NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION
(Supplemental)
Frank J. Dugan, Referee
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
AMERICAN TRAIN DISPATCHERS ASSOCIATION
CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Claim of the American Train Dispatchers
that:
(a) The Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company hereinafter referred to as "the Carrier" violated the currently effective
Agreement between the parties to this dispute, particularly Article
9, when Assistant Chief Dispatcher W. M. Fulton, Trick Train Dispatchers A. G. Neel and D. W. Young were suspended from service
fifteen (15) working days without pay as a result of deficient
and unsustained charges, such action being unjust, unreasonable,
arbitrary and in abuse of the Carrier's discretion.
(b) Carrier shall now compensate claimants as follows:
1. Mr. W. M. Fulton, fifteen (15) days pay at Assistant
Chief Dispatchers' rate and for any wage loss sustained while attending investigation held on March 12,
13 and 14, 1958.
2. Mr. A. G. Neel, fifteen (15) days pay at pro rata
rate and for any wage loss sustained while attending
investigation held on March 12, 13 and 14, 1958.
3. Mr. D. W. Young, fifteen (15) days pay at pro rata
rate and for any wage loss sustained while attending
investigation held on March 12, 13 and 14, 1958.
OPINION OF BOARD:
There was a head-on collision between a pas
senger train and an engine with a caboose on the Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Railroad near Danville, Illinois. The accident occurred on the Danville Sub
division between Brewer and Yard Center, Illinois. Danville Station 3.3
miles north of Brewer is located within yard limits. The north and south
yard limits are located 1.19 miles north and 4.81 miles south of the station.
111
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A train dispatchers' office is located on the west side of the main track approximately 1.51 miles south of the station. At Brewer, several yard tracks
parallel the main tracks on the east and west. The accident occurred within
yard limits on the southward main track at a point 2.25 miles south of the
station at Danville. The accident occurred on a curve.
On the day of the accident engine 206 road switcher type headed north
pushing a caboose and entered the southward main track at the diesel electric Shop-lead track switch. It proceeded southward and collided with train
No. 94, 2.25 south of the Danville Station.
No. 94 was a northbound first-class passenger train. Its crew received
copies of train order No. 14 at Cayuga, 14.6 miles south of Brewer. This
train order stated:
"Order No. 14 Jan 7, 1958
DH C&E Opr, All southward trains SD RS 248 AM
BW C&E Opr, All southward trains SD JW 248 AM
YD C&E Ydmaster, Engs starting RN 249 AM
CU C&E Opr, No. 94 19D D 250 AM
No. 94 Eng 1609 has right over opposing trains on
southward track Cayuga to Danville.
JTW"
The train passed Cayuga at 3:01 A. M., 44 minutes late, crossing from
the northward main track to the southward main track, passed signal 64
which showed Slow-Clear, passed Walz, the last open office at 3:18 A. M. and
collided with 206, while going 37 miles per hour.
At the time of the accident an assistant chief train dispatcher, a southend train dispatcher and a north-end train dispatcher were on duty at the
dispatchers office. First class trains operating between Danville and Evansville, 164 miles south of Danville are under the jurisdiction of the south-end
train dispatcher, Young. Freight trains operating north of Brewer are under
the jurisdiction of the north-end train dispatcher, Neel. About 2:40 A. M.,
the yard-master at Brewer requested the assistant chief train dispatcher to
operate No. 94 over the southward main track against the current of traffic
between Cayuga and Danville to prevent a delay to another train. The assistant chief dispatcher then had the south-end train dispatcher Young issue a
train order No. 14 to that effect. Train order No. 14 was addressed to
operators at Cayuga, Walz and Danville, the conductor and engineer of
No. 94 and the yardmaster, engines starting at Brewer. The order was
completed at 2:50 A. M. Movements of engines operating on the main tracks
between the repair shop track and Brewer Yard are governed by rules pertaining to movements within yard limits.
