To rule that Carrier's position is not correct and rule that employes who attend investigations involving operating matters for the purpose of making a statement of facts in connection with the matter under investigatidn, are entitled to be paid for such attendance irrespecive of the fact that they lost no time, would be tantamount to converting the discipline rules to potential penalty rules which obviously was not the intent.

The Employes base the claim on "Article 3(a) or Article 7(f)." The provisions of these rules conclusively show that they are not synonymous as to application. The Employes failure to base the claim on any specific rule evidences the uncertainty in their own opinion of the validity of the claim.

OPINION OF BOARD: On June 26, 1945, Claimant was required to attend an investigation as a witness for the Carrier on his assigned day of rest. The Organization contends that he should be compensated under Article 7 (f) of the current Agreement reading as follows:

"A train dispatcher who at request of the management, attends court, or appears as witness for the Railway, will be furnished transportation, and will be paid for time lost, or if an extra dispatcher, at the trick rain dispatcher's daily rate, for each day so engaged, wih a maximum of eight hours for each caendar day. If regularly assigned and so used on the rest day assigned to his position, he will be allowed eight hours pay at the pro rata rate of the position to which assigned. Necessary actual expenses while away from headquarters will be allowed. Any witness fees or mileage accruing will be assigned to the Railway."

The effective date of the current Agreement is April 1 1945 and it is the first agreement negotiated between this Carrier and the Dispatchers. The record shows that prior to its negotiation, it was the practice not to pay employes for attendance at investigations on their assigned days of rest. The question for determination is whether Article 7 (f), heretofore quoted, now requires such payment.

In considering the particular language used in the rule, especially the words "attends court, or appears as witness for the Railway;" it is evident that it means someting more than appearing as a witness in court for if such were not the case, there would have been no occasion for including the words "or appears as witness for the Railway." It cannot logically be argued that attending court does not include one's appearance as a witness in court. It is urged that the use of the word "witness" of itself evidences an intent to limit the effect of the rule wholly to court proceedings. We do not think the word "witness" as used in the rule before us has such a limited meaning. In our opinion it means one who gives oral testimony concerning a transaction or event of which he has personal knowledge. An appearance in court is not a necessary element of the definition when it is used in its ordinary sense. It is self evident, therefore, that the addition of the words "or appears as witness for the ailway" contemplates something more than an appearance in court. We think it means that it was intended to include employes who appear as witnesses at investigations or other similar hearings where the taking of testimony is contemplated.

It is urged that the parties in negotiating the rule placed a mutual conostruction upon it which we are obligated to follow. Assuming for the purpose of this opinion that the rule is so indefinite and ambiguous that we are warranted in examining the negotiations of the parties in an attempt to discover what the parties themselves meant by the rule, we find a definite confiidt between the parties as to what was then intended.

Prior to the negotiation of the present Agreement, effective April 1, 1945, the Train Dispatchers Committee proposed the following rule:

'Attending Court. A train dispatcher required by the Railway Company to attend court, inquests, investigations, or hearings shall be allowed the same compensation as he would have received if working his assignment, and if unassigned he shall be paid rate applicable to trick train dispacher; if regularly assigned and so used on the rest day assigned to his position, he will be allowed eight (8) hours' pay at time and one-half rate. He shall be reimbursed for necessary expenses incurred Such witness fees or mileagle as he may receive shall be assigned to the Railway Company."

The Carrier says that it refused to go along with the Employes to the extent indicated by this proposed rule and that the negotiated rule was agreed to for the very purpose of eliminating pay for attending inquests, investigations and hearings and limiting the application of the rule to attendance in court or analogous matters.

The Organization's representative states that he was the spokesman for the Dispatchers' Committee when Article 7 (f) was negotiated and he appears as a signatory to the current Agreement. His version of the preliminary negotiations is that the Carrier objected to the wording of the proposed rule. because it would evidently support claims where the employe appeared at a hearing or investigation where he was personally involved To meet this and other objections, Article 7 (f) was substituted and agreed to.

It is readily seen that no mutuality of intent is shown nor does it appear that there has been any mutuality of application of the rule since the Contract was negotiated. This differentiates the case from Award 3089.

We conclude, herefore, that the rule as it appears in the Agreement applies where an employe is required by the management to appear as a witness at an investigation. It is a rule of contract construction that effect should be given to all the language of an agreement whenever it is possible to do so. The presumption is that every word, phrase and clause was included for a purpose. We can only give effect to the words "or appears as witness for the Railway" by holding that it applies where the employe is required to attend investigations and hearings for the purpose of giving evidence even though it is not a court proceeding as that term is generally understood.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Agreement was violated as alleged.

AWARD