PARTIES TO DISPUTE:






STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the General Committee of The Order of Railroad Telegraphers on the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad that:





EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: The Agreements between the parties to this dispute are by reference thereto made a part of this submission.

The facts are, that Carrier without conference or agreement, abolished three operator-levermen positions at the Interlocker at South Whitley, Indiana, on December 14, 1954, without in fact abolishing the work of the positions, and concurrent with the abolishment transferred the performance of the work to employes in a separate seniority district and under another agreement.



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There are no train orders to handle. Present operations are conducted strictly in accordance with the working agreements covering the various crafts.


The Employes are now asking this Board to set back the clock and maintain positions which are not needed and which would serve no useful purpose. They are asking that the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission be nullified, despite the fact that they were given the opportunity by public notice of opposing such action. They are asking that a windfall be given to unidentified claimants for an alleged violation of the Scope Rule when no work remains to be performed under that rule.


There has been no violation of the current agreement and there is no basis for such an allegation. The claim is entirely without merit and should be denied.


All that is contained herein is either known or available to the Employes and their representatives.




OPINION OF BOARD: This dispute involves a contention by the Employer that when the Carrier abolished all three positions of operator-leverman at the Interlocking Tower South Whitley, Indiana, and transferred the work of these positions to employes of another craft, located in a different seniority district, it violated their Agreement. There is also involved a contention that the Carrier failed to comply with Article V of the August 21 Agreement.


The employes have not asked for the re-establishment of the South W hitley installation, but rather, because of such wrongful act, the Carrier be required to compensate the Senior idle employe, extra in preference, on the seniority district involved, eight (S) hours pay for each shift of each day commencing with December 14, 1954, and also all other employes adversely affected for any loss of wages and expenses.


The first question that confronts us, is did the Carrier have the right to abolish the positions at South Whitley tower?


It is the contention of the Carrier that the closing of South Whitley Tower was brought about by completion of C.T.C. on the Chicago Division, which practically eliminated the work previously performed by the Operators and Levermen at that point.


The record clearly shows that at South Whitley the C.T.C. has done, what it was designed to do, that is, it has made automatic the operation of switches and signals under the Supervisory Control of train dispatchers.


This Division has had many similar cases before it, we will quote from Award 4452, with Judge Carter, Referee:





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This Division has found that the A.T.D.A. is involved in this dispute and per Section 3 First (j) of the Act, A.T.D.A. was afforded opportunity to be heard which it waived.

Thus on the merits of the case there was no violation of the Agreement by the Carrier as it had a right to abolish the positions at South Whitley tower.




Thus it was the duty of the Carrier under the Agreement, within 60 days after the filing of the claim to notify whoever filed the claim or grievance in writing of the reasons for the disallowance, if the claim was disallowed.



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The Carrier states that the letter denying the claim was written on March 11, 1955, which was the very last day permissible, to wit the 59th day, and that it was mailed in the usual manner, in accordance with past practice, in the mailbox, March 11, 1955 which was Friday. The letter of March 11th was not mailed according to the post mark until March 14, 1955 which was the 62nd day after the filing of the claim.


The Carrier explains that by reason of grade elimination, work under construction at the time the mailbox at the depot was temporarily relocated, which it contends undoubtedly resulted in postal employe's failing to pick up the letter of March 11th over the weekend.


The employes submit a copy of a letter written to the Postmaster at Fort Wayne, Indiana, and his reply we quote from the letter of September 29, 1955, written by the Postmaster to Mr. Hayes:




This Division was confronted with a similar case in Award No. 8412, we quote:

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We can come to no other conclusion, than that the Carrier failed to comply with Article V of the Agreement, in failing to give the required denial of the claim within the 60 day period.


Carrier claims that the officer of the Carrier authorized to receive the instant claim was the Chief Dispatcher, who issued the order abolishing claimants positions, and that the successive order of appeals, as required was to the Superintendent, General Superintendent and finally to the Director of Personnel.


The record shows that the instant claim was first filed by the General Chairman with the Superintendent (not with the Chief Dispatcher) under date of January 10, 1955, and it is the claim of the Carrier that from the very first, the Carrier called the attention of the Employes; that the claim had not been "properly progressed in the regular manner." The answer to this contention is that the letter calling this to the attention of Employes was the letter dated March 11, 1955, and postmarked March 14, 1955, in other words it was too late, more than 60 days had expired.


The Carrier relies on Award 8889 (McMahon), but in that case the procedure was outlined in the Agreement.




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While there was some confusion in the handling of the claim on the property, the admission by the Carrier that "there are some few instances where the initial handling has been with the Superintendent," and also the fact that the letter calling the Employes attention to the improperly handling was the letter dated March 11, and postmarked March 14th, which was late, the 60 days having elapsed, we find no error in the manner in which the claim was handled.

In a case involving the same Article V of the August 21, 1954 Agreement and the same problem that confronts us in this case, the Second Division in Award No. 3298 (Referee Ferguson) said we quote with approval:




The claim before us is a "continuing claim", there is no way under the Agreement that the claim can be terminated, the claim would go on forever; this we do not believe the parties had in mind when the Agreement was entered into.
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FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:


That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21,1934;


That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and










      Claim sustained as set out in the Findings.


            NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD By Order of THIRD DIVISION


            ATTEST: S. H. Schulty

            Executive Secretary


Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 8th day of March, 1962.

        DISSENT TO AWARD 10401, DOCKET TE-8875


Although Award 10401 sustains the Employes' position with respect to the Carrier's obligation to notify them of its disallowance of a claim within the 60-day limit the majority, composed of the Carrier Members and Referee, has committed a number of errors harnvful to the Employes and their relations with their employers.


