NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION
Ben Harwood, Referee
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY (Pacific Linea)
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Ex Parte submission of the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen in-
Request of Dining Car Stewart John A. Meany, Northern District, for reinstatement with seniority unimpaired and claim for
compensation for all time lost as a result of his dismissal from the
service, December 3, 1959, for alleged violation of rules covering the
dining car service of the Southern Pacific Company.
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Under date of September 21,
1959, Carrier's Superintendent of Commissary addressed the following letter
to claimant:
"You are hereby charged with responsibility for irregularities
in connection with the handling of meal checks while assigned as
Steward in Coffee Shop Car 10264, operating in Train #10 enroute
Oakland to Portland September 11th, 1959, which may involve violation of the General Rules and Regulations of the Dining Car
Department dated San Francisco, California, January 1st, 1956, as
follows:
Rule `E'-Employees must render every assistance in
their power in carrying out the rules and instructions and
must report to the proper officials any violation thereof.
that portion of Rule 801 reading:
Rule 801 - Employees who are . . . dishonest . . . will
not be retained in the service.
that portion of Rule 802 reading:
Rule 802-Indifference in the performance of duties
will not be condoned.
15791
10266-13
596
ousness in Carrier's actions in the instant case; hence in line with its established principle, the Board is requested not to disturb Carrier's action. In
this connection the Board's attention is particularly directed to Award 5301
of this Division between the two parties here involved, involving similar
circumstances.
Notwithstanding Carrier's position supra and in no way admitting that
the dismissal of the Claimant was improper, the Carrier submits that in the
event the Board does sustain the claim insofar as the request for reinstatement is concerned, and gives consideration to the matter of compensation for
time lost, such consideration must necessarily be confined to the difference
between the amount the Claimant would have earned in the service of the
Carrier from the time of his dismissal to the time of his reinstatement and
the amount he earned in other employment during said period, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (e) of Rule 20 quoted above.
CONCLUSION
Carrier asserts that the claim in this docket is entirely without merit
and requests that it be denied.
All data herein submitted have been presented to the duly authorized
representative of the employes and are made a part of the particular question
in dispute.
The Carrier reserves the right, if and when it is furnished with the submission which may have been or will be filed ex parts by the Petitioner in this
case, to make further answer as may be necessary in relation to all allegations and claims that may be advanced by the Petitioner in such submission,
which cannot be forecast by the Carrier at this time and have not been
answered in this, the Carrier's initial submission.
(Exhibits not reproduced.)
OPINION OF BOARD:
The claim here under consideration arose due
to Claimant's dismissal as Dining Car Steward December 3, 1959, following
formal investigation conducted September 30 and November 10 and 11, 1959,
wherein a large volume of evidence was adduced concerning Carrier's charge
that Claimant was responsible for irregularities in the handling of meal checks
which "may involve violation of the General Rules and Regulations of the
Dining Car Department dated San Francisco, California, January 1st, 1956,
as follows:" (at this point was set forth a considerable number of said rules
which for the purposes of this opinion it is deemed not necessary here to
repeat.)
The transcript of testimony taken at the investigation, some 94 pages
of the record, shows unusual care by both parties in adducing evidence in
support of and against the charges and also most exhaustive cross-examination
with reference to controverted facts. It is unfortunate that such a protracted hearing could not have disposed of the controversy. But in our view
prejudicial error was committed by the Carrier in conducting the investigation
when the hearing officer not only excluded certain written evidence offered
by Claimant during cross-examination of one of two "investigators" for the
Carrier, a Mrs. Carmichael, whose earlier testimony had strongly supported
the charge of irregularities in the handling of meal checks by Claimant, but
also prevented a witness from testifying in behalf of Claimant.
10260-19
597
The situation referred to came about at the hearing as follows. It
seems that Claimant expected to prove through an employe of the Carrier,
Mr. Sam Miller, a steward, that Mrs. Carmichael was not even on the train
in question on September 11, 1959, when said irregularities were alleged to
have occurred.