On the day of the accident a crew was called to report for duty at
3:00 A. M. to operate an extra freight train from Brewer Yard. Engine
Unit 206 was to haul this train. The road foreman of engines entered the
dispatchers office and said hello to the dispatchers. Three or four minutes
later at 3:00 A. M. the conductor entered the dispatchers office, said hello
to the dispatchers checked the register, read his work messages and left with
the road foreman of engines. Nothing was said to them that train No. 94 was
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authorized to operate over the south main track. Engine 206 entered the
south main track about 3:16 A. M. Train No. 94 passed Walz at 3:18 A. M.
After receiving train order No. 14 the operator at Walz "lined for
94 to use the southward track." After a short time he went down to
put coal in the furnace and when he came back the north-end telephone was
ringing. The north-end dispatcher Neel asked him about the location of
No. 94 and he said it was going by then. Shortly after No. 94 and Engine
206 collided, the north-end train dispatcher Neel testified at the hearing
that he also tried to contact No. 206 by radio but was unable to reach it.
The I.C.C. Railroad Accident Investigation Report No. 3796 states:
"Examination of the tapes removed from the speed-recording
devices of diesel-electric units 16 and 1102 after the accident
occurred disclosed that the speed of No. 94 was reduced from approximately 65 miles per hour to 40 miles per hour in the vicinity
of the south yard-limit sign by a service brake application. The
speed of the train then decreased gradually from 40 miles per hour
to 37 miles per hour throughout a distance of 2.2 miles to the point
of accident. It is evident that the train was operated at excessive
speed through the interlocking and that it was not being operated in
such manner that it could be stopped short of a train or obstruction,
as required by the rules, when the collision occurred.
Cause
"This accident was caused by failure properly to control the
speed of a first-class train operating against the current of traffic
within yard limits."
Rule 93 provides:
"Yard limits are designated by special instructions in the timetable.
"Within yard limits, the main track may be used clearing first
class trains when due to leave the last station where time is shown,
but not less than five minutes. In case of failure to clear the main
track, protection must be given as prescribed by Rule 99. Protection against second class, third class, extra trains and engines is
not required.
"Within yard limits, second class, third class, extra trains and -
engines must move prepared to stop short of train, obstruction or
switch not properly lined.
"Within yard limits, when running against the current of
traffic, or on a portion of two or more tracks used as a single track,
all trains and engines must move prepared to stop short of train,
obstruction or switch not properly lined."
At the hearing to investigate the cause of the accident, the following
rules were read to D. W. Young, the south-end dispatcher:
"Q - I would like to read for the record General Notice:
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"Safety is of the first importance in the discharge of
duty.
"Obedience to the rules is essential to safety.
"To enter or remain in the service is an assurance of
willingness to obey the rules.
"The service demands the faithful, intelligent and
courteous discharge of duty.
"To obtain promotion, ability must be
shown for
greater responsibility."
First paragraph of rule 700:
"Constant presence of mind to insure safety to themselves and
others is the primary duty of all employes."
Rule 836:
"Train dispatchers will direct the movement of trains, issue
train orders and messages in a clear and concise manner so that
there may be but one interpretation and will transmit and record
them as prescribed by the rules. They will guard against dangerour
conditions in train movements, and improper or unsafe combinations
in train orders.
"They will make the various records required and observe
special instructions, including `Instructions to Train Dispatchers'."
"Rule 836:
"Train dispatchers must report immediately to the chief train
dispatcher any irregularity relating to the movement of trains or
the handling and execution of train orders."
"Rule 108:
"In case of doubt or uncertainty, the safe course must be
taken."
There is no other indication in the transcript of the hearing that this
dispatcher was charged with violation of any other rules.
The same rules were read to A. C. Neel the north-end train dispatcher
and no others. This witness was asked if he had complied with the five rules
and he said he had. The same rules were read to the assistant Chief Dispatcher
(and another rule not relevant here) and he said he had complied with
them.
The Organization first contends that there was no fair and impartial
hearing because a hearing contemplates a charge having been assessed and
the notice to claimants requested them to appear for an investigation for
the purpose of developing the cause and responsibility for the accident.
