure but I
believe he went to check the rear to see if it would clear
and when they shoved back into the Ramp lead one of the cars
hit the left front fender. I asked him if he reported it and
he said he had talked to a group of carmen and supervisors -
that they were discussing the damage and I asked him again did
he report the incident and he said 'naw' - not as such."
Even if Smith's testimony is credited over the denials of Claimant and Shelton,
that testimony does m t establish that Claimant left his truck unattended. There
is no showing of more than that Claimant got out of the truck to check the rear
to determine with greater certainty that there was proper clearance. Such conduct
cannot reasonably be characterized as leaving one's truck unattended because
Claimant was then, in fact, attending to the truck in a manner reasonably called
for under the circumstances.
The charge that Claimant failed to report the accident to vehicle MD4016
on Friday, August 31, 1979, is found supported in the record of the investigation.
The charge is not covered by the language of the Carrier's Safety Rule 638, but
is covered by Rule 638(g). .That rule is not explicitly limited to accidents
occurring on public roadways although such accidents are obviously included in
the rule. All accidents, no matter haw trivial, are to be reported to one's ~_,r
imme
diate supervisor. Claimant made no effort to report this to his immediate
supervisor. Indeed, he testified thathe
did not
even know who his immediate
supervisor was on August 31, 1979. Although it is found that Claimant did not
attempt to hide the accident and that there were supervisors (none of whom were
Claimant's immediate supervisor) and. others to whom Claimant indicated that his
vehicle had been involved in an accident, and who viewed the damage to the right
front fender of the vehicle, Claimant was not excused thereby from reporting
the accident to his immediate supervisor.
There is no evidence in the record to show that Claimant was required to
make any additional report to "Special Agents" as implied by questions propounded
by the Hearing Officer in the investigation.
Under all of the circumstances of this case, wherein Claimant made no effort
to conceal the fact that damage was done to his vehicle on August 31, 1979 and
readily admitted such fact to Carrier supervisors on that date; and wherein the
damage was relatively minor to property only and resulted from what management
recognized as merely "poor judgment"; and wherein one of the charges against
Claimant has not been proven and the remaining charge is in the nature of an
unintentional but technical rule violation; it is the determination of this
Board that the thirty-calendar-day disciplinary suspension was an unreasonably
severe form of punishment.
Claimant, an employe of the Carrier for approximately 27 years, could well
have been expected to respond to a much less severe disciplinary suspension. ._W
Consequently, the Board will order that the disciplinary suspension be reduced
Form 1
Page
5
Award No. 9415
Docket No.
8945
2-ICG-CM-183
to one calendar week
beginning September
26,
1979
at 7:00 a.m. with other
remedial orders as forth in the Award.
A W A R D
The claim is sustained to the extent-that the Carrier is ordered to reduce
the thirty-calendar-day disciplinary suspension to a seven
(7)
calendar day
disciplinary suspension, as set forth above, and is ordered to pay Claimant for
all lost wages resulting from the excessive suspension from October 2,
1979
at
7:00
a.m. forward with his seniority rights unimpaired.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
Attest: Acting Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board
By ~ .._.._.
semarie Brasch - Administrative Assistant
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 16th day of March, 1983.