Mrs. Carmichael under cross-examination previously had denied being a
guest in the Hotel Imperial at Portland, Oregon, on September 11th, at a time
which would have made it impossible for her to have been on the train in
question from Davis, California, to Portland. The foundation for the evidence sought to be admitted had thus been properly laid. In order to portray
the development of this situation at the hearing which led to what is considered
to have been prejudicial error, we will quote from the record.
"MR. MEANY TO MRS. CARMICHAEL
Where did you board train 10 that date?
At Davis.
Both you and Mrs. Meurer at Davis?
Yes.
Were you in Davis 3 or 4 days?
MR. DOIG
That has no bearing on the case, Mr. Meany.
MR. RUTLEDGE
Let us enter an objection to Mr. Doig's ruling on that
question.
MR. MEANY TO MRS. CARMICHAEL
Do you make your own schedule? Do you go where you want
to go, or do they tell you where to go?
They give me my instructions.
And you went all the way from Davis to Portland on Train #
10 Sept. 11th?
Yes.
What time did you get in Portland?
I don't remember the exact time but I could tell you if you are
interested. We arrived at 12:15 a. m.
Do you go to Portland very often?
On occasion.
When was the last time you were in Oregon?
10260-20
59S
1 don't remember.
Where do you stay in Portland?
MR. DOIG
That has no bearing in the case, Mr. Meany, if this line of
testimony you are following is to develop some facts which happened
on the train on the date in question, we would be glad to listen to you.
MR. MEANY
We are coming to that, Mr. Hearing Officer, it has a very important bearing and we object to your ruling.
MR. DOIG
Your objection noted in the record.
MR. MEANY
Our objection is based on the fact that you are permitting Mrs.
Carmichael to answer what you think might be favorable, and you
are not permitting her to answer questions that will eventually lead
to a very imporant matter.
MR.
MEANY TO MRS. CARMICHAEL
Did you make a report on Mr. Miller and Mr. Wiggin also that
day at the hotel in Portland?
MR.
DOIG
I object to that, Mr. Meany. Mr. Miller and Mr. Wiggin, or
whatever steward you name are in no way connected with Train 10
on the date in question.
MR. MEANY TO MRS.
CARMICHAEL
You say you arrived in Portland at 12:15 a. m.?
The following morning-it must have been on the 12th.
The morning of Sept. 12th?
Yes, by my wristwatch. I don't carry a railroad watch.
We are not going to quibble over a few minutes, but are you
sure it was the right date?
Yes, sir, I am.
It would 12:15, approximately, a. m. on Sept. 12th?
15 minutes after midnight, yes.
10260-21
I want to introduce at this time in evidence, registration slip
of the Imperial Hotel and ask Mrs. Carmichael if this is her
signature?
It is not. I have never stayed at the Imperial Hotel and don't
know where it is. It is not my signature.
Do you have your signature on your driver's license, or on a
report; we want to see it to compare signatures.
That is not mine.
(signature compared with document Mrs. Carmichael presented.)
MR. DOIG
That won't be necessary. She stated for the record that she
was not at the Imperial Hotel. I believe that should be sufficient.
MR. MEANY
We have reason to believe that Miller, whom you cut out a
minute ago-we have reason to believe he saw her there.
MRS. CARMICHAEL
Mr. Miller is a liar.
MR. DOIG
I don't believe Mr. Meany, whether Mr. Miller saw Mrs. Carmichael or not-I believe it has absolutely no bearing on Train
# 10 that particular date.
MR. MEANY
I want to say for the record that the name Carmichael, as written
on the registration compares very favorably with the one I have just
seen on the Bank of America card.
MR. DOIG
I object to that.
MR. MEANY
I want this offered in evidence. I am going to prove this is
her signature. If you want to call off the hearing -
MR. DOIG
I don't wish to call the hearing off, we want to give you all the
latitude in the world to develop the facts on train # 10 from Davis
to Portland, Oregon, Train # 10 on the particular date, and then if
you have no further facts to develop relative the incidents on that
particular date,-I can see no reason why this should be entered in
the investigation.
10260-22
600
MR.
