(3) None of the alleged Agreement violations were handled on the property in accord with applicable Agreement provisions, hence ere not properly before this Division for adjudication-

(a) Certain of the alleged violations were not handled on the property up to the highest Carrier officer designated to handle claims;

(b) The balance of the alleged violations were not handled on the property after final declination by the highest Corner officer designated to handle claims, in accord with the requirements of Schedule Agreement Article 34 (Time Limit Rule).

(4) The claimants are unnamed, hence the claim as presented is vague, indefinite, and impossible of ascertainment."

"The Employes will not try to reproduce all of the correspondence exchanged between the parties in connection with the 164 violations included in this submission. * * * "

The Labor Member who argued this case noted that the Carrier itself had not raised such procedural objections, and upon investigation, reports in his rebuttal brief that he had secured-

"and have in my possession the entire organization file in each of the 164 claims we are now dealing with. Each of those claims was handled precisely as required by the parties' rules and the Railway Labor Act. There is a letter in every one of those files covering each step of handling, including declination by the highest officer of the Carrier designated to handle such claims. * " * I have copies of the General Chairman's letters in which he unequivocally informs the Carrier's highest officer that his decision-in each of the 164 claimsis not acceptable. * * * At page 135 of the record the carrier says it ". . subscribes to the information set out in detail in petitioner's statement of claim.', without in any way indicating there was any procedural failure on the part of the Employer. Nowhere in its submission does the Carrier make any such charge, and in the penultimate paragraph of its submission, page 136, indicates full compliance by both parties with all requirements of the agreement and Railway Labor Act."

The Referee did not deem it necessary to accept the Labor Member's invitation to inspect, in the presence of Carrier Members, the files in question.

We will, therefore, reject points (3) and (4) of Carrier Member's argument and hold that this claim is not procedurally defective, that it is not impossible of ascertainment.

We shall proceed to consider points (1) and (2) offered in behalf of Carrier in support 'of its argument that the claim should be denied. Essentially such argument is that the same claim, with the same parties and agree-

ment rules, was disposed of by this Board in Award 7976 and, under many prior awards of this Board, unless Award 7976 is held palpably wrong, this claim must be denied.

A literal reading of the claim in this docket shows it to be the same agreement transgression that was covered by Award 7976; however, the violations before us now cover the period May 8, 1953 through June 18, 1955, whereas Award 7976 covered the period April 20, 1951 through March 22, 1952.

We had a somewhat similar question before us in Award 8419. However, the claim there was identical in every respect and detail to the claim disposed of by this Board in Award 5432.

We will not accept argument in Carrier's behalf and dismiss this claim on its assertion that it was disposed of .by Award 7976. A similar claim was disposed of by Award 7976, but not the same claim as here. To do so would be to say once an Organization charges a Carrier with an agreement violation, and such claim is disposed of by an award of this Board, that Organization is forever estopped from again charging the sime Carrier with violating the same agreement provision on other occasions or under other circumstances. Such reasoning would be absurd.

This is not to say that such would not be a desirable situation. We have in mind a number of industries and major companies which have permanent arbitration machinery with a permanent arbitrator. Once an agreement provision is there determined by the arbitrator, it is seldom that a second case may ensue to test such provision, unless, of course, the facts may be so different as to require separate consideration.

There is a crying need for such stability in determining agreement interpretation in the railroad industry. Under the prevailing machinery, such ideals are impossible of attainment. The industry and the parties here are most certainly mature enough in the field of collective bargaining to permit of such an accomplishment. It is not, however, in our province to determine the obstacle to such idealism.

This case must turn, then, on claim in Carrier's behalf that-

"this record does not furnish any substantial evidence to show Award 7976 is wrong and should be overruled."

The claim in Award 7976 first came to the Board in Docket TE-6724. Award 6779 found-

"That the entire Agreement was not before the parties during consideration of the within dispute and accordingly the same is remanded, with privilege to resubmit if not resolved as stated in the Opinion."

The Opinion of the Board there noted:

"A Carrier Member of the Division, after arguments were closed, submits, what he terms, newly discovered evidence. This evidence consists of correspondence relating to a Telegraphers' submission in 1937 mentioned in First Division Award 5295, of which this Division has no record The correspondence explains the reason therefor.

