NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS,
FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES
THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Claim of the System Committee of the
Brotherhood that the Carrier violated the terms of the Clerical Agreement
on Sunday, June 29, 1952, when it refused to compensate Parsons Extra
Clerk Donald E. Angel at the rate of time and one-half for service performed
on his rest day, and that the Carrier shall now be required to compensate
Clerk Angel for the difference between what he was paid at the pro rata
rate of his position and what he should have been paid at the punitive rate.
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS:
At Parsons Yard, Ohio, there
is in effect an agreement establishing, effective January 1 1951, a bona fide
extra list of Group 1 employes. (See Employes' Exhibit "A" attached.)
Mr. Donald E. Angel, the claimant, was employed by the Chesapeake and
Ohio Railway Company on June 10, 1952, and was assigned to a standing
on this bona fide extra list to perform service for the Carrier in accordance.
with provisions of the extra list agreement. During the period involved
in this claim Mr. Angel was so assigned. The issue involved is the rate
of pay applicable to the service performed by Mr. Angel on Sunday, June
29 1952. The Carrier has paid the straight time rate of pay for service
performed by Ankel on that date. The Employes contend that Angel performed service on more than five days in the work week beginning Monday,
June 23, 1952, and extending through Sunday, June 29, 1952. The Employes further contend that Angel was entitled to two rest days during
the period Monday, June 23 and Sunday, June 29, 1952, and having been
accorded but one rest day Tuesday, June 24-the agreement supports the
claim for payment at the rate of time and one-half times the basic straight
time rate for work started on the seventh calendar day of Angel's work
week the last day of the work week that he could have been accorded his
second rest day in the period.
During the work week involved Angel was called from the extra list to
fill temporary vacancies in regular assignments as follows:
Date Day of Wage
1952 Week Position Hours Worked Rate How Paid
6-23 Monday Yard Clerk 12:O1A- S:oOA$14.52 Straight time rate.
6-24 Tuesday Did not work
6-25 Wednesday Record Clerk S:oOA- 4:OOP 14.52 Straight time rate.
6-26 Thursday Yard Clerk 4:OOP-12:o0P 14.52 Straight time rate.
6-27 Friday Yard Clerk 12:O1A- S:OOA 14.52 Time and one-half rate.
6-28 Saturday Yard Clerk 12:O1A- 8:o0A 14.52 Straight time rate.
6-28 Saturday Messenger 12:01A- SODA 13.15 Time and one-half rate.
6-29 Sunday Messenger 12:O1A- 8:OOA 13.15 Straight time rate.
(3361
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paid for in excess of eight straight time hours will not be used in
computing the 40 hour work week for the extra clerk and also
will not be used in computing the number of regularly assigned
extra clerks to be assigned to the extra list for the succeeding
payroll period."
Therefore, there is nothing in the extra list agreement which sets aside
the general agreement provisions with regard to computing the 40-hour work
week for extra employes.
The Carrier's payments in this case have been made fully in accordance
with all of the agreement rules, and the claim should be denied in its entirety.
All data included in this submission have been discussed in conference
or by correspondence with the Employe representatives.
(Exhibits not reproduced)
OPINION OF BOARD:
It. is the claim of the Organization that Extra
Clerk Donald E. Angel had but one rest day (Tuesday) off in his work
week starting Monday, June 23, 1952 and having worked six days of the
seven, he should have been paid one and one half times the basic straight
time for work on Sunday, June 29, 1952, the second rest day of his work
week, instead of the straight time rate paid by Carrier.
Organization cites, in support of its claim, these portions of Rule 30:
"{a) The Carrier will establish * * * a work week of 40
hours, consisting of five days of eight hours each, with two con
secutive days off in each seven * * *; so far as practicable the days
off shall be Saturday and Sunday.
"(h) To the extent extra * * * men may be utilized under
this agreement, their days off need not be consecutive * * *:'
Organization also relies on this portion of Rule 31 (c)
"Employes worked on more than five days in a work week shall
be paid one and one-half times the basic straight time rate for
work on the sixth and seventh days of their work weeks * * * (exceptions which follow are not applicable here)."
Organization contends:
"Since the facts of record indicate that Angel was worked
on six separate and distinct calendar days during his work week as
an unassigned employe which began on Monday, June 23 and extended through Sunday, June 29, 1952, the sole dispute between
the parties is whether Angel should have been allowed pay at the
rate of time and one-half time for service performed from 12:01
A. M. to 8:00 A. M. on Sunday, June 29, 1952, or was he properly
allowed pay for that service at the straight time rate of pay. The
Employes contend that Angel should have been accorded one more
rest day during the period involved in addition to Tuesday June 24,
1952. That additional day-viewing the record-should ~ave been
Sunday, June 29, 1952."
Argument in behalf of Organization concedes, however, that Carrier
"had the alternative of letting Claimant have Sunday as his second day off
duty; or working Claimant as Carrier did, but paying him therefor at the
punitive or premium rate * * *."
Carrier, however, points to the agreed fact that Claimant, having worked
4:00 P. M. to midnight, on Thursday of the week in question and the shift
immediately following from 12:01 A. M. to 8:00 A. M., Friday, was paid
for the latter shift at time and one-half. Also, because Claimant worked a
shift starting at 12:01 to 8:00 A. M., Saturday and also worked the 4:00
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345
P. M. to midnight shift the same day, he was paid at the punitive rate for
the latter shift, the premium shifts each having come within the 24 hour
range beginning with the start of his previous assignments, respectively.
Section 5(c) of Memorandum of Agreement between the parties effective January 1, 1951 reads as follows:
"When extra clerks are worked the second tour of duty within
a twenty-four hour period, and/or worked beyond forty hours in
any work week, for which service time and one-half is paid, time
paid for in excess of eight straight time hours will not be used in
computing the 40 hour work week for the extra clerk and also will
not be used in computing the number of regularly assigned extra
clerks to be assigned to the extra list for the succeeding payroll
period." It is argued on behalf of Carrier that:
"*
* * during his work week-Monday, June 23, through and
inclusive of Sunday, June 29-Claimant worked five straight time
days for which he was compensated at the straight time rate and
16 hours' overtime for which he was compensated at the rate of
time and one-half.
"Rule 31 (d) expressly provides that 'There shall be no overtime on overtime' and 'neither shall overtime hours paid for * * *
be utilized in computing the 40 hours per week. * * *' Accordingly
the sixteen hours Claimant worked and was paid for as overtime
during his work week cannot be used in computing the 40 hours per
week. Further, Section 5 (c) in the Memorandum of Agreement expressly provides that,-
, `* * * time paid for in excess of eight straight time
hours will not be used in computing the 40 hour work week
for the extra clerk.'
"Inasmuch as the sixteen hours Claimant worked and was paid
for as overtime cannot be used in computing the forty hours in his
work week. Rule 31 (c) relied on by Petitioner is neither applicable
nor was it violated. Claimant has been properly paid and is not
entitled to the additional compensation claimed."
Carrier's argument, predicated on the clear language of the applicable
Agreements, will be susained and a denial Award will be made.
FINDINGS:
The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving
the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the
whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act,
as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the
dispute involved herein; and
That the Agreement was not violated.
AWARD
Claim denied.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of THIRD DIVISION
ATTEST: A. Ivan Tummon
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 20th day of March, 1958.