DOIG TO
MRS. CARMICHAEL
I will direct one question to Mrs. Carmichael. Did you stay at
the Imperial Hotel and registered at the Imperial Hotel in Portland
at the termination of your trip on Train # 10?
I did not.
Thank you, Mrs. Carmichael.
May I go further with that?
Yes.
I have never heard of this Imperial Hotel in my life until he
shoved that slip in my face. I did not know such a place existed.
MR MEANY
It is quite odd that the Imperial Hotel would have a guest by
the name of Mrs. Carmichael, even though the Hearing Officer would
not examine this slip, he would see that the time clock has a date
on this slip Sept. 11th, 1959.
MR.
DOIG
The time and date on the back of this Imperial Hotel registration slip shows Sept. 11th at 12:44 a. m. Train # 10, according to
time sheet rendered by you, shows train # 10 arriving at Portland
at 12:20 a. m. which under the circumstances, this slip, if it is the
one you have in mind, is time and date one day prior to arrival of
Mrs. Carmichael.
MR. MEANY
At last Mr. Doig has arrived at the same conclusion we were
leading up to and that is that the present records indicate Mrs. Carmichael was registered in at the Imperial Hotel 12 hours ahead of the
arrival of Train # 10 and was not even on Train # 10 Sept. 11th.
Can you produce, Mrs. Carmichael, any witnesses other than Mrs.
Meurer who can say you were on Train # 10 that day?
MR.
DOIG
I will state for the record that anything relating to Mrs. Carmichael's actions other than the time she was on Train # 10 Sept.
11th to Sept. 12th, we will not accept as testimony at this hearing.
MR. MEANY
I again wish to put in the record a photostatic copy of a guest
registration slip of the Imperial Hotel, Sept. 11th. I also wish to
enter into the record another hotel guest registration slip # 78536,
practically 72 slips back, bearing my own signature and my time of
arrival was Sept. 12th at 1:04 a. m. I will ask the Hearing Officer
10260-23
601
if he wishes to accept in evidence these photostatic copies of registration slips?
I do not.
MR.
RUTLEDGE
Let the record show that we object to your ruling, Mr. Doig.
MR. DOIG
It will be so noted."
[Later in record with reference to Mr. Miller]
"November 11th.
Reconvened: 8:55 a. m.
MR. DOIG
Following is letter handed to me by Mr. Rutledge, to be introduced into the record:
November 11th, 1959.
Mr. C. 0. Sullivan,
Supt., West Oakland Commissary.
We herewith request the presence of Steward Sam
Miller at the reconvening of the investigation of Steward
John Meany.
/s/ L. M. Rutledge
Vice Chairman of Grievance Committee
of B. of R. T., Lodge # 236
MR. DOIG TO MR.
MEANY
Mr. Meany, may I ask at this time why you have requested Mr.
Miller as a witness at this time?
Because Mr. Miller has important information that is very pertinent to our case.
Was Mr. Miller on Train # 10 Sept. 11th?
It has nothing to do with train # 10 Sept. 11th.
What bearing will this have on the evidence?
He will refute the testimony of Mrs. Carmichael as she presented it here yesterday.
Was Mr. Miller in Portland the day prior to your arrival in
Portland?
10260-24
602
Mr. Miller was in Portland the day I left Portland.
I have here, Mr. Meany, departure card for Train .# 12 dated
Sept. 11th, train # 12, departing Oakland at its usual time. I also
have time sheet signed by Mr. S. Miller to cover departure card of
that date. Mr. Miller left here on train .# 12 on the 11th, arriving
in Portland the morning of the 12th. Testimony which you have
given previously, if I am not confused, you testified that Mrs. Carmichael was registered at the Imperial Hotel on the night of August
11th. Mr. Miller at that time was here in Oakland or aboard train
# 12. Do you still wish to call him?
We do.
Do you want him now?
We might as well.
MR.
DOIG TO MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller, you have been called by Mr. Meany as a witness to
testify in his behalf as to certain incidents happening on train # 10
Sept. 11th Oakland to Portland. Will you identify yourself by your
correct name for the transcript.
Sam H. Miller.
