POSITION OF CARRIER: These claimants started actual traveling in their camp cars at 4:20 P. M., September 8, 1951, a rest day for them. Their work day assigned hours ended at 5:00 P. M., September 7, 1951, and they were released at end of tour of duty.

The only traveling by them on September 8, 1951, during hours estab. lished for work period on other days, was between 4:20 P. M. and 5:00 P. M., and payment was made therefore, (20 minutes additional being erroneously allowed) in accordance with Rule 24 of the Signalmen's Agreement, reading:

"RULE 24. TRAVEL IN CAMP CARS. Employes regularly assigned to camp cars and traveling by direction of the management in such cars, will be allowed straight time for traveling or waiting during regular working hours and for rest days and holidays during hours established for work periods on other days. When traveling in camp cars between the end of the regular hours of one day and the beginning of regular hours of the following day, no time will be allowed,"

This rule provides for payment while traveling only during regular assigned hours and on rest days only during hours established for work periods on other days. The employes did not travel on September 8, 1951 between 8:00 A. M. and 4:20 P, M., and therefore, are not entitled to any payment under Rule 24 during that period.

Rule 24, as designated by its title, is a straight travel rule and the reference to "waiting" applies only after the start of travel, i.e., waiting enroute for connections, delays, enroute, etc. In the instant case, they first started to move in camp cars at 4:20 P. M., September 8, 1951.

The employes cannot show where any payment has been made in the past as they now contend.

Under the evidence recited above, their claim should be denied.

It is hereby armed that all data herein contained is, in substance, known to the Organization and is hereby made a part of the question in dispute.

OPINION OF BOARD; We think the real reason for the claim in this case is the Carrier's error in seeking to rely on Rule 24 of the Agreement effective as of July 1, 1952, which date is subsequent to the date of the claim (September 8, 1951).

While it is true that Rule 24 in the 1952 Agreement is identical in language with Rule 22 of the 1938 Agreement except for the title, "Travel in Camp Cars," as revised in the 40-Hour Week Agreement signed at Chicago on August 2, 1950, it is understandable why the Carrier would like us to tie the case to the 1952 Agreement which provides in Rule 23, "The Term 'traveling or waiting,' as herein used, means traveling on trains or waiting for trains while en route." (Emphasis supplied)

Some question might arise as to whether the word "herein" in the above quotation is limited to Rule 23 or could with propriety modify all the Rules 22 to 24 of the 1952 Agreement because the caption to Rule 22 is "PayTraveling and Waiting." Presumably the Carrier adopts the latter theory, because in its ex parte submission, it says, "Rule 24, as designated by its title, (as already indicated there was no such title to Rule 22 at the time this claim arose) is a straight travel rule and the reference to `waiting' applies only after the start of travel, i.e., waiting en route for connections,

delays en route, etc." It is obvious that the Carrier must revert to Rule 23 quoted above to pick up the word "en route" because that is the only place the word appears in all three rules.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the dictionary (Webster's New Collegiate, 1949 Ed) definition of en route is "On or along the way," which could indicate inclusion of both terminals for the purpose of computing "waiting" time, a point we need not decide in this case.

Because of the use of the word "or;" in the phrase "traveling or waiting;" the rule could read for the purposes of thus claim that these employes "will be allowed straight time for waiting during regular working hours, etc."

Carrier relies upon Award 6065 where a very similar rule was involved and the Carrier was successful because the clause relied upon read "When traveling in outfit cars etc." The words, "or waiting," were omitted from that portion of the rule, and the employes were seeking to recover "for waiting" en route under that rule. But the hurdle that the employes could not get over in that case was ". . . the only time allowed will be for actual time traveling, etc." (Underscoring by Carrier) The Board said that because of the language, "actual time traveling," being in the rule, the claim would have to be denied. If that limiting phrase was in the present rule we would have to deny the claim.

Another hurdle which the Claimants make in this case is our Award 5977, where again a somewhat similar rule was involved and the phrase, "Travel or waiting time," was in the rule. But in that case Rule 2 (which included the quoted language) was qualified by reference to Rule 1 which limited time to "time traveling" "on or off their assigned territory." (Emphasis supplied)

The Board said in that award, "While the rules may seem harsh or inequitable, this Board cannot rewrite the rules." So it is in this case, except that the seeming harshness militates against the Carrier.

It is admitted in this case that the Carrier paid for part of the time claimed, but seeks to excuse itself by saying it misinterpreted the rule. We think that is a fair statement because it was less than a year after this claim arose that the Carrier was successful in negotiating the 1952 Agreement which corrected the situation that undoubtedly gave rise to the misinterpretation. (Carrier could have been misled, or at least justifiedly confused by our award in 5157). But whatever the reason it should not be held against the Employes. (Awards 2350, 6538)

The Carrier complains that the employes are assuming an inconsistent position with that they took in Award 6065. There is nothing new about that. Life is full of inconsistencies, and the work on the Board is full of them, if for no other reason that frequently the agreements themselves are inconsistent; it just happens that this one must be resolved in favor of the employes.

Finally, the Carrier stresses the fact that the employes are indefinite about the time their car was billed. If the Employes were trying to recover for anything beyond their usual starting time that might become important, but such is not the case.

The claim should be sustained.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Carrier violated the Agreement.

AWARD