10386--5 rJ
They also claim that the Company violated the rule that the claimants "shall
be advised in writing of the precise charge at the time he is notified to appear
at the hearing." Article 9(b) of the Agreement. Although the claimants
were not precisely charged as required by Rule 9(b), numerous awards of
this Board have held that the claimants waive their objection to this procedural defect by appearing and testifying without making a timely protest.
Award No. 4781, 8502, 8488. The same is true as to the use of the word
"investigation" in the notice to claimants instead of the word "hearing".
Award No. 8488, 8502. By the same token, the Carrier cannot allege violations of operating rules before the Board that it did not press at the investigation.
The rules relied upon by the Carrier at the investigation are general
rules of safety. It appears that since both train No. 94 and Engine 206
were within yard limits, the operating rule of the railroad that was applicable
was Rule 93. At the investigation of the accident, Mr. Cottingham, Chairman of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen asked Mr. Warren, chief
investigating officer for the Carrier:
"Q-Mr. Warren, as company interrogating officer of this investigation, this raises a problem in my mind and the question is
simply this: does the carrier recognize any obligation with
these road engines and cabooses going from Oaklawn to Brewer
and if so, who is the proper qualified official to answer that
question at this time?
Mr. Warren-I
would like to ask Mr. Dowdy, Chief Train Rule
examiner, to answer your question as to the method of the operation.
Mr.
Dowdy-The Carrier provides Rule 93 to protect movements such as this. Third paragraph says 'Within yard limits,
second class, third class, extra trains and engines must move prepared to stop short of train, obstruction or switch not properly
lined: That rule gives them authority to make that move. Rule
834 which Mr. Warren read into the record-'Trains, or engines
without trains, will be under direction of the yardmaster.'
Q-In this instance, the yardmaster and both dispatchers have
denied jurisdiction over this train or engine, and you as train
rule examiner, are you upholding that contention?
A -Rule 93 gives this engine permission to make that move.
Q - Even in the face of an oncoming passenger train?
A - If it is in yard limits, yes sir."
Again the Chief Rules Examiner testified as to Engine 206:
"Q-What is this engine from Oaklawn to Brewer, proceeding to
Brewer, to get a train?
A - He is merely a yard move. He is just an engine and caboose
moving under the yard limit rule.
Q -Is he a yard engine from Oaklawn to Brewer?
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A -No, he isn't a yard engine as a yard engine is defined in the
book of rules. He is merely an engine and a caboose moving
as provided by rule 93."
He also testified:
"Mr.
Wyatt
-Everyone denies having jurisdiction over these
engines going from Oaklawn to Brewer and moving under rule 93.
I would like for you to answer who has jurisdiction over these engines from Oaklawn to Brewer and what protection do they get
from Oaklawn to Brewer after their train?
Mr. Dowdy-Their protection enroute is provided for by rule
93.
Q - I asked who had jurisdiction over these engines and what protection they get from trains running against the current of
traffic.
A-As for trains running against the current of traffic they have
protection of rule 91(a) and rule 93. 1 should not have said
rule 91(a). I should have said 93, and as to who has
jurisdiction over them, I would have to read rule 834:
"R. E. Dowdy
'At stations where yard force is employed, train or
- engines without trains, will be under control of the yard-
master and all employes in train, yard and engine service
will be subject to his direction. Road crews of trains en
tering such stations will be responsible for their respective
trains and engines until same are taken charge of by the
yardmaster or his representative.'
"Q-Then the yardmaster has jurisdiction over these engines?
A-According to rule 834.
Q -Now what protection do they have if they are not notified
by the yardmaster that this train is running over the southbound, running against the current of traffic?
A-Rule 93."
He testified further:
"Mr. Wilson - The rule states that the train dispatcher will
not issue a form D-R until he knows the track is clear of opposing
trains, is that right?
A - That's right.
Q-Then, is the train dispatcher also required to know that that
track is clear of engines or yard movements in yard limits
before issuing such an order?
10386
A - No, as under our present book of rules we cannot give trains
right over yard engines.