By what company are you employed?
Southern Pacific.
In what capacity?
Steward.
Dining Car Steward?
Yes.
Were you a passenger on Train .# 10 Sept. 11th?
No.
Or an employee on Train # 10 departing from Oakland Sept.
11th, arriving in Portland the same date?
No.
Do you have any information with reference to anything that
would have happened on train # 10 as of that date?
No.
Then I will have to disqualify you as a witness, Mr. Miller.
Any testimony you would give her [sic - "here"] would have no
bearing on any incidents relating to incidents on a particular train
on a particular date.
10260-25
603
MR.
RUTLEDGE
We strongly protest your ruling in this matter, because we know
that Mr. Miller has very important information pertinent to the
allegations and facts of this investigation.
MR.
DOIG
Your objection and protest will be noted in the testimony. However, my original ruling still stands and Mr. Miller may be excused.
MR.
RUTLEDGE
Yesterday we proved-
MR.
DOIG
I will object to that, Mr. Rutledge. Nothing has been proven,
nor did we intend to."
Timely objection of record to the disqualification of Mr. Miller as a
witness for Claimant was then made by both Mr. Meany and his representative Mr. Rutledge.
As was said in brief on behalf of Claimant "it was the duty and responsibility of the Hearing Officer to hear all witnesses for development of the
facts, citing First Division Award 12,500 as follows:"
"'Where it is made to appear that the investigating officer fails
or refuses to call to his assistance witnesses whom he has been informed have personal knowledge of the facts which are the subject
of the inquiry, he, in our judgment, has failed to carry out the true
intent of the inquiry. It was the evident intent of the parties that the
investigating officer should be impartial, neither interested in proving
the charges, nor in disproving them. He should keep his eye singled
on the one and only purpose, and that is, to develop the truth, regardless of the result to either party.' "
Again it is said in another First Division Award No. 18847:
. . . there is the more serious shortcoming of an essential
witness not having been called at the request of the claimant, or his
having not been given time to produce the witness on his own, because even in cases where the employe has admitted infringement of
the rules, this Division has ruled that the procedure was fatally
defective if the employe was not fully protected in his right to produce witnesses in his behalf. Award [1st Division] 11364."
"The right of an employe to have witnesses called on his behalf
is so fundamental that we often have upset disciplinary proceedings
with that either as one of the bases for our censure or the sole one.
(Awards [1st Division] 8260, 10348, 11820, 13633, 14351, 14354,
14358, 16333.) Sometimes we have severely criticized the hearing
officers for high-handedness in the denial of this right, and while we
do not do so in this instance, we adhere to our settled view that the
reasonable opportunity to present witnesses in his own behalf is a
right of an employe which must not be abridged, and therefore the
10260-26
604
claim must be sustained." (And see Awards 5297, 15656 and 19910,
First Division; and Third Division Awards 2613 and 7088.)
Here the employe was denied such fundamental right, even though it
be argued, as it was by Carrier, that the evidence sought to be adduced but
excluded would not have invalidated "the incontrovertible and accepted facts
to the contrary that had previously been entered in evidence without exception having been taken thereto at the time."
We believe that the exclusion of the offered evidence and the disqualification of Claimant's witness Miller was arbitrary, unjust and indefensible
(Awards 3000 and 6104) and we so hold. Accordingly, it is our conclusion
that the Carrier violated the Agreement and that the claim should be sustained.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving
the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon and upon the whole
record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employe involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act,
as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the
dispute involved herein; and
That the Agreement was violated.
AWARD
Claim sustained.
NATIONAL RAILROAD
ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of THIRD DIVISION
ATTEST: S. H. Schulty
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 19th day of December 1961.
Serial No. 198
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION
INTERPRETATION NO. 1 TO AWARD NO. 10260
DOCKET NO. DC-12484
NAME OF ORGANIZATION:
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
NAME OF CARRIER:
Southern Pacific Company (Pacific Lines)
Upon application of the Carrier involved, that this Division interpret
said Award in the light of a dispute between the parties as to its meaning
and application, a; provided in Section 3, First (m) of the Railway Labor
Act, approved June 21, 1934, the following interpretation is made:
The question posed for interpretation is whether Carrier must pay Claimant under Award 10260 full compensation for all time lost as a result of his
dismissal, with no deduction therefrom for earnings made in outside employment between the time he was dismissed from Carrier's service and the time
he was reinstated therein.