Second, the newly submitted evidence contains what appears to be a letter ratification of an oral agreement relating to the very point at issue.

"In the interests of the expeditious handling of disputes, we would generally look with disfavor upon unilateral, supplemental submissions. However, in resolving disputes, we assume that the entire Agreement of the parties is before us. From the late showing made, the entire Agreement was neither before us nor the parties when they considered this controversy upon the property. Accordingly, we are remanding the dispute to the parties for further consideration in light of the new evidence and the opinions expressed herein. If negotiations do not result in settlement of this dispute within ninety days, the dispute may be resubmitted with appropriate comment on the evidence before mentioned."

The dispute subsequently was resubmitted as Docket TE-7504 and decided by Award 7976. Both dockets were cited by Carrier Member arguing this case as part of the evidence before us in this dispute.

Award 6779 was adopted by this Board October 13, 1954. The "evidence" which prompted the Board to remand the dispute to the parties consisted of a letter, dated February 26, 1941, from Carrier Superintendent L. P. Kennedy to John W. Graham, LaGrange, N.C., described by the Organization as a former General Chairman on this carrier from 1930 until March 19, 1935, when he resigned.

This letter consists of Mr. Kennedy's version as to what transpired at a conference between the parties held December 13, 1934-more than six years before such letter was written. It was attested to by Mr. Kennedy's affidavit, and an affidavit on Mr. Graham's part, reading:

"The best I can remember the statements below are correct as to the agreements reached."

It was presented to the Referee handling Docket TE-6724 almost twenty years after the conference is alleged to have been held. And, as Referee Donaldson noted in Award 6779, it was presented "after arguments were closed" in Docket TE-6724.

Award 6779 did not, however, decide the claim on its merits.

Upon its resubmission as Docket TE-7504, the Organization attacks the manner in which such "new evidence," which we will hereafter refer to as the Graham-Kennedy letter, was presented to the Board; it asserts it was presented and received long after "the parties had rested their case," and was, therefore, inadmissible under the Board's consistent admonition to the parties in all disputes that it-

"is not disposed to admit known evidence at an oral hearing which has not theretofore been presented for consideration by the interested parties during negotiations between them in their undertaking to adjust the dispute without petition to the Adjustment Board."

This Board used such language in advising the parties of the time and place for oral hearing on that dispute, which was then handed as TE-6724.

In its submission to this Board in TE-7504, Organization states:

"The Employes do not think it is necessary to discuss the contents of the Graham-Kennedy letter. The very manner in which it was brought into being is sufficient to remove it from the realm of consideration. The letter is neither an agreement nor an interpretation of the agreement between the parties. It represents an attempt to create a record of something that never transpired at Norfolk on the day in question even though assuming that the original letter is in existence in the form disclosed. * * * The Organization representatives on the property have never laid eyes on it although apparently existing for approximately fourteen years it has never, at any stage, been disclosed as documentary to the collective bargaining agreement. The General Chairman of the Telegraphers on the Norfolk Southern on February 26, 1941 was H. M. Harris. If there were to be any oral understandings, letters, memoranda or other documents bearing on the Telegraphers' Agreement, then Messrs. Kennedy and Poe should have addressed themselves to General Chairman Harris whom they well knew was the authorized representative of the employes at that time. Certainly Graham had no standing in such matters, any more than some retired officer of the Carrier would have had in a similar proceeding with Harris. * * *"

It is not for us here to decide if this Board should have accepted the Graham-Kennedy letter in TE-6724.

But we will not consider it in the dispute now before us because we agree, with the Organization, that it "is neither an agreement nor an interpretation of an agreement between the parties."

We must and will decide this case on the basis of the duly negotiated agreements between the parties. The Graham-Kennedy letter does not fall within that category.

"Article I-Scope:

The following rules, working conditions, and rates of pay will apply to all telegraphers, telephoners (except switchboard-operators), agent-telegraphers, agent-telephoners, clerk-telegraphers, levermen, towermen, operators of mechanical telegraph machines, block operators, such station agents (freight or ticket), and assistant agents as are herein listed, hereinafter referred to as employes, and such additional positions as may be hereafter created or established within this scope."

"Article 15:

No employes other than covered by this schedule and train dispatchers will be permitted to handle train orders at telegraph or telephone offices where an operator is employed and is available, or can be promptly located; except in emergency, conductors or engineers will be permitted to do so, in which case the telegrapher will be paid for the call."

