NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
Richard F. Mitchell, Referee
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
THE ORDER OF RAILROAD TELEGRAPHERS
THE NEW YORK, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS
RAILROAD COMPANY
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Claim of the General Committee of The
Order of Railroad Telegraphers on the New York, Chicago and St. Louis
Railroad that:
1. The Carrier violated
the Agreement
between the parties when
it abolished the three operator-levermen positions at the Interlocking
Tower, South Whitley, Indiana, on December 14, 1954, without in
fact abolishing the work of said positions; and unilaterally transferred said work to employes under another agreement and in a
separate seniority district.
2. The Carrier shall, because of such violative act, be required
to compensate the senior idle employe, extra in preference, on the
seniority district involved, eight (8) hours' pay for each shift of each
day, commencing with the date of the filing of this claim, December
14, 1954, and
3. The Carrier shall also be required to compensate all other
employes adversely affected for any loss of wages, or for expenses
incurred due to Carrier's violative act, and in addition,
4. The Carrier stands in violation of Article V, paragraphs (a)
and (b) (Carrier's Proposal No. 7) of the August 21, 1954 Agreement
when it failed to notify the employes of its disallowance of said claim
within the 60 day time limit from the date claim filed, as stipulated
by said agreement, for which Carrier shall pay the claim as presented.
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: The Agreements between the
parties to this dispute are by reference thereto made a part of this submission.
The facts are, that Carrier without conference or agreement, abolished
three operator-levermen positions at the Interlocker at South Whitley, Indiana,
on December 14, 1954, without in fact abolishing the work of the positions,
and concurrent with the abolishment transferred the performance of the work
to employes in a separate seniority district and under another agreement.
[2881
10401-31
318
There are no train orders to handle. Present operations are conducted strictly
in accordance with the working agreements covering the various crafts.
The Employes are now asking this Board to set back the clock and maintain positions which are not needed and which would serve no useful purpose.
They are asking that the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission be
nullified, despite the fact that they were given the opportunity by public
notice of opposing such action. They are asking that a windfall be given to
unidentified claimants for an alleged violation of the Scope Rule when no
work remains to be performed under that rule.
There has been no violation of the current agreement and there is no
basis for such an allegation. The claim is entirely without merit and should
be denied.
All that is contained herein is either known or available to the Employes
and their representatives.
(Exhibits not reproduced.)
OPINION OF BOARD:
This dispute involves a contention by the Employer that when the Carrier abolished all three positions of operator-leverman
at the Interlocking Tower South Whitley, Indiana, and transferred the work of
these positions to employes of another craft, located in a different seniority
district, it violated their Agreement. There is also involved a contention that
the Carrier failed to comply with Article V of the August 21 Agreement.
The employes have not asked for the re-establishment of the South W hitley
installation, but rather, because of such wrongful act, the Carrier be required
to compensate the Senior idle employe, extra in preference, on the seniority
district involved, eight (S) hours pay for each shift of each day commencing
with December 14, 1954, and also all other employes adversely affected for any
loss of wages and expenses.
The first question that confronts us, is did the Carrier have the right
to abolish the positions at South Whitley tower?
It is the contention of the Carrier that the closing of South Whitley Tower
was brought about by completion of C.T.C. on the Chicago Division, which
practically eliminated the work previously performed by the Operators and
Levermen at that point.
The record clearly shows that at South Whitley the C.T.C. has done, what
it was designed to do, that is, it has made automatic the operation of switches
and signals under the Supervisory Control of train dispatchers.
This Division has had many similar cases before it, we will quote from
Award 4452, with Judge Carter, Referee:
"It is evident from a reading of the foregoing Scope Rule that
work incident to the operation of a CTC installation is not specifically
mentioned. The Organization contends that the definition of the
word `leverman' and `towerman' as used in the industry, includes
those charged with the operation of CTC machines.
