STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the General Committee of The Order of Railroad Telegraphers on The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, that
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: An agreement by and between the parties bearing effective date of July 1, 1928 (reprinted July 1, 1948) is in evidence, hereinafter referred to as the Telegraphers' Agreement.
Chesapeake Junction is a point located on the Alexandria Sub-division of the Baltimore Division. At one time there was a telegraph office at this location with around-the-clock service on three separate shifts to operate the movements of trains to and from the single track at this point and to perform all the telegraphic communication work arising at that station. On or about May 12, 1943 the telegraph positions at Chesapeake Junction were declared abolished by the Carrier and the controls of the switches and signals for the movement of trains to and from the single track at Chesapeake Junction were transferred to the telegraph service employes at "JD" Signal Station at Alexandria Junction, 3.8 miles distant, to handle by remote control operation.
On January 3, 1951, a water line pipe beneath the tracks burst at Defense Highway Crossing, Bladensburg, Maryland which required trains to proceed at a slow speed at this point. This required that a special train order be issued to each and every train passing over the track at the point where the water line had burst. The repair work which started on January 3 was not completed until January 9, 1951 and train orders were required for all trains operating over this point until the repairs were completed.
within the stipulated exception to the general rule. Certainly it was never the intent of Article 35 to prohibit telephone conversation between trainmen and operators within the interlocking limits of the Tower. Since the territory controlled by Alexandria Junction 'Tower properly includes the end of double track east of Chesapeake Junction, communication by telephone, or by any other means, between trainmen in this area and the tower man at the Junction is permissible under the rule. , Certainly no operator was displaced as a result of anything done here.
For these reasons, the Carrier submits the Employes cannot support a claim under the application of any rule to be found in the Working Contract.
Based on the above, the Carrier respectfully petitions this Division to find this claim, 'Parts (1) and (2), as being wholly without merit and to deny them accordingly.
All data submitted in support of the Carrier's position has been presented to, or is known by, the other party to this dispute.
OPINION OF BOARD: The essential, relevant facts in the instant dispute are not a matter of controversy between the Parties. (1) On the Carrier's Alexandria Branch is Chesapeake Junction, a point about four miles from Alexandria Junction, which latter connects the Carrier's Alexandria and Washington branches. (2) At Chesapeake Junction there are various signals and devices directing the movement of trains to and from that po:nt; and these are remote-controlled by operators at Alexandria Junction. (3) Before May 13, 1943, and particularly during the Carrier's construction of a passing double track in the early part of the war, telegraph operators had been employed to help control traffic at Chesapeake Junction. But as of that date these positions were abolished, and the above mentioned remotecontrol system was installed at Alexandria Junction. The positions at the latter office were, through negotiation between the Parties given higher rates of pay because of the increased amount of duty and responsibility. (4) On January 3, 1951, a water pipe line burst at Defense Highway Crossing on the Alexandria Branch. This made it necessary for trains to proceed at greatly reduced speed east of Chesapeake Junction while repairs were being made. The Carrier required eastbound trains to stop at this Junction. Train crew members there copied down orders received by telephone from the operator at Alexandria Junction. In other words, the remote-control mechanisms at Chesapeake Junction were adequate for handling the conditions involved in normal train movements, but not for the special conditions with which this case is concerned. (5) Repairs were completed by January 9, 1951, and normal train movements were thereafter resumed.
The Organization contends that for the January 3-9 period the Carrier should have re-established the train order office at Chesapeake Junction, so that the train orders could have been transmitted manually to train crew members by Organization members. The Carrier's decision to operate as above described is alleged to have violated the scope rule of the agreement as well as Article 35 (both are quoted in full in the Organization's presentation, above). It is the Organization's contention that (1) the Carrier gave to non- Organization employes work which under the Scope Rule could have properly been assigned only to positions under the Organization's recognized jurisdiction; and (2) under Article 35 the Carrier agreed not to displace operators by having non-Organization employes use the telephone for handling train orders, except in the three circumstances mentioned in that rule, none of which applies here.
The Carrier contends that no provision of the Agreement was violated. It argues that (1) since train movements east of Chesapeake Junction were directed by remote control from Alexandria Junction and the action complained of took place within the interlocking limits of the latter's 5901-25 25
control, it was entirely proper for the operator at Alexandria Junction to talk directly with the trainmen (i. e., the latter were "handed" their orders through modern technological devices) ; (2) the previously mentioned settlement of higher rates for Alexandria Junction operators was designed to cover and avoid any such claim as the instant one; (3) in any case under Rule 35 the exceptions of "emergency" and "passing sidings" existed in this case, so that the rule's prohibition does not apply; and (4) even if these exceptions are not deemed applicable here, the rule forbids only "displacement" of operators, and there was no such displacement here.
In respect to the first main issue-the applicability of the Scope Rule of the Agreement-there can be little doubt, in the light of numerous previous awards by this Board, that the manual handing of train orders to train crews comes within the proper general meaning of that Rule. In the absence of some other rule to the contrary, more specifically applicable to the circumstances of this case, we would be disposed to rule at once in favor of the Organization. But there is such a specific rule-Rule 35. Therefore, we must consider its meaning in terms of this case's facts.
In Rule 35 the Carrier agrees not to displace operators by letting nonoperators use the telephone to handle train orders except in bona fide cases of emergency or where the non-operators use the telephone at the ends of passing sidings or spur tracks in communicating with operators. To resolve this case, then, we must decide whether there was a bona fide emergency and whether passing sidings or spur tracks were involved; if we find none of these, we must then decide whether the Carrier's action displaced any operators.
We do not think that the record establishes the existence of an emergency, in the usual meaning of that term for railroad operation. We think that the Organization succeeded in showing that the Carrier had sufficient time to plan for the use of one or more operators at Chesapeake Junction if it had chosen to do so. In our judgment also the record indicates that the track involved was not passing sidings or spurs in the usage normally attached to those terms.
We are then left with the question, Did the Carrier's action displace operators? What meaning should propery be attached to "displace" in the light of this case's circumstances? If "displace" here means that, when or because the trainmen received and copied their orders over the telephone from an operator four miles away, one or more operators lost their jobs or their positions were abolished, it is obvious that nothing of the sort occurred. The operator positions at Chesapeake Junction had disappeared almost eight years before. They were displaced by technological improvements and not by what the Carrier did from January 3 to January 9, 1951. On the other hand, if we define "displacement" to mean that the handling of train orders under the Carrier's decision made it possible to avoid the temporary employment of one or more operators at Chesapeake Junction for the period in question, we cannot but conclude that there was such displacement.
We think we must hold here to the second of the above-stated definitions. We believe that the general intent of the Agreement was not only to protect employes' rights in existing positions but also to guard against giving their recognized duties to other employes where new work, temporary or permanent, arises. In the instant case, operators were deprived of work just as surely as if the manual transmission of orders had long existed at Chesapeake Junction and the Carrier had suddenly given such duties over to trainmen, thereby abolishing operators' positions. Thus, we believe that the Carrier was required by the Agreement to use operators at Chesapeake Junction for the period January 3 to January 9, 1951.
This is not to say, of course, that under other circumstances we should not be inclined to adopt the first of the definitions outlined above and come 5901-2s 26