Finally, the Company has shown that the Awards of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, with particular reference to the Third Division, clearly set forth the right of a Company to adjust its forces in line with its volume of work and to determine the place where its work shall be done.
In view of the fact the Organization has been unable to show there has been any violation of the rules Agreement in the matter complained of, its claim is without merit and should be denied.
All data presented herein in support of the Company's position have heretofore been submitted in substance to the employe or his representative and made a part of this dispute.
OPINION OF BOARD: Prior to the incident giving rise to this claim A. L. Anderson occupied a Car Supplier position on the Group 2 seniority roster at Birmingham, Alabama. Car suppliers perform in general the work of checking and stocking Pullman sleeping cars with linen and small supplies. On March 24, 1954 Carrier wrote the Organization as follows:
The indicated action was made effective as of April 9, 1954, at which time Claimant Anderson was furloughed. The work transferred to Memphis and Louisville thereafter was performed by Car Suppliers on the Group 2 seniority rosters at those locations. It appears that some car supplying work has continued to be performed at Birmingham, however. The evidence on this point is not entirely satisfactory-a condition that could have been avoided had the Organization accepted Carrier's offer to conduct a joint check of the work involved. Carrier concedes that following the abolishment of the subject position the Storekeeper at Birmingham, a Group 1 employe, was instructed to check the inspection report of all cars and to supply the necessary equipment where shortages were listed. It is also conceded that since April 9, 1954 supplemental clean linen has been placed on certain extra cars passing through Birmingham in connection with National Guard movements. Carrier further states that because Claimant Anderson indicated an unwillingness to return for short vacancies of 30 days or less, a car supplier was employed temporarily at Birmingham in 1955.
Group I and Group 2 positions at Birmingham are on separate seniority rosters. Separate seniority rosters also exist for Group 2 positions at Birmingham, Memphis and Louisville, as required by the Agreement. Thus the question 8692-14 922
presented is whether the transfer of the involved work to different seniority rosters under the subject circumstances, with the consequent abolishment of the subject Car Supplier position, was violative of the Agreement.
While citing Scope Rule 1 and Seniority Rule 3 of the Agreement, the Organization relies primarily upon Rule 7 which provides for the establishment of seniority rosters, and which states in part: " · . Seniority rosters shall remain in effect until changed by mutual agreement between Management and the General Chairman: . ." In the Organization's view, this rule bars the Carrier from unilaterally transferring work from one seniority roster to other rosters, and from abolishing a position on a given roster as a consequence of such action. The Carrier denies any Agreement violation, contending that its action is of the type expressly provided for under Rule 26 (b).
Rule 26 is entitled "Transfer of Positions or Work". Paragraph (a) thereof states in part: "Employes may follow their positions when same are transferred from one seniority roster to another . . . ." The rights of employes under such conditions are thereafter set forth in further detail. Paragraph (b) of this Rule states:
Rule 26 (b) is a specific rule dealing with the transfer of work between seniority rosters. Rules 1, 3 and 7-upon which the Organization relies-are general rules. Thus Rule 26 (b) must be deemed as controlling with respect to transfer of work. That Rule contemplates that work amounting to a cumulative total of less than four hours per day may be transferred from one roster to another without negotiation between the parties. The work transferred from Birmingham to Memphis and Louisville in the subject instance amounted to little more than one hour per day. Thus the Organization's concurrence in this transfer was not required.
With respect to the checking and supplying of shortages by the Group 1 Storekeeper at Birmingham after the above-noted work transfer took place, we are of the opinion that no Agreement violation took place. We do not think a Storekeeper is contractually barred from performing the small amount of such work as is here involved. It also should be noted that this work, when combined with the work transferred to Memphis and Louisville, still amounted to substantially less than four hours per day.
The reassignment of work as above-described having been made without violating the Agreement, Carrier was entitled to abolish the Car Supplier position held by Claimant. It is apparent that this position had become very much a part-time job so far as the volume of work was concerned. Carrier has an obligation to operate as efficiently as possible so long as it does not violate the Agreement.
In the light of all the evidence in this case, we conclude that there is no contractual basis for the claim.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds: 8692-15 923