Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No. 10354
SECOND DIVISION Locket No. 10268
2-MNCA-EW-185
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Hyman Cohen when award was rendered.
( International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Parties to Dispute:
( Metro North Commuter Authority
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
1. That under the current Agreement the Consolidated Rail Corporation
(Conrail) unjustly disciplined Electrician George Patrick III, Harmon, N. Y., wheat
it assessed him a 10 days' suspension on May 22, 1981, causing him to be held
from service 40 days.
2. That accordingly, the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) be ordered
to restore Electrician George Patrick III to service with seniority unimpaired
and with all pay due him from the first day he was held out of service until the
day he is returned to service, at the applicable Electrician's rate of pay for
each day he has been improperly held from service; and with all benefits due him
under the group hospital and life insurance policies for the aforementioned
period; and all railroad retirement benefits due him, including unemployment and.
sickness benefits for the aforementioned period; and all vacation and holiday
benefits due him under the current vacation and holiday agreements for the aforementioned
period; and all other benefits that would normally have accrued to him had he
been working in the aforementioned period in order to make him whole; and expunge
his record.
FINDINGS:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all
the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute=
are respectively carrier and employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act
as approved June 21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
The Claimant entered the service of the Carrier on July 21, 1978. On April
5, 1981 he was employed as an Electrical Worker at the Carrier's Harmon Shop,
New York. On April 29, 1981 the Claimant was notified to attend a hearing in
connection with.the following charge:.
"Being absent on April 5, 6 and 19, 1981, which in lieu of your
previous attendance record constitutes excessive absenteeism."
Following the hearing, the Claimant was assessed 10 days suspension for excessive
absenteeism.
I.
Form 1 Award No. 10354
Page 2 Locket No. 10268
2-MNCA-EW-185
The organization contends that the Carrier carries the burden of proving
the alleged offense based upon the exact terms of the charge. Thus, since "in
lieu of" means "in place of" or "instead of", the Organization argues that the
Carrier must prove that the Claimant's absences on April 5, 6 and 19, 1981
"constitutes excessive absenteeism".
As a matter of fundamental justice, a charge should properly inform the
employee of the offense he is alleged to have committed so that he can adequately
defend against it. The Board believes that the charge in this case contained a
typographical error which could be reasonably understood by the Claimant. The
literal reading of the charge would indicate that "Being absent on April 5, 6 and
19, 1981 which in place of or instead of your previous attendance record constitutes
excessive absenteeism". Thus, in place of his previous attendance record, the
Claimant's absence on April 5, 6 and 19, 1981 constitutes excessive absenteeism.
If the Claimant was to be charged with excessive absenteeism, for being absent
only on April 5, 6 and 19, 1981 the words "which in lieu of your previous
attendance record" is superfluous and a gratuitous phrase that has no sensible
purpose in the charge. The Board has therefore concluded that the Claimant
should have reasonably understood the charge to mean that his absence on the
three (3) April, 1981 days, "in view of", or in light of "his previous attendance
record" constitutes excessive absenteeism. Claimant was not misled nor can it be
reasonably urged that due to the exact terms of the charge he was unable to
prepare a defense to meet the reasonable and common sense meaning derived from
it.
Turning to a different matter, the Carrier used the Claimant's attendance
record prior to April, 1981 in an effort to prove its charge that such absences
along with his absences on April 5, 6 and 19, 1981 were excessive.
Rule 6-A-3(a) states:
"The trial shall be scheduled to begin within 30 calendar days from the
date the employee's General Foreman or equivalent officer had knowledge
of the employee's involvement. "'
Even though the Claimant's absences prior to the April, 1981 absences
exceeded 30 calendar days prior to the date of the charge the Carrier did not
violate Rule 6-A-3(a). To prove the charge that an employee's absences constitute
excessive absenteeism, it is necessary to refer to a record of the employee's
absences over a period of time. To sustain the Organization's,argument would
preclude the Carrier from disciplining an employee for the well established
industrial offense of excessive absenteeism. Accordingly, the Carrier can
utilize the Claimant's absenteeism record prior to April to prove its charge of
excessive absenteeism.
Form 1 Award No. 10354
Page 3 Docket No. 10268
2-MNCA-EW-185
The final inquiry that must be addressed is whether the disciplinary suspension
of the Claimant for 10 days is unjust, arbitrary or capricious. In this connection,
the Board relies on the record of the hearing. Asked whether he had "been spoken
to before, about his absenteeism record", the Claimant responded "***I don't
recall anyone talking with me formally about it." There is nothing else in the
record that discloses that the Carrier informed the Claimant that it considered
his absences prior to April 1981 as a matter of concern. No warning was given to
the Claimant prior to April, 1981 about his absenteeism record. Moreover, there
was no formal notification to the Claimant of the consequences of further absences
and consultation or progressive discipline, or both to remedy the situation short
of the 10 day disciplinary suspension issued in this case. Prior to the issuance
of discipline by the Carrier, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
Claimant was aware that his sporadic absences in April, 1981, along with his
prior absenteeism from January 1981 constituted a violation of any Rule of the
Carrier. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the Carrier's disciplinary
suspension of 10 days was unjust, arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, it should be noted that the Claimant's absenteeism subsequent to
April 19, 1981 is of no weight since it is outside the scope of the record.
Accordingly, the claim is sustained.
A W A R D
Claim sustained.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
Attest:
v
~ I
Nancy
. A
'ver - Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 27th day of March 1985.