Argument presented in behalf of Carrier observes that-

"It is readily notable that the Employes did not then consider their Scope Rule as an all-inclusive role, because if they had there would have been no necessity to negotiate and adopt a Train Order rule,

"It is equally notable that the Train Order rule, by reason of its restrictive language, only reserves to Telegraphers (or Dispatchers) the handling of train orders at points where an operator is employed, and permits the continuance of the practice on this property for other than Telegraphers to handle train orders at points where Telegraphers are not employed * * *."

"On August 14th, conferences were had with the representatives Order of Railway Conductors and Order of Railroad Telegraphers, who objected to the present practice of relying upon conductors to handle train orders.

We have agreed with the representatives of these two organizations that it is not our purpose to require conductors to handle train orders, excepting under conditions of an emergency nature, such as accidents, personal injury, wash-outs, fires, engine failure, or such other similar causes.

Please see that this understanding is respected by all concerned and strictly complied with, acknowledging receipt."

"At a meeting of the O.R.C. and O.R.T. General Committees jointly, with their Vice Presidents Nemitz and Dermody, which was held with the General Manager of the Norfolk-Southern Railway August 13, 1922, on the matter of the requirements of Conductors to use telephones, I beg to quote you below letter addressed to Superintendents Shea and Cox, signed by General Manager Pelter August 14th, which were the results of our conference: (the Pelter letter, referred to above, is then quoted)

"Therefore, you are advised that it is not the intent of the management to require the Conductors to use 'phones other than for for the above purposes; and at any time in the future you are required to do so by a dispatcher, request of him for a message to do so and promptly forward that to the Local Chairman in the proper way, who wlll handle with the Superintendents."

"Conductors, trainmen and yard service employes are not now and have not been in the past required to copy train orders, except

in cases of emergencies, and the Respondent does not believe that there is any foundation or basis for the filing of the instant claim with the Board. * * * "

Organization argues:

"The first agreement in effect on this property was established during Federal control of railroads. Rules with respect to working conditions for telegraph service employes were fairly uniform throughout the nation. Orders, regulations, supplements and decisions rendered by the Administration applied to all carriers. Among these was Interpretation No. 4 to Supplement No. 13, excerpts of which are set forth at Page 13 hereof. By referring to that Interpretation we find the Administration stating that the work of handling train orders either by telegraph or telephone falls to the employes covered by Supplement No. 13 (telegraphers). There was never any question but what the handling of train orders by telegraph was telegraphers' work. The orders were dispatched ~by telegraph and it followed that they were copied by telegraphers only. * * * There was no dispute, and there could be none, that the entire field of communication service on railroads as to train orders, messages or reports of record was reserved to telegraphers. With the advent of the telephone, telegraphers' agreements were modified to include the telephoner class in case any work formerly handled by telegraph was diverted to the newer medium. * * * "

Organization argues further that this Board-

" * * * has stated many times in substance that Scope Rules generally fall within one of two classifications-those which are very general do character and include all work traditionally performed by the contracting craft, and those which specifically spell out the work included. Scope rules of this Organization purposely do not spell out, in so many words, the work which is embraced within the terms of the agreement, but it is an accepted and well established fact that they do cover work. They are within the category of Scope Rules 'general in character' where tradition, historical practice and custom define the work covered; hence they cover all of the work traditionally, historically and customarily performed by the classes of employes therein specified. Awards 3003, 3004, 3999, 4516, 5038, 5133. They identify the employes by classes who possess the contractual right to perform all of the work encompassed by the agreement, an integral and unquestioned part of which is the transmission and reception of communications by telegraph or telephone such as the train orders here involved. They have not only the fitness and ability, but also the contractual right to perform such work. Award 3881.