Rule 20 (e) of the Agreement between the parties reads:
"Where discharge (or suspension) is found to have been unjust,
the steward shall be returned to service and paid for net wage loss."
In other words the Division is asked to determine the meaning of the
words "net wage loss" when applied under the award here concerned.
The written and oral argument presented in behalf of opposing parties,
Claimant and Carrier, and the considerable number of Interpretations to
Awards and Awards themselves submitted by way of authority, have been
given detailed study and consideration.
Obviously, we are here dealing with a written contract and as was said
in First Division Award No. 16495:
"In construing a constitutional provision or any writing first
resort is to letter and spirit. That implies application of writing
to subject matter. If without going farther, the meaning is plain,
interpretation is at an end." University v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259,
220 NW 958.
Here it would seem there can be little, if any, doubt about the meaning
of the parties to the Agreement when they say "net wage loss". Without
attempting to discuss Interpretations and Awards arising under different
Agreements and different fact situations, and believing it futile to try to
reconcile certain conflicting Interpretations and also dicta therein which
have teen called to our attention, we hold that in complying with Award
[9351
1-10260-2
936
10260, and in accordance with Rule 20 (e) of the Agreement of the parties,
Carrier may have credit for earnings of Claimant in outside employment,
to-wit in employment other than by Carrier, from the date of his dismissal
from Carrier's service until the date he was reinstated in said Service. See
Third Division Interpretations Nos. 1 to Awards 9216 and 8807.
Referee Ben Harwood, who sat with the Division as a neutral member,
when Award 10260 was adopted, also participated with the Division in
making this interpretation.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of THIRD DIVISION
ATTEST: S. H. Schulty
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 27th day of July 1962.
LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT TO INTERPRETATION NO. 1
TO AWARD 10260, DOCKET DC 12484
The Majority is in grievous error when it reopens the case and makes
a new award in the guise of an interpretation, reaching a result wholly
inconsistent with the factual situation as contained in the record, Award 10260.
Regardless of the position taken by the Carrier in its so-called request
for an "interpretation", the parties have adopted the proper interpretation
and application of Rule 20 (e) over a long period of time, which is diametrically
opposite to Carriers' contention here.
The question posed for "interpretation" was whether or not the Carrier
must pay Claimant under Award 10260 full compensation for all time lost
as a result of his dismissal, with no deduction therefrom for earnings made
in outside employment.
The question at issue is fully set forth in the record, however, the
Carrier submitted nothing in support of its contention. In defense of its
position, Petitioner submitted Exhibits "L", "M" and "N".
The aforementioned Exhibits "L", "M" and "N" show that Rule 20(e)
is not subject to the "interpretation" sought by the Carrier.
Exhibit "L" discloses that in the final disposition of the notices served
by the Organization on June 20, 1947, an agreement was reached on December
12, 1947, in which the Carriers' proposal No. IS - reading:
"Pay for time lost is to be reduced by other earnings . . " was withdrawn by the Carriers' Conference Committee and the current rule has
remained unchanged since it became effective on July 1, 1936, and adhered
to by the Carrier since that time, as evidenced by Exhibits 11M21 and "N"
relating to a similar (1953) case in which the employe was reinstated and
paid for all time lost with no deductions for outside earnings being urged
or made by the Carrier.
The parties own interpretation, as established by practice, custom and
usage over the years, is the best evidence of what was intended to be the
basis of compensation for time lost in a case such as herein.
1-10260-3
937
The Award in the instant case therefore should have been applied in
accordance with the established practice of the Carrier, which for all practical
purposes may be regarded as a part of the Agreement.
The Majority states:
"Here it would seem there can be little, if any, doubt about the
meaning of the parties to the Agreement when they say, `net wage
loss'."
