

The Second Division consisted of the regular members and in addition Referee Irving R. Shapiro when award was rendered.

Parties to Dispute: (Sheet Metal Workers' International Association
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(Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company

Dispute: Claim of Employees:

1. That the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company violated the controlling Agreement, particularly Rule 87, on July 22, 23, 1971, when they improperly assigned Electricians the duty of disconnecting and connecting freon copper pipes from condensor coil to air conditioner unit, Main Office Building, South Louisville Shops, Louisville, Kentucky.
2. That accordingly the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company be ordered to compensate Sheet Metal Workers W. T. Thompson, O. B. Pearson, W. S. Dobson and W. H. Young for eight (8) hours each at the pro rata rate of pay for such violation.

Findings:

The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

Parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon.

Carrier in its submission states that "the freon gas line work was necessary to put the unit (air conditioning) in service." This brings the work involved within the purview of the application of Classification of Work Rule 87 of the Controlling Agreement. This was dealt with at length in Award 6774 and the Findings there are applicable hereto.

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Award No. 6775
Docket No. 6600
2-L&N-SM-'74

A W A R D


Part 1 of Claim sustained.

Part 2 of Claim remanded in accordance with the Findings of
Award 6774 relative thereto.

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Second Division

Attest: Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board

By


Rosemarie Brasch - Administrative Assistant

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 21st day of October, 1974.

CARRIER MEMBERS' DISSENT TO AWARDS 6774, 6775, 6776, 6777, 6778

(Referee Shapiro)

G. M. YOUNG

Carrier Members respectfully submit that these awards are invalid on jurisdictional grounds.

The author of these awards refuses to recognize and enforce clear agreement provisions which all parties to this dispute frankly concede are binding upon them and those provisions establish the usual manner for the handling of such claims. The provisions read:

" . . . no . . . representative of organizations signatory hereto, will individually request management to take work from one craft and give it to another craft . . .

" . . . we will find a way to reach an agreement and settle any disputes that may arise between any two crafts signatory hereto, involving jurisdiction of work, and when such dispute has thus been settled, then request will be presented to management for conference to negotiate the acceptance by management of the settlement thus made." (Underlining added.)

We do not believe the parties could have found language that would have more clearly expressed an agreement absolutely prohibiting any of the signatory organizations from individually presenting to Carrier a claim involving jurisdiction of work and another signatory organization. Furthermore, the record leaves no room whatever to doubt the fact that these clear provisions are an agreement that binds all of the parties to the instant dispute. Carrier and the Electricians both cite and rely on them and the petitioning Sheet Metal Workers concede their existence, never question their complete validity, never claim they have been complied with, but attempt to avoid their effect in these particular cases by advancing the incredible argument that these cases do not come under said agreement provisions because the piping work involved is allegedly reserved to Sheet Metal Workers by their Classification of Work Rule. The complete answer to this argument is that the parties had before them the Classification of Work Rules when they agreed to said provisions, yet they saw fit to establish no exception to their unconditional commitment.

These awards significantly do not adopt this absurd argument of the Sheet Metal Workers. Rather, the author contrived objections of his own to the crystal clear agreement, referring to the obligation of the parties thereunder as an "alleged contractual obligation", citing the irrelevant fact that Carrier was not a party to the "Miami Agreement" and concluding that "Appendix 'A' makes no provision for circumstances where an attempt by the Organizations to resolve an alleged jurisdictional dispute fails." (Underlining added.)

In view of the confusion that is so abundantly apparent in these awards, we wonder what is meant by this reference to an "alleged jurisdictional dispute"; therefore, we will avoid that terminology and speak in the clear, unambiguous and absolute terms of the agreement provisions that are controlling. Those provisions that no signatory organization "will individually request management to take work away from another craft" and that the signatory organizations "will find a way to reach an agreement and settle any dispute that may arise between any two crafts signatory hereto, involving the jurisdiction of work, and when such dispute has thus been

"settled, then request will be presented to management . . ." Certainly, these claims come under the ban of those provisions, and the author of these awards has simply refused to recognize said provisions and give them their intended effect.

As the Electricians point out in their third party submission, Section 3 First (1) of the Railway Labor Act provides that disputes cannot be brought to this Board until they have been handled on the property in the usual manner; and the usual manner for handling a jurisdictional dispute of the type involved in these claims makes it mandatory that agreement be reached by the two organizations claiming the work before any claim can be submitted to Carrier and further processed.

This Board has consistently and without exception recognized that a rule of procedure such as that quoted above must be complied with as a condition precedent to properly invoking the jurisdiction of this Board. In Award 2898 which is cited in Award 6774 as authority for assuming jurisdiction in the instant cases, the Board expressly found that: "The said dispute was settled under the jurisdictional dispute procedure of February 15, 1940 between the organizations by agreeing that the work belonged to the Sheet Metal Workers." Certainly that award is no authority for assuming jurisdiction in the instant cases where no agreement was reached and it was the petitioning organization that terminated the negotiations of the parties. See Awards 2747 through 2780 (Smith), 2931 through 2936 (Kiernan), 5789, 5793 (Coburn), 6759, 6763, 6765 (Eischen).

The cited Eischen awards were released a few days after release of the proposals in the instant cases and thus represent the latest expression of any Referee concerning the jurisdictional question presented in these cases. It will be observed that the last Eischen award (6765) involved the same Petitioner, the same Carrier, and the same agreement that are involved in these cases. This award correctly concludes:

"We have often decided cases of the type presented herein and we can see no justification for now deviating from that clear precedent. See Awards 2931, 2936, 5789 and 5793. We cannot ignore valid and legally operative agreements entered into in good faith by the parties, notwithstanding subsequent changes in alliances and allegiances. In the instant case, such an agreement contemplates the submission of such dispute to attempted mutual resolution among the Organizations involved with conference negotiation with management for acceptance of such inter-Organizational settlement.

"We find that the instant dispute is referable properly to the resolution machinery established by Appendix A of the Agreement and is prematurely before our Board for adjudication pursuant to the provisions of Section 3, First (1) of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, and Circular No. 1 of the National Railroad Adjustment Board.

"Consistent with the foregoing, we are without jurisdiction to decide this claim on its merits. Accordingly, it will be dismissed without prejudice." (Underlining added.)

These claims also should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because they have not been handled in the usual manner.

J. L. Maylor

H. A. M. Bradenbrook

E. P. Crowley
W. B. Jones
A. M. Youker