"Your Board from its inception has consistently held to the pattern set by similar tribunals to the effect that work of a class covered by the scope of an agreement, and not within an exception contained therein, belongs to the employes in whose behalf the agreement was made, and cannot be delegated to others without violating the agreement, and rightly so. See Awards 2858, 3684, 3901, 3902 and 3955. Many other awards of your Board are just as conclusive and emphatic. It is not the Employes' desire to unduly burden the record, however, we think it is proper to direct particular attention to a few additional awards which are directly in point. * * * "

"The facts in relation to the subject matter of the instant claim, and the position of the carrier with relation to such matter, are most thoroughly and sufficiently stated in Carrier's Ex-Parte Submission. Briefs and Rebuttals in an identical dispute, involving many of the same stations as are involved in the instant claim, which has been docketed by your Division as Docket TE-6724, on which Award 6779 was rendered, which award remanded the dispute back to the property to attempt to reach settlement, and instructing that in the event settlement was not so reached the dispute be re-submitted. The dispute was re-submitted to your Division and is now pending adjudication under Docket TE-7504. (Decided by Award 7976.)

"To avoid burdening the record in the instant claim by lengthy and unnecessary repetition with respect to the respondent carrier's position on the subject matter of the instant claim, reference is here made to Dockets TE-6724 and TE-7504, and those dockets are here, by reference, made a part of this submission."

Organization makes this statement:

"After termination of Federal control of railroads, the United States Railroad Labor Board, an agency created by Federal Statutes, in its decision No. 757, dated March 3, 1922, adopted the pattern cut by the United States Railroad Administration, in that the classification included in the Scope Rules promulgated ~by the Director General of Railroads in Supplement No. 13 to General Order No. 27 and its directives and interpretations, were reaffirmed and continued in agreements with this Organization. This question-application of the scope rules-was further dealt with by the United States Railroad Labor Board in its decisions 2025. 2455, 3278 and Interpretation No. 1 to Decisions Nos. 757 and 2025, dated April 15, 1924. No change was made in the previous holdings that communication service-messages, orders and reports of record, transmitted or received. whether handled by Morse telegraph or by telephone (synonymous terms) came within the scope of the agreement here in question and must be confined to employes covered thereby."

Organization argues:

"Most certainly these official declarations concerning the Scope Rule coverage and classifications of positions, make it clear that none other than those included in the craft or class of telegraphers, telephoners, block operators, etc., may properly be assigned to perform service of the classes specified."

"No employes other than covered by this schedule and train dispatchers will be permitted to handle train orders at telegraph or telephone offices where an operator is employed and is available, or can be promptly located; except in emergency, conductors, or engineers will be permitted to do so, in which case the telegrapher will be paid for the call." ,

" * * * the Scope Rule in and of itself is a grant of rights to the employes covered by the Agreement which rights are secured to them so long as the Agreement is in force, and any infringement amounts to a violation. This as a general attitude towards the Scope Rule is supported by numerous Awards. It appears to be a correct analysis.

"The so-called train order rule is not a grant of work to the employes covered by the Agreement but is a specific restriction and limitation upon the right of the carrier to allow work covered by the Scope Rule to be performed by those not covered. It simply under named conditions permits work covered to be performed by others."

Award 6863 (Parker)-Here the train order rule is in three parts:

"'(a) No employe other than covered by this Agreement and train dispatchers will be permitted to handle train orders except in oases of emergency.

"'(b) If train orders are handled at stations or locations where an employe covered by this Agreement is employed but not on duty, the employe, if available or can be promptly located, will be called to perform such duties and paid under the provisions of Article 7; if available and not called, the employe will be compensated as if he had been called.' "

Paragraph (c) spelled out "emergencies" in detail.

Award 7400 (Larkin) had no train order rule.

We have also reviewed Award 7976 upon which Carrier relies heavily. It observed:

" * * * At none of the stations was there regular and continuing day by day, week after week, handling of train orders by non-telegraphers. It would appear, then, that the more or less scattered instances herein constitute only 'occasional' or 'irregular' handling of train orders by non-telegraphers at stations where no telegrapher is stationed. The Record leaves little doubt that train orders have been so handled on this property for many years, starting about 1910 and continuing at least to the time of the incidents involved in the present dispute. This past practice is of paramount importance in determining the coverage of a Scope Rule of the general character involved herein."

While Award 7976 said "these (Scope and Train Order) rules were retained unchanged in each successive Collective Agreement * * * in the setting of the aforesaid practice" the record before us shows the Organization protesting Carriers action from August, 1922, when General Manager Palter agreed with the Organization on this question, forward. Award 7976 predicated its denial of the claim mainly on Awards 6863 and 7953.