_n »
10401--32
319
"*
* * It must be borne in mind that when the Scope Rule of the
Telegraphers' Agreement was negotiated, CTC installations were
unknown and consequently not contemplated by the signatories to that
Agreement. It is clear to this Board that the definition of a towerman
or a leverman heretofore recited contemplated the handling of signals,
switches and mechanical interlocking equipment from a tower under
the general direction of a dispatcher by the train order method. By the
accepted definition, a towerman or leverman operates interlocked
switches and signals from a central point as does the operator of a
CTC machine. The definition of a towerman or leverman, however,
contains the additional limiting words `by means of levers', a limitation wholly foreign to a CTC machine which operates automatically
without the use of levers. The work of a towerman or leverman is
necessarily restricted in the scope of its operation to the vicinity of
the tower. A CTC operation is handled from a central point and controls large sections of a railroad line. Its scope of operation is much
greater. It is automatically controlled and eliminates the train order
method of handling trains. The Telegraphers' Agreement clearly includes the work of towerman and leverman. They naturally belong
there because of the necessity for handling train orders in connection
with their work. We cannot say that the operation of a CTC machine,
which eliminates train order control and consequently one of the most
descriptive elements of a telegrapher's work, is included in the scope
of the Telegraphers' Agreement because it includes towermen and
levermen. * * *
"We think the matter constitutes a jurisdictional dispute. It is a
dispute of long standing on this and other railroads. It has resulted in
mediation on some other Carriers where the situation has been
similar to the one we have before us. Awards
641, 2804.
The record
indicates that this work has by agreement or arbitration been negotiated on other Carriers by the Telegraphers and Dispatchers without
consistency of result. This is evidence only of the jurisdictional nature
of the dispute. There must be an agreement with reference to the
work before this Board has jurisdiction to act, this Board being
solely an interpreting agency under the law creating it. * * *"
This Division has found that the A.T.D.A. is involved in this dispute and
per Section
3
First (j) of the Act, A.T.D.A. was afforded opportunity to be
heard which it waived.
Thus on the merits of the case there was no violation of the Agreement
by the Carrier as it had a right to abolish the positions at South Whitley tower.
We come now to the claim of the Employes:
"that the Carrier stands in violation of Act V, paragraphs (a)
and (b) of the August
21, 1954
Agrement when it failed to notify the
employes of its disallowance of said claim within the
60
day time limit
from the date claim was filed as stipulated by said Agreement, for
which Carrier shall pay the claim as presented."
Thus it was the duty of the Carrier under the Agreement, within
60
days
after the filing of the claim to notify whoever filed the claim or grievance in
writing of the reasons for the disallowance, if the claim was disallowed.
We quote the pertinent part of Article V:
10401-33
320
"All claims or grievances arising on or after January 1, 1955
shall be handled as follows:
"(a) All claims or grievances must be presented in writing by
or on behalf of the employe involved, to the officer of the Carrier
authorized to receive same, within 60 days from the date of the occurrence on which the claim or grievance is based. Should any such
claim or grievance be disallowed, the carrier shall, within 60 days
from the date same is filed, notify whoever filed the claim or grievance (the employe or his representative) is writing of the reasons
for such disallowance. If not so notified, the claim or grievance shall
be allowed as presented, but this shall not be considered as a precedent
or waiver of the contentions of the Carrier as to other similar claims
or grievances.
"(b) If a disallowed claim or grievance is to be appealed, such
appeal must be in writing and must be taken within 60 days from
receipt of notice of disallowance, and the representative of the Carrier
shall be notified in writing within that time of the rejection of his
decision. Failing to comply with the provision, the matter shall be
considered closed, but this shall not be considered as a precedent or
waiver of the contentions of the employe as to other similar claims
or grievances. It is understood, however, that the parties may, by
agreement, at any state of the handling of a claim or grievance on
the property, extend the 60-day period for either a decision or appeal,
up to and including the highest officer of the Carrier designated for
that purpose."
The Carrier states that the letter denying the claim was written on March
11, 1955, which was the very last day permissible, to wit the 59th day, and that
it was mailed in the usual manner, in accordance with past practice, in the
mailbox, March 11, 1955 which was Friday. The letter of March 11th was
not mailed according to the post mark until March 14, 1955 which was the 62nd
day after the filing of the claim.
The Carrier explains that by reason of grade elimination, work under
construction at the time the mailbox at the depot was temporarily relocated,
which it contends undoubtedly resulted in postal employe's failing to pick up
the letter of March 11th over the weekend.
The employes submit a copy of a letter written to the Postmaster at Fort
Wayne, Indiana, and his reply we quote from the letter of September 29, 1955,
written by the Postmaster to Mr. Hayes:
"In reply to yours of September 29, 1955, please be advised that
we have no record of failure to collect from the collection box located
at the Nickel Plate Depot, on schedule, on Friday, March 11, 1955.
This box is scheduled to be opened five times during each week,
by 3 different employes. It is almost inconceivable that all would
have missed it on that particular day. Since yours is the only inquiry
regarding the matter, it must be assumed that collections were made
according to schedule."
