Miss Rapp had never worked in the Comptroller's Office. Practically her entire service has been as a clerk in the Payroll Accounting Department. Employes have claimed she had a knowledge of I. C. C. classification and insofar as the distribution of certain labor items, the Carrier will agree, but it also asserts that Miss Rapp had no knowledge whatsoever of materials used by the Carrier or the proper distribution of same from an I. C. C. classification standpoint. Furthermore, she had no knowledge by which she could determine the difference between various operating charges and investment and maintenance :accounts.

The Voucher Department of the Carrier is not extensive. It consists of Chief Voucher Clerk and three Assistants. One Assistant, or in other words, the position of the employe who was given a leave of absence, must work largely on his own initiative and on his own knowledge of the work required. It was a knowledge of this work which Miss Talarico had acquired by approximately three years of work in the Department which particularly qualified her to assume temporarily the position of the employe on leave.

The attention of the Board is called to the fact that this position was to be filled for only six months at the most. As a matter of fact the employe on leave returned in four and one-half months. The Carrier considers the strict application of seniority rules as inconsistent in a case of this kind, unless of course, it is privileged to select employes based on adequate fitness and ability.

In briefly sumiming up its position, the Carrier respectfully requests your Board to deny this claim for the following reasons:

(1) Miss Rapp did not have adequate fitness and ability for the work on which she placed a bid.

(2) Miss Talarico did have sufficient fitness and ability.

(3) The Carrier violated no Agreement rule in eliminating Miss Rapp due to her lack of adequate fitness.

(4) Rule 10 providing for assistance and proper trial applies only after employes are properly assigned.

OPINION OF BOARD: In August, 1945, the General Clerk in the Office of the Comptroller secured a six-months leave of absence. The position was bulletined and Claimant, with a seniority date of June 20, 1927, was the only bidder. The position was denied to Claimant and assigned, on September 15, 1945, to Mary Talarico, a junior employe with seniority date of November 11, 1942. Claimant contends that she should have been assigned to the position and claims the difference in rate of her regular position and the position of General Clerk from September 15, 1945 to January 15, 1940. The Carrier contends that Claimant did not have fitness and ability to perform work as required by Rule S of the current Agreement, which provides:

"Employes covered by these rules may use their seniority as provided in any rule in this Agreement subject to their fitness and ability to perform the work; fitness and ability being sufficient, seniority shall prevail, except, however, that this provision shall not apply to the excepted positions."

Claimant was entitled to the position if she had sufficient fitness and ability to perform, the work of the position. The discussion will be limited to the question of Claimant's fitness and ability.

The record shows that Claimant transferred from the Safety and Welfare Department to the Payroll Department in 1932, starting as a stenographer. In 1940 she was assigned to the position of Maintenance of Way Timekeeper, the duties of which consisted of keeping all labor distributions and records for the Bridge and Building Department and Electrical Depart-

ment of the Miyabe Division. In 1942 she was assigned to the position of Shop, Roundhouse and Store Department Timekeeper, the duties of which consisted of keeping all labor distributions and records for the Shop, Roundhouse and Store Department of the Iron Range Division.

The duties of the position sought required a knowledge of operating and investment accounts and a knowledge of Interstate Commerce Commission classifications in order to make a proper distribution of charges as between various operating and investment accounts. It is argued by the Carrier that Claimant had never worked in the Comptroller's Office and while she had a working knowledge of Interstate Commerce Commission classifications in so far as they relate to the distribution of labor items, she lacked knowledge of the difference between various operating charges and investment and maintenance accounts. For the purpose of this opinion, it will be conceded that the employe assigned was better qualified to step into the position and immediately perform the duties of the position because of her previous employment in the office where the position was located. But this is not a controlling feature.

It must be borne in mind that the responsibility for the safe and efficient operation of a railroad rests with management. The selection of capable employes is the prerogative of management and this responsibility rests with management completely except as it has been voluntarily limited by agreement with the Organization. The general purpose of Rule S, and similar rules on other carriers, is to eliminate favoritism and prejudice in assigning positions within the scope of the Agreement. This is accomplished by requiring the senior applicant in point of service to be assigned if he has sufficient fit-

ness and ability to do the work. This does not mean that the employe has to be immediately fitted for the job. It means that he has such intelligence, training and experience that it could be reasonably assumed that he could do the work in a satisfactory manner after a brief apprenticeship, usually a qualifying tirae fixed by the rule itself. Naturally this requires the exercise of judgment, a function of management. Whether management has exercised an honest judgment requires an investigation of an intangible thing difficult of ascertainment. We cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of management because the official charged with the responsibility is usually familiar with the record of the employe his habits, personality and character, and many other items bearing upon Ais fitness and ability which cannot be reflected in the record presented before this Board. We are limited, therefore, to a close scrutiny of the record to determine whether there is evidence of favoritism or prejudice, and if there is sufficient evidence to support the determination made by the Carrier.

We find no evidence in this case that Carrier's officials were prejudiced against this claimant or that they unduly favored the employe assigned. We think also there was evidence in the record requiring the exercise of judgment which is sufficient to sustain the conclusion reached by the Carrier that Claimant did not have sufficient fitness and ability for the position sought. We agree with the Organization that Rule S ought not to be used as an excuse for the exercise of arbitrary action. But, in the absence of a showing of undue favoritism towards the one assigned or prejudice against the employe rejected, or a showing that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the exercise of managerial judgment, this Board cannot interfere. Awards 3151 and 3273.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June: 21, 1934;

That the Agreement was not violated.

AWARD