Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD Award No. 11173
SECOND DIVISION Docket No. 10749
2-DM&IR-EW-'87
The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in
addition Referee Eckehard Muessig when award was rendered.
(International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Parties to Dispute:
(Duluth, Mi;ssabe and Iron Range Railway Company
Dispute: Claim of Employes:
1. That the Duluth, M:issabe and Iron Range Railway Company violated
Rule 15G of the current Shopcra:Et Agreement and past policies and practices,
set forth on the property of the railroad and accepted by this Organization
and the Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Railway Company, when it wrongfully
assigned a Two Harbors Electrician to perform work on a computer run wheel
lathe at the Proctor Car Shop, From July 11, 1983 to August 11, 1983.
2. That accordingly, the Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Railway
Company be ordered to pay Electrician David Dewsbury for 176 hours at the
straight time rate of pay.
FINDINGS:
The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record
and all the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this
dispute are respectively carrier and employes within the meaning of the
Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the
dispute involved herein.
Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
The Claimant herein is employed by the Carrier at its Proctor,
Minnesota Maintenance Shop in the Electrician classification. The instant
grievance arose after the Claimant was removed from his assignment which
essentially consisted of working on a computer associated with a wheel lathe.
The Carrier assigned another Electrician junior to the Claimant from its Two
Harbor area dock facility to do the work. The Claimant contends that the
work, in effect, is a temporary assignment and, in accordance with Rule 15(G)
of the parties' Agreement, he was entitled to perform the work.
The Board notes at the outset that the essential facts from which
this dispute arose are not in contention. However, arguments have been
presented, primarily in the Submission of the Carrier, that were not brought
forward on the property and, accordingly, these may not be considered in view
of the long-established practice of this Board.
Form 1 Award No. 11173
Page 2 Docket No. 10749
2-DM&IR-EW-'87
The parties in this dispute have a systemwide Seniority Agreement and
we agree with the Carrier that assignment to a bulletined position in a specific Shop does not, as such, create a separate Seniority District. However,
that is not the point that the Organization, from the outset of its Claim, has
pursued. Specifically, the organization cites portions of Rule 15(G) which it
contends have been breached under the facts and circumstances of this Claim.
We agree. While it is apparent that there are reasonable arguments on both
sides of this issue, with respect to the construction of Rule 15(G), we conclude that the weight of the record properly before us supports the Organization. We have reached this conclusion primarily on the basis that the Carrier
never substantively countered the Organization's arguments concerning its Rule
15(G) contentions on the property. Moreover, while there may be a difference
between "a position" and "work" as argued by the Carrier, it has not substantively applied the distinction as to the application of Rule 15(G) to the
facts and circumstances of this Claim. Clearly, the Carrier in this case
utilized an Electrician from another Shop to do Electrician work. Absent
another explanation, this would reasonably lead to a conclusion that there was
more Electrician work in the Proctor Shop than the Electrician assigned to the
Proctor facility could perform. After five days, the Claimant made an application for the position as provided by Rule 15(G). This Rule clearly recognizes "temporary service" and situations that such service or work would be of
less than thirty (30) days and hence, need not be bulletined.
With respect to damages claimed, the Board is aware of and has considered the many arguments on both sides of this issue. Under the specific
circumstances herein, and noting that the Claimant was not financially harmed,
we hold with the Carrier and deny Part 2 of the Claim.
A W A R D
Claim sustained in accordance with the Findings.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division
Attest:
Nancy er - Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 25th day of February 1987.
CARRIER MEMBERS'
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
TO
AWARD 11173, DOCKET 10749
(Referee Muessig
We concur with the Majority's holding that Claimant was due no
compensation since he was not financially harmed. We further concur with
the Majority's holding that the parties have a systemwide seniority
Agreement and that assignment to a bulletined position in a specific shop
does not create a separate seniority district.
The Majority held
"...arguments have been presented, primarily in the
Submission of the Carrier, that were not brought forward on
the property and, accordingly, these may not be considered in
view of the long-established practice of this Board."
Ordinarily, we would not find fault with such reasoning, but here the
on-the-property record, particularly the December 22, 1983 declination
letter signed by Carrier's Director of Personnel and Labor Relations,
identified four distinct theories which were presented by the Claimant and
the Organization, and all four were specifically responded to by the Carrier
in such letter. The essential logic of rebuttal for each theory was made in
the record as evidenced by the following excerpt from the above-mentioned
December 22, 1983 letter which appeared as Employees' Exhibit J:
"...Mr. Dewsbury is an electrician assigned to the Proctor
Electric Shop, who takes issue with the Carrier's recent
action in utilizing aelectrician assign at Two Harbors,
to perform maintenance work at Proctor Car Shop.