There is also Award 8327 (McCoy). While this is a denial award, denial was made on the grounds that "no human hand intervened between the telegrapher and the train crew to whom the order was addressed."

This award was also cited on behalf of the Organization, but with specific reference to this portion of the award:

" * * * It is only when a carrier decides to have work performed that the rights of employes to perform that work arises. If the wrong employe performs it, a violation of the Agreement has occurred. That is the extent to which our decisions in general have gone. The Scope Rule protects telegraphers from having their work taken by others. The Train Order Rule here is written in just such terms. It prohibits employes 'other than covered' from handling train orders:' (Emphasis supplied.)

It must be noted, however, that the train order rule there involved, so far as material, provides:

"No employe other than covered by this Agreement and Train Dispatchers will be permitted to handle train orders * * *."

It makes no reference, as does the rule here before us, to "telegraph or telephone offices where an operator is employed and is available, or can be promptly located * * *."

We must determine, then, the extent, if any, to which the train order rule here modifies the Scope Rule.

The Organization argues that the train order rule-

" * * * deals specifically with train orders which may be required in emergencies where an operator is employed. The operator is to be paid a call. On the other hand, if a train order is handled in an emergency only, at a point where no operator is employed, then no one is

paid. The condition precedent in both instances is that sn eanergency shall exist, leaving no alternative than to resort to such handling. All of the train orders involved in these claims were copied when no emergency situation prevailed. * * * " (Emphasis theirs.)

Organization also offers this argument:

"The Carrier attempts to read more into Article 15 than ever was intended by the United States Railroad Labor Board who fathered the rule. The intent of that Board is expressed in the language of the rule. The indiscriminate handling of train orders at unmanned stations where telephones were already installed or subsequently installed was never meant to be legalized by this rule. If the Labor Board had considered for a moment that the handling of train orders resided in any other class or could be delegated to any other employes, such as train service employes, it would not have specified payment of a call to the telegraphers when an emergency prevailed. The fact that the Board drafted a rule authorizing payment to the telegrapher is indicative it held to the fact that the scope rule covered the handling of all train orders. If any other reasoning were to be adopted it would mean that the Carrier would be free to abolish any or all telegraphers' positions and divert the handling of all orders to another class or craft of employes so long as it failed or refused to maintain a telegrapher's position where the work was performed. The Agreement was not so drawn.

"The Employes have never acquiesced in conductors or others handling train orders. It was not an agreed upon practice either before or after the first agreement. What happened before the first agreement is irrelevant. The first agreement came with the United States Railroad Administration. Under its supplements and interpretations it held that the handling of train orders by telephone was work coming within the purview of telegraphers. After Federal control, encroachment was halted by the letter agreement of August 14, 1922. Certainly these authorities gave no recognition to any practice of allowing train crew employes to handle train orders. It did just the opposite, as did Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Conductors' and Trainmen's Agreement also adopted in 1922. And then we have the further evidence right out of the Carrier's mouth in Award 5295 of the First Division where it stated in its submission in that dispute:

'Conductors, trainmen and yard employes are not now and have not been in the past required to copy train orders, except in cases of emergencies . . .

"These Employes have never condoned a practice which would be adverse to themselves and coptrary to every principle they have sought to maintain with respect to handling train orders. * * * "

A sampling of Carrier's replies to such protests follows:

Date Carrier Signature Comment

7/29/33 J. S. Cox, Supt. "Perhaps, with the necessity for

economizing in every way possible,

this practice has grown, however,

I am instructing the Dispatchers

to, so far as possible, send train

orders to Operators instead of

Conductors."

2/22/34 L, P. Kennedy, Supt. "So far as I know we are not

requiring anyone to handle train

orders except in case of emer

gency."

"Not a single other agreement of the many," Organization argument continues, "which this carrier has with its different classes of employes proposes to allocate the handling of train orders to other persons. The agreements of the conductors and trainmen prohibit such work being thrust upon them except in emergencies. The train order form even anticipates that such work will be performed by a telegraph or telephone operator * * *."

We think the train order rule here is ambiguous to the extent that the respective interpretations placed upon it by the parties can be read into it.

1. We have in this record the Pelter agreement, reached 8 months after the rule was adopted and, according to the Organization, as a result of its protests aganst violations of the rule.