We are in complete agreement with the Majority that the parties understood the meaning of the rule. The Carrier, in 1947, was represented by a
Carrier's conference committee during negotiations for changes of rules.
Its proposal to insert language into Rule 20(e) which would permit it to
take credit for earnings a Claimant received from other employment during
a period of dismissal, was rejected by the Committee representing the employes and subsequently withdrawn. The Carrier's primary purpose in
requesting an "interpretation" to Award 10260 was to prevail upon the
Board to grant by 'interpretation' that which it was unable to achieve during
negotiations.
The question at issue was dealt with by the parties in the record and
it is reasonable to assume that the facts of record were carefully considered
by the Majority. The Award was rendered without qualification or limitation.
It is clear and unambiguous in its decision, "Claim Sustained", based upon
the facts of record.
The Claim was for:
`Compensation for all time lost as a result of his dismissal
from the service
. . . 11
The order of the Board directed the Carrier to make effective Award
10260 and pay the sum to which the employe was entitled under the Award,
on or before February 16, 1962. This was in accordance with the provisions
of Section 3 First (O) of The Railway Labor Act as amended reading as
follows:
"In the case of an Award by any division of Adjustment Board
in favor of petitioner, the division of the Board shall make an order,
directed to the carrier, to make the Award effective and, if the
award includes a requirement for payment of money, to pay the
employe the sum to which he is entitled under the award on or
before a day named."
This Board has no authority to modify an award through the guise
of an interpretation as was done here, there by reducing the sum of money
due the employe, in direct violation of The Railway Labor Act (supra).
In the instant case, the Division cannot properly go further than:
Interpretation No. 1--Serial No. 66-Wherein Referee Tipton stated:
"This Board can only interpret the award that has already been
adopted in this dispute and not make a new award." (Emphasis ours)
Interpretation No. 1, Serial No. 105, Referee Carter stated:
1-10260-.-4
938
. The award is necessarily based on the facts shown by
the record
. . . 11
Interpretation No. 1-Serial No. 110, Referee Wenke held:
"In doing so it should be understood that an interpretation of an
award is not a rehearing or a new trial of the case on its merits.
Its purpose is to explain or clarify the award as made, not to make
a new one. Consequently questions raised and disposed of will not
be considered again. (Emphasis ours)
Interpretation No. 1, Serial 10, Referee Sharfman held:
"Since the claim was sustained without condition or limitation,
the measure of relief to which the employe is entitled must be
determined by the terms of the claim. These terms, based upon
the contention that the employe was improperly displaced from his
regularly assigned position, embraced two requests: first, that he
be restored to his regularly assigned position; and second, that he
be 'compensated in full for any monetary loss resulting from the
carrier's action in removing him from his assignment.' The fact
that the claimant is not now required to return to his former position
is immaterial, since this arrangement was reached by agreement
of the parties subsequent to the award. The sole issue concerns
the extent of the compensation to which the claimant is entitled
under the original award. When the claim as to compensation
was sustained, it was sustained in the terms in which it had been
submitted and argued on behalf of the employe; and this claim
was not limited to net wage loss, but included 'any monetary loss'
resulting from the carrier's action. The substantive position of
the carrier in the original proceeding had been directed solely
to a denial that any provision of the prevailing agreement between
the parties had been violated. The Board expressly found otherwise,
and liability on the part of the carrier for the full measure of compensation as specified in the claim naturally followed." (Emphasis
supplied)
Interpretation No. 1, Serial No. 31, Referee Blake held:
"The award sustains the claim without qualification."
Interpretation No. 1, Serial No. 39, Referee Mitchell held:
"The claim in this case was for all losses sustained by all employes involved in or affected by this Agreement violation from
October 1, 1940, until the violation is corrected. The award
sustained the claim as made, which means that the employe affected
should be paid until the violation is corrected." (Emphasis added)
Under the above referred to authorities, the Board is guilty of unjustifiable error in not dismissing the Carrier's request for an interpretation
of an issue that had already been considered and rejected.
For the above reasons, I dissent.
H. C. Kohler, Labor Member
Third Division, NRAB