"In this claim, Mr. Dewsbury implies that the Carrier
was incorrect in the way the work was assigned in at least
four ways. First, he implies that, because of an alleged
historical practice, only electricians assigned to the
Proctor Electric Shop may perform electrical work in the
Proctor Car Shop. Second, he implies that the system
CMs' Dissenting & Concurring
Opinion to Award 11173
Page 2
"seniority agreement was violated. Third, he alleges that
he was arbitrarily disqualified from performing the work.
Fourth, he contends that a temporary position existed for
trouble-shooting the lathe computer, and that he was the
senior applicant and should have been assigned under Rule
15.
"I will respond to these contentions in the order listed
above. First, there is no agreement which guarantees that
certain wor within certain geographical boundaries must be
performed by Proctor Electric Shop employees. The shop does
not, in fact, have any special status under the contract; it
is merely a convenient and efficient place to head quarter
electricians. Being assigned there does not create a
'seniority district,' which in effect is what Mr. Dewsbury is
suggesting.
"Second, since no prior right employees were furloughed
during the time the work was performed, there was no
violation of the system seniority agreement.
"Third, Mr. Dewsbury was not disqualified or
discriminated against. It appears simply that he began a
job, and another employee completed it. I am sure that -
happens every day, and I don't think it needs to be taken as
disqualification or discrimination. I believe both employees
held electrician positions, at the identical rate of pay.
Under those circumstances, the carrier may decide which
electrician to assign to which task on a given day.
"Fourth, there is a difference between 'a position' and
'work. When Mr. Olson worked on the lathe control, he was
working on his own regular position. He was performing work
away from his headquarters, which is permitted under the
rules, and it was work which is assignable to an electrician,
the position he held." (Emphasis added)
Granted, in Carrier's Submission each point was further explained in
detail, by examples and Award citations. To conclude that such procedure
represents the use of "...arguments ...that were not brought forward on the
property..." amounts to a level of technicality which is new to our
collective experience on the Second Division.
CMs' Dissenting & Concurring
Opinion to Award 11173
Page 3
Secondly, the Majority coed enses the claim to a Rule 15 (g) issue.
This rule allows senior employees to express their preference for "new
positions or vacancies" of less than thirty days but more than four days
duration. The logic of the Award is that when Electrician "A" holds a
position at Proctor, and Electrician "B" is temporarily sent there from
another point (Two Harbors) to d o work for, say ten days, there is an ipso
facto "new position," and senior employee
"A"
may demand it.
Apparently the Majority places no importance on the fact that "A" and
"B" hold identical Electrician ,positions, and that "B" was assigned to
"temporary work away from home point or shop," under Rule 3 (d) which was
cited in Carrier's declination letters dated September 8 and November 3,
1983, and in the General Chairman's rejection letter dated December 13,
1983. Evidently, the key to the Majority's reasoning is that the two
Electricians were performing different items of work; thus if "A" was
assembling batteries and "B" ways cleaning light fixtures,
"A"
could claim
the light fixture work if it was of more than four but less than thirty
days' duration. Never mind that "A" and "B" already hold identical
bulletined positions, the only difference between them being their assigned
headquarter points.
What this Award does is ignore the time-honored distinction between
"positions" and "work." The Majority equates the two, contrary to many
prior Awards which hold that the Carrier decides who does what work, where
two employees hold identical positions.
CMs' Dissenting & Concurring
Opinion to Award 11173
Page 4
In this regard, it is interesting to note that in Claimant's August 12,
1983 letter he stated his complaint as follows:
"...I was replaced by a junior electrician who is holding
and still holds a bid position, across division lines, in Two
Harbors, Minn."
"I understan (sic) it would be considered picking and
choosing my own work had a junior employee who held a
bulletined position in the Proctor Electric shop been
assigned to this work. This is not the case as the employee
assigned to this work continues to report to Two Harbors and
drives daily, across division lines, to do this work which
has been, until this case, the work of the Proctor Electric
Shop."
Likewise, at Page 6 of its Submission the Organization acknowledged:
"...An electrician cannot necessarily choose his
assignment at a particular location, but can choose the
location where he wishes to work, by the bidding process." ~'"
As evidenced by the Award, the Organization did not point to an
Agreement provision prohibiting an Electrician headquartered at Two Harbors
from performing work at Proctor. The Majority ignored the time-honored
principle that except insofar as it has restricted itself by the Agreement,
or as it may be limited by law, the assignment of work necessary for its
operations lies within the Carrier's discretion.
· .~--
M. C. Lesnik P. V. Varga
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M. W. Fn§ef-hut ~ . - . E. Yost
R. L. Hicks