"we have agreed with representatives of these two organizations (Conductors and Telegraphers) that it is not our purpose to require conductors to handle train orders, excepting under conditions of an emergency nature, such as accidents, personal injury, washouts, fires, engine failure or such other similar causes."

"Article 18 of the agreement with the Telegraphers provides as follows:

'No employe other than covered by this schedule and train dispatchers will be permitted to handle train orders at telegraph or telephone offices where an operator is employed and is available or can be promptly located, except in emergency conductors or engineers will be permitted to do so, in which case the telegraphers will be paid for the call.'

Likewise, Article 20 of the agreement with the conductorstrainmen provides in part:

'Conductors or trainmen will not be required to copy train orders over the wires, excepting under conditions of an emergency nature such as accidents, personal injuries, washouts, fires, engine failures or other similar causes.'

With exceptions that have been in effect on this railroad prior to agreement entered into in 1922, which I will give you as a result of my investigation into this matter, these rules will be carried out."

"It is not our purpose to require conductors to handle train orders, excepting under conditions of an emergency nature, such as accidents, personal injury, washouts, fires, engine failure, or such other similar causes."

For us to here sustain argument in behalf of Carrier that-

"the Train Order rule, by reason of its restrictive language, only reserves to Telegraphers (or Dispatchers) the handling of train orders at points where an operator is employed;"

would be to say to this Carrier that it may eliminate all telegrapher jobs with impunity and, having done so, may assign their work to anyone it chooses without restriction. To do so would completely wipe out the Scope Rule of the Agreement.

Finally we find the Carrier citing the Memorandum Agreement of January 3, 1951 between the parties which, it alleges-

"provides that at places where neither an agent or operator is regularly employed any person designated by the railway may copy written train lineups or other instructions transmitted over the railway's communication system or otherwise, and that no employee represented by the telegraphers' organization shall have or make any valid claim or grievance by reason thereof. Conversely, the agreement provides that at points where an agent or operator is regularly employed, such employe will be used to perform such work, and that if such occurrence is during the hours such agent or operator is not on',duty but is available, and such agent or operator is not called to perform the work, he will be allowed a call payment therefor."

We are here concerned with train orders, not line-ups.

The January 3, 1951 agreement is concerned with the desire of this Carrier-

"to transmit by its communication system or otherwise, written train line-ups or other instructions to its section and bridge foremen or others whose duties necessitate the operation of track motor cars or other work equipment * * *: '

If the confronting agreement rules were intended as Carrier argues in the instant case, there would have been no necessity for it to negotiate a special agreement with the Organization to cover the transmission of written train line-ups or other instructions to its section and bridge foremen.

It is not, therefore, illogical to assume that the Agreement itself was a bar to the handling of such information in the manner desired.

While the January 3, 1951 agreement offers us nothing to follow here, the manner in which it proved to be a solution to a problem in which both parties were vitally concerned is of interest, because there the Carrier chose what we lbelieve was the proper course of action: negotiation with the Telegraphers' Organization.

We have every appreciation of the problems facing this nation's railroads. They must and should take advantage of every opportunity available to permit of safe, efficient and economical operation of their properties within the legal and agreement limitations within which they must function. This includes the practical use of the products of the modern age in which we live.

But where a Carrier binds itself by agreement, as this Carrier has here, to assign certain work it wishes to have performed to those qualified workmen coming within such class, it must negotiate with the Organization representing such class if it wishes to have such work performed in a mamier other than provided by such agreement. It is likewise the duty of the Organization

involved to meet such problems in a realistic manner, mindful of the fact that the eventual outcome will injure or benefit Carriers and Organizations equally.

For the reasons herein set forth we will sustain part (1) of the claim.

With respect to part (2) of the claim, we note Organization argument that the Carrier action complained of deprived "many employes from full-time work. We ask only that the Carrier shall pay for the days that these several points functioned as train order offices. There is no question but what the Carrier would be required to compensate an idle conductor or trainman for a day's pay if a telegrapher had been substituted to perform any of their work."

We are not, however, concerned here with the conductors' or trainmen's agreements. We will sustain part (2) of the claim only to the extent of allowing-as the Train Order Rule itself does in cases of emergency-payment of a call to each claimant for each of the violations charged and here sustained.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Agreement was violated.

AWARD