sentatives of the Signalmen's Organization, we have included with this brief as Exhibit `M', Division Engineer Hampton's letter, dated Portland, April 25, 1936, addressed to M of W Employee-Signal Employes and Water Service Employes. The letter in question did not in any way modify Rule 7 nor deprive the Carrier of any of its rights under Rule 7; it should be observed that the letter is addressed to employes other than Signal Employes. It does not indicate that the hours assigned had been agreed to by Signalmen under Rule 7; it constituted instructions not in any way related to nor based on agreement provisions, and even if it had been based on the provisions of Rule 7, that rule provides for changes in the starting time, based on actual service requirements, hence, any argument predicated on this document to support the instant claim will not serve a useful purpose."

There is in existence an agreement between the parties bearing effective date of March 1, 1926.

OPINION OF BOARD: The evidence of record establishes the fact that prior to the time when this dispute originated the parties had reached an agreement that the hours of work of signal employes should be from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 Noon and 1:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. It follows that the Carrier in assigning the present claimants to work from 12:00 Noon to 4:00 R M., and 5:00 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. either changed the starting time of the shift already assigned or established a new shift with a starting time different from that of the starting time agreed uVon. The record also indicates that the carrier took the action in question without the consent of the petitioner or its local committee. The question for the Division to answer is, therefore, whether the Carrier, in taking the disputed action, violated the provisions of Rule 7 which provies:

The petitioner contends that this rule means that the starting time of "any shift" having once been established by "mutual understanding" between the local officials of the carrier and the employes' committee can be changed only in the same manner, that is, by a "mutual understanding" between the same parties. The petitioner contends further that "mutual understanding" as employed in this rule means an "agreement" in the usual sense of the word.

The Carrier, in defense of its position, contended that to approve the interpretation requested by the petitioner would give it "plenary and sovereign authority to dictate what the assigned hours shall be." The Carrier argued that the term "mutual understanding" as used in Rule 7 means that the carrier is merely required to notify the employes' committee that, in view of the requirements of the service, it proposes to change, or has changed, the starting time of a given shift. In brief, the Carrier insists that Rule 7 does not require it to reach any agreement with the petitioner with respect to a change in the starting time of a shift.

The contention of the Carrier that the rule merely requires it, in terms of service requirements, to notify the employes' committee that it proposes to change the starting time of a shift of signal employes is not tenable. This would, indeed, be a strange construction to place upon the language of Rule 7. While the term "understanding" in some connections may have the meaning insisted upon by the Carrier, it is clear that in contracts, both commercial and collective, the term is commonly used synonymously with the term "agreement". The Carrier, in support of its contention, relied strongly on the clause, "based on actual service requirements". Moreover, it offered substantial evidence tending to show that the method of operation employed

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on the work in question was both economical and desirable. The Division, however, is of the opinion that the inclusion of this clause was intended to indicate the basis on which an understanding might be reached between the parties, and was not intended to give the Carrier the power to make a change in the starting time of a shift without the consent of the petitioner.

The Carrier's contention that to concede the correctness of the Petitioner's position would give it absolute power to dictate the starting time of all shifts may be well taken with respect to the subject matter under controversy. This, however, is a consideration which the Carrier should have weighed when it entered into the agreement. Moreover, the result of the construction here adopted is not more unusual than that of the operation of many rules in collective agreements. The Carrier may be convinced that a rate of pay which has been agreed upon for a given class of employes is not justified by current business conditions. This fact, however, would not justify the Carrier in changing such rates without the consent of the Organization representing such employes.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Carrier in the action that it took violated Rule 7 of the agreement between the parties, and that the claimants are entitled to be compensated in accordance with their respective claims.

AWARD