quired by Rule 29 of the parties' Agreement, is without merit. Likewise the contention that he did not have a fair and impartial trial as contemplated by Rule 29 because the Division Supervisor acted as accuser, prosecutor and judge. As stated in Award 4840 of this Division:

. . It must be borne in mind that the conduct of a hearing in a disciplinary proceeding does not require an adherence to all the attributes of a trial of a criminal proceeding in the courts. Prior to the advent of collective agreements, management could hire and fire, or otherwise discipline employes, without reason and without cause. This prerogative has been limited by contract and it is the enforcement of these limiting contractual provisions with which we are here concerned. In other words, the Carrier must show that it acted upon evidence that warranted the application of discipline or, stated inversely, it must show that it did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily. The Carrier's trial officer represents it in making this determination. It is not a case of the trial officer being both prosecutor and judge, it is a matter of contract compliance in which the trial officer interprets the Agreement in the light of the evidence in the first instance . . . .

It would undoubtedly be desirable to have a neutral party act as judge in important investigations, such as the one here involved, but until the parties so provide in their agreements this Division is without authorty to require it.

There is direct evidence showing that Graham rode from the perishable

dock to tracks 19 and 20 on a tongue connecting two wagons. This was in violation of Rule 1136. But such violation is certainly not sufficient grounds on which to discharge an employe with approximately 34 years of satisfactory service.

There is also evidence by James W. Eib, senior officer with the Security Department, that Graham urinated onto a package of cakes in his car and the Agency was therefore not clearly wrong in finding Claimant was guilty of this phase of the charges made against Graham. However, there are certain extenuating circumstances which case serious doubt as to the truth of Eib's testimony on which such finding must necessarily by based. First, the fact that Eib did not immediately confront Graham with the charge when the physical facts of what he is charged with would have been clearly discernible, and Second, complete lack of evidence that any shipment was damaged. In view of the Claimant's 34 years of satisfactory service and these extenuating circumstances we find that the dismissal was unreasonable and arbitrary punishment and that he has already been sufficiently punished by having been off his job for about two years.

It is the opinion of this Division, considering the record as a whole that Graham should be returned to service with his seniority unimpaired but that his record should not be cleared of the charges nor should he be compensated for wages lost.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Agency's act of dismissing Graham from the service was unreasonable and arbitrary.

AWARD