The first error-one that may be forgivable in view of prior awards, but error nevertheless-lies in the statement that:


    "The record clearly shows that at South Whitley the C.T.C. has done, what it was designed to do, that is, it has made automatic the operation of switches and signals under the Supervisory Control of train dispatchers."


The record shows no such thing, clearly or otherwise. The record shows that the Carrier accomplished its design by means of the C.T.C., that is, the transfer of the work involved in controlling operation of the switches and signals at South Whitley from telegraphers to train dispatchers.


The operation of switches and signals by means of C.T.C. equipment is no more automatic than operation of an electric fan . In either instance it is necessary to operate manually a device which completes an electric circuit so the current can cause the unit to operate.

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The train dispatchers do not merely exercise supervisory control over operation of these switches and signals-they did that before the changes were made-but they manually operate the devices, the levers, which complete electric circuits that carry the current which causes the switches and signals to perform their required functions. This is precisely the work performed by the telegraphers before their jobs were abolished. It was not automatic then, and it is not automatic now.


Failure of referees to recognize or accept this basic fact-and I challenge anyone to prove that it is not a fact-has led to this glaring error. The present award merely compounds the error.


After correctly finding that the Carrier had not complied with the requirement that it notify the Employes of its disallowance of the claim within 60 days, the majority then committed a second, and even more grievous error. It accepted and considered an issue which was no part of the dispute.


The case was initially argued in panel session with the Referee on September 29, 1961. After extended consideration by the Referee further discus sion-at his request- was held on January 19, 1962. Then, on January 22, 1962, the Carrier Member submitted a memorandum in which he raised two entirely new issues, that is, contentions and arguments which were not made by the Carrier itself either in handling on the property or in its submissions to the Board. I replied in writing on January 23.


The first of these extraneous arguments, a contention that the claim was defective because the claimants were not identified by name, was summarily rejected without comment, and properly so.


The second, however, was entertained and was dealt with in the last two paragraphs of the "Opinion of Board". This extraneous matter injected by the Carrier Member consisted of a contention that the Carrier's liabilitv ceased when the Employes finally learned that the Carrier intended to disallow the claim, even though such notice came after expiration of the 60-day limit. No such question was ever mentioned by either party on the property or in the record before us.


This Board has long and consistently held that it has no power to decide questions which were never made a part of the particular dispute, and which have not been handled "in the usual manner" by the parties on the property in their efforts to reach a settlement. This is obviously a correct principle, and in conformity with the Railway Labor Act. Any other course would be to deny the parties due process.


I believe one citation is sufficient to illustrate the principle, although literally scores of our awards have commented and approved. In Award 8484 Referee Vokoun said, after reviewing a number of prior awards on the subject:


    "From the above opinions of the Board it is apparent that the Board has diligently protected the parties, both Carrier and Organization, in the presentation of their cases on appeal to the Board in limiting claims to those discussed on the property and limiting the defenses interposed so that there can be no enlargement-or in lay language, no second look after the case is concluded on the property."

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This principle and many supporting awards were brought to the attention of the Referee. By its action of ignoring both the principle and our prior awards, and making a decision on the improperly injected question the majority denied the Employes due process in that they were denied the right to present their views. For that matter the Carrier also was likewise deprived of its opportunity to express itself. For all we know the Carrier might have desired to meet its problem in an entirely different manner. But in any event the majority erred seriously and the decision on the point should be treated as a nullity.


Then, further, after the majority had improperly accepted and considered an extraneous issue, it made a decision which is unsupportable. In its last paragraph the majority states that:


    "The claim before us is a `continuing claim', there is no way under the Agreement that the claim can be terminated, the claim would go on forever . . .".


    After making this interpretation, the majority went on to say:


    . . . this we do not believe the parties had in mind when the Agreement was entered into."


And then immediately after noting that there is no way under the Agreement that the claim can be terminated the majority proceeds to terminate it in part III of the "Findings".


Now what kind of reasoning is this? Everyone knows that this Board has no power to change agreements. Also, everyone knows that contracts are to be construed so as to give effect to the parties' intention as expressed by the language used, not so as to give effect to what someone believes or thinks they meant.


If, as the majority found, there is no way under the Agreement to terminate the claim it obviously would be necessary to go outside the Agreement to find some way to do so. It necessarily follows that when the majority went outside bath the agreement and the record to relieve the Carrier of an obligation it utterly exceeded the Board's power, which is clearly limited to interpretation of agreements and application of such interpretations to the question in dispute as submitted by the parties after their own efforts have failed to resolve their dispute.


The language of Article V which became applicable when the Carrier failed to notify, within 60 days, whoever filed the claim of its reasons for disallowance is not ambiguous. It clearly provides that "If not so notified, the claim or grievance shall be allowed as presented . '. It does not say that the liability thus incurred will cease as of a certain time or anything of the sort.


The attempt of the majority to add a provision which is entirely foreign to the language of the rule should not, and in my opinion will not stand. Certainly further consideration of the question, if and when it properly occurs, will result in correction of this obvious error.


For the reasons, and to the extent set out above I consider Award 10401 to be erroneous, and I hereby register dissent.


J. W. WHITEHOUSE

Labor Member

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326

ANSWER TO LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT TO AWARD NO. 10401,

DOCKET TE-8875


In the main, the Labor Member's Dissent simply expresses dissatisfaction over his arguments having been rejected by our finding on the merits in Award 10401 that there was no violation of the Agreement by the Carrier. In addition, the weight of authority, as well as of reason, support limitations on the requirement for payment by default under Article V of the August 21, 1954 Agreement, which Article Part 4 of the claim itself placed before the Division.


                      /s/ W. H. Castle


                      /s/ P. C. Carter


                      /s/ R. A. Carroll


                      /s/ D. S. Dugan


                      /s/ T. F. Strunck