Q-Under the present circumstances at Oaklawn, in your opinion,
wouldn't it be a physical impossibility for the train dispatcher
to know that that track is clear of yard engines and road
engines?
A -Well, as far as being impossible is concerned -
Q -Under the present set-up?
A -I can't say that it would be impossible, but I don't see how
you could keep up with your duties as a train dispatcher and
put in the time it would take to find that out."
"Q-We have, further, the example of the engine 206 on night in
question. You stated that they needed check on overdue
southbound, first class southbound trains, to enter this territory we are dscussing. Is that correct?
A-That's correct.
Q-The yardmaster has testified that he wouldn't necessarily
notify yard crews that any passenger trains are to be running on opposing tracks. The dispatchers have testified that
they don't feel the need to inform road engines in the movement from Oakland to Brewer, to tell them of the fact of
passenger trains running on the opposing main. Is it your
opinion, as Chief Train Rule Examiner, that this information
is not needed in the class of engines concerned?
A-It is my opinion that if rule 93 is properly complied with,
then this information is not needed."
"Q-Then, by your own admission we have lap over rules and dual
jurisdictions that create a safety hazard in train operations
at that point, do we not?
A -I don't see that we do. The dispatcher has jurisdiction over
No. 94 so far as train orders are concerned, and so far as
rule 834 is concerned we have always interpreted that rule
to mean trains arriving in the yard, however, if the yardmaster issued instructions to 94 within yard limits, 94 would
be expected to obey them?
Q-What is your interpretation of rule 836? First paragraph?
A-I can't see where there could be any interpretation to that
rule except the way it reads.
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Q - I will refer you to that part reading, 'they will guard against
dangerous conditions in train movements, and improper or
unsafe combinations in train orders.'
A-Engine 206 was not a train movement.
Q - It was large enough to cause quite an accident, was it not?
A -The size had nothing to do with the definition of a train.
(~ - I don't think you could strike the entire rule out because only
one participant was actually a train, do you?
A-So far as the dispatcher providing for his train movements, I
can see no dangerous conditions in the train order he issued,
and rule
93
provides for the operation under this rule insofar
as No.
94
was concerned."
The testimony of the Chief Rules Examiner is vital in this case. While
an officer of the Carrier, he testified in a most impartial manner. The net
effect of his testimony is that both the train and the engine and caboose
were proceeding within yard limits under Rule
93.
He further testified
it was not necessary for the dispatchers to notify Engine 206 of the .fact
of passenger trains running in the opposing main. When asked whether
under the present circumstances at Oaklawn wouldn't it be a physical impossibility for the train dispatcher to know that the track is clear of yard
engines, he said he didn't see how you could keep up with your duties as
train dispatcher and put in the time it would take to find out. When asked
who had jurisdiction over these engines he pointed to Rule
834
which puts
them under the control of the Yardmaster.
In view of this uncontradicted testimony, it is difficult to see on what
basis Carrier disciplined Claimants keeping in mind that they were only
charged with violating general rules of safety and Carrier pointed to no
specific rule pertaining to their duties prior to the accident. Indeed, it
seems from the testimony that all parties relied on Rule
93
to prevent accidents and that the dispatchers were justified in relying on that rule and did
so even though the testimony shows that some railroads have abandoned
the last paragraph of this rule as dangerous.
Since the dispatchers were not charged with the violation of other safety
rules at the hearing it would be improper to consider them here. Nor does
the fact that one dispatcher belatedly attempted to contact Engine 206 and
the operator at Walz change the picture since it is not shown that he violated
a rule of the Company in his prior actions. The fact that the I.C.C. report
of the accident pins the blame exclusively on the engineer of Train No.
94
must also be considered. Thus, this Board believes the Carrier improperly
disciplined the Claimants.
FINDINGS:
The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the
whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the parties waived oral hearing;
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act,
as approved June 21,
1934;
10386-9 g
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the
dispute involved herein; and
That the Agreement was violated.
AWARD
Claim sustained as per opinion.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of THIRD DIVISION
ATTEST: S. H. Schulty
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 27th day of February 1962.