which seems to be the employes' position, we do not find anything in Rule 37 to support the employes' request that he be paid for an additional 3 hours each day at the rate of time and one-half, because we required him to start work at 11:00 A.M. Among other things, this rule specifically provides that `time in excess of eight hours, exclusive of the meal period, on any day will be considered overtime and paid on the actual minute basis at the rate of time and one-half.' The employe on Position No. 20 was not required to work regularly in excess of 8 hours, and if on a given date he did work in excess of 8 hours he was paid for the excess at the rate of time and one-half as required by Rule 37.

"There is no definite provision, or as much as an inference, in Rules 36 and 37, or any other rules of the schedule, which will support the employes' request that the Carrier be penalized to the extent of being required to allow the employe additional pay for three hours at the rate of time and one-half in a case where Rule 36 of the schedule is violated, at the same time there has been no violation of Rule 36 in this particular case.

"In this connection, we are attaching as Carrier's Exhibit No. 1 copy of Decision No. 1470 of the United States Railroad Labor Board dated December 8, 1922, and as Carrier's Exhibit No. 2 copy of this Board's Decision No. 3022 dated February 25, 1925, which decisions support our position that there has been no violation of the starting time rule of the clerks' schedule in our handling of yard clerk's position No. 20 at East St. Louis.

"The facts and circumstances in this case are as set up in the agreed upon Joint Statement of Facts and in the Carrier's position; Rules 36 and 37, as well as the other rules of the schedule, have been fully complied with by the carrier, and we do not believe further argument is necessary to convince the members of this Board that there are no reasonable grounds for the employes' request. We respectfully ask that the request be denied."

OPINION OF BOARD: The facts essential to the disposition of this dispute can be summarized briefly. Prior to August 9, 1933, the carrier maintained four positions of clerks in the "C" Yard at East St. Louis with these assigned hours:

1 position from 7:00 A.M. to3:00 P.M.

1 position from3:00 P.M, to 11:00 P.M.

1 position from 11:00 P.M. to7:00 A. M.

1 position from2:30 P.M. to 10:30 P.M.

On the date in question the carrier advertised a fifth position in the "C" Yard with an assignment of hours from 11:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M. The starting time of this position, it will be observed, does not fall within the designated hours of Rule 36 of the agreement between the parties. It is this position which is in issue in the present dispute.

The petitioner insists that under a proper interpretation of Rule 36 the starting time of this assignment was not permissible. The rule relied upon provides that "where three consecutive shifts are worked covering the twenty-four (24) hour period the starting time of each shift will be between the hours of six and eight A.M., between two and four P.M., and ten P.M. and midnight."

The petitioner argues that since there is continuous service at the office or station involved, and since the carrier has established a cycle of three employes, each relieving the other over a period of twenty-four hours, the carrier cannot assign any other employes at this office or station except within the limits of the hours fixed by Rule 36. The prohibi-

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tion, argues the petitioner, against starting a shift between the designated hours is not limited to positions making up the "three consecutive shifts," but applies to any assignment at the station or office involved.

The carrier, in defense of its refusal to honor the claim when presented to it, states that the interpretation requested by the petitioner is not permissible. The carrier also claims in support of its position that over a period of years it had frequently made similar assignments without protest from the petitioner. The petitioner, however, emphatically denies the accuracy of this statement. Certainly the carrier did not present any records to substantiate its assertion.

The precise issue here involved has not hitherto been presented to the Third Division for decision. Both the petitioner and the carrier cite decisions of other tribunals in support of their respective positions. These precedents, however, are not very helpful in reaching a proper award in this dispute. The Division must, therefore, as fairly and as objectively as it can, place an interpretation on the rule in question.

Some assistance in the task at hand may be gained from a brief examination of the purpose of the rule. The rule or its equivalent is very pervasive in railway collective agreements. Naturally enough, these rules vary considerably in detail. It is clear, however, that all of them are intended to protect employes against being called and released at unreasonably inconvenient hours. It is clear, of course, that the application of the rule does to a greater or less extent interfere with managerial distinction. As far as it can, therefore, the Division should reach a conclusion which will adequately protect employes against the risk in question, and which will not unduly hamper management in the handling of its personnel with a view to meeting its service requirements.

The phrase "three consecutive shifts," in the opinion of the Division, must be taken to refer to a situation in which work is required to meet service requirements at a given office or station. When this situation occurs it will be found that carrier will provide a cycle of at least three employes covering a period of twenty-four hours, each relieving the other. It is obvious that, depending upon the service requirements, the carrier may find it necessary or desirable to assign three or more employes to one period of work, two or more to a second period of work, and only one to a third perio. In any event, it is the opinion of the Division that each period of work constitues a shift within the meaning of Rule 36.

It follows from what has been said in the situation described in the preceding paragraph, that the carrier, needing one or more additional employes to perform work at a given office or station, must assign them to one of the periods of work or shifts already fixed under the provisions of Rule 36. When the carrier made the assignment in issue in this dispute, it in effect established a new shift. It is the opinion of the Division that Rule 36 does not permit this in the circumstances of this dispute.

The contention of the carrier that the petitioner lulled it into repose by its long delay in the presentation of this claim to the Adjustment Board is without merit. If the contention is based on the assumption that the claim is outlawed by lapse of time, the answer is that the Railway Labor Act does not establish any limitations of time within which a claimant must present his claim to the Board. The Adjustment Board certainly has no authority to fix any such limitations.

The objection of the carrier to the payment of overtime under Rule 37 must also be overruled. It is true, as the carrier points out, that the claimant "was not required to work regularly in excess of eight hours." The Division, however, has found that the carrier made an improper assignment in this case. Accordingly, the claim, although it may be described as

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a penalty, is meritorious and should be sustained. The Division quotes with approval this statement from the Report of the Emergency Board created by the President of the United States on February 8, 1937:

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the carrier and the employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934:

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That under the rules of the agreement between the parties the claim herein presented is meritorious and should be sustained.

AWARD