BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES
STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of , e Brotherhood that:
OPINION OF BOARD: This is a discipline case involving Dell C. Murdock, seniority date of October 11, 1936, who worked on the second trick, 4:00 P. M. to 12:00 midnight, in position of Crew-Dispatcher, Yard Officer, Ogden, Utah. Claimant was on duty on Saturday, June 30, 1956. At about 11:20 P. M. on that date Assistant Superintendent M. C. Ingle relieved Claimant from further service that night on the asserted basis that the latter was in violation of Rule G. It appears the Claimant remained under pay until the end of the trick, however. Rule G provides:
Under date of July 2, 1956 Superintendent R. O. Bills Issued Claimant written notice charging violation of Rule G and advised he was being held out of service pending investigation and hearing. The Superintendent conducted the hearing, following which he found Claimant guilty of having violated the subject rule and dismissed him from the service. Thereafter a claim for reinstatement of Claimant was submitted to the Superintendent but was declined. The matter was then progressed to Carrier's Vice President, the highest officer designated to handle such appeals.
It is contended in Claimant's behalf that the evidence adduced at the hearing did not support the charge; that the trial officer improperly excluded testimony pertinent to the investigation-thereby showing bias; and that Claimant was denied his right of appeal to the Superintendent since that latter had preferred the charge, conducted the investigation and made the decision of dismissal. It is urged that the Agreement required that .the hearing be conducted by Assistant Superintendent Ingle as the claimant's supervising officer. The term "supervising officer" is interpreted by this contention to mean the employe's immediate supervisor.
In the subject instance it was the Assistant Superintendent who first observed the claimed improper condition of the Claimant, who obtained other witnesses to this condition, who relieved the Claimant from further duty at 11:20 P. M., on June :30, 1956, and who appeared as a complaining witness at the discipline hearing. It is not clear from the record that the Assistant Superintendent was Claimant's immediate supervisor. Rule 30 does not state that the hearing shall be held by the employe's immediate superior, although we concede that the contract language could be so construed. But in any event, we do not think it is contemplated by the rule that the hearing must be conducted by an officer so situated as the Assistant Superintendent was under the involved circumstances. It must be apparent that more independent consideration of the facts could be had by an officer who was removed from the events which precipitated the charge. Thus we do not find that Claimant's rights were violated by the fact that the Superintendent was the official who conducted the hearing and made the resulting decision. Moreover, it cannot be said that the Superintendent's action in giving written notice of the charge disqualified him from conducting the hearing.
With respect to the conduct of .the hearing itself, we are of the opinion that the Superintendent was more restrictive in the admission of certain evidence than would shave been desired. Nevertheless we note that the evidence of possible relevance that was initially excluded was subsequently admitted. The hearing record contains all pertinent evidence which was offered in Claimant's behalf. We do not find that prejudicial error was made in this respect.
No good purpose would be served in reviewing the facts disclosed at the hearing. There is substantial evidence in the record which supports the Carrier's finding .that Claimant violated Rule G. We further note that on this property the violation of Rule G is regarded as a "capital" offense. The claim must be denied. 8896-3 36