This Division was confronted with a similar case in Award No. 8412,
we quote:
10401-34
321
"We cannot agree with this argument. Article V, Section 1 (a),
specifies correlative rights and duties of employes (or their representatives) and of carriers. A carrier's specified duty is to give timely
notice of a disallowed claim, with reasons for disallowance. Otherwise
the claim must be allowed as presented. Inherent and necessary for the
proper performance of this specified obligation are certain other,
unspecified obligations. Among
these are (1) The duty to keep the
channels of communication within management open and free; (2) the
duty to investigate claims promptly; (3) the duty to confer on claims
promptly with representatives of claimants; and (4) the duty to make
prompt decisions of allowance or disallowance. It is argued that some
or all of these items are rights of a carrier under the Railway Labor
Act. This may well be true. But they are also duties of a carrier
under the second sentence of Article V, Section 1 (a) of the August
21, 1954 Agreement. They are duties which inhere in said sentence;
and if said duties are not fulfilled, the carrier suffers a penalty. To
so rule is not to rewrite or add to the Parties' Agreement.
"In respect to the loss of a written, timely filed claim in
the
mails or otherwise, it must be clear that a Carrier could defeat the
purpose of Article V, Section 1 (a) if it failed wittingly or unwittingly to see that the claim was passed up to the decision-making
official through proper channels. If the position of the Carrier in the
instant case were to prevail, it would be possible to disallow a claim by
losing it rather than by passing on its merits. If the claim were refiled after being lost, it would be possible to allege that said re-filing
was not timely."
We can come to no other conclusion, than that the Carrier failed to comply
with Article V of the Agreement, in failing to give the required denial of the
claim within the 60 day period.
Carrier claims that the officer of the Carrier authorized to receive the
instant claim was the Chief Dispatcher, who issued the order abolishing claimants positions, and that the successive order of appeals, as required was to the
Superintendent, General Superintendent and finally to the Director of
Personnel.
The record shows that the instant claim was first filed by the General
Chairman with the Superintendent (not with the Chief Dispatcher) under
date of January 10, 1955, and it is the claim of the Carrier that from the very
first, the Carrier called the attention of the Employes; that the claim had not
been "properly progressed in the regular manner." The answer to this contention is that the letter calling this to the attention of Employes was the letter
dated March 11, 1955, and postmarked March 14, 1955, in other words it was
too late, more than 60 days had expired.
The Carrier relies on Award 8889 (McMahon), but in that case the
procedure was outlined in the Agreement.
We quote from the Carrier's submission:
"The usual handling of claims or grievances on the Chicago
Division in telegrapliers' cases is the initial filing of claim with the
Chief Dispatcher, with successive appeals, if reqoired, to the Superintendent, General Superintendent, and finally to the Director of
Personnel.
10401-35
322
There are some few instances where the initial handling has
been with the Superintendent. The initial handling or filing is usually
by the Local Chairman with any subsequent handling by the General
Chairman. In a few instances the initial handling has been by the
General Chairman. The Carrier has not taken exception to the filing
of claims by the individual employe or his authorized representative,
be that representative the Local Chairman or General Chairman.
However, it does object to duplicate handling of the same claim on
a concurrent basis."
While there was some confusion in the handling of the claim on the
property, the admission by the Carrier that "there are some few instances
where the initial handling has been with the Superintendent," and also the
fact that the letter calling the Employes attention to the improperly handling
was the letter dated March 11, and postmarked March 14th, which was late,
the 60 days having elapsed, we find no error in the manner in which the claim
was handled.
In a case involving the same Article V of the August 21, 1954 Agreement
and the same problem that confronts us in this case, the Second Division in
Award No. 3298 (Referee Ferguson) said we quote with approval:
"We are of the opinion that time limits fixed are agreed to by
the parties should be strictly applied. This claim falls within the type
known as a continuing claim. `Continuing claims' are a device adopted
by the parties to avoid a multiplicity of claims, to avoid the need for
filing a new claim every day for that day's violation.
Article V..1 (a) of the August 21, 1954 agreement provides
explicitly, `All claims must be presented . . . within 60 days . . .
Should . . . such claim be disallowed, the carrier shall, within 60
days . . . notify in writing of the reasons . . . If not so notified the
claim or grievance shall be allowed as presented,'.
"At first glance the rule appears deceptively simple of application. The difficulty arises when it is attempted to put it into operation
in a claim for an alleged violation in the future. If the claim is found
to be valid on its merits, it should properly be allowed without any
restriction on future application. On the other hand, if the claim was
without merit in the first place, as we have already found in this
docket, the allowance on the technical rule violation presents a
delemma, which the framers of the rule did not anticipate except as
they provided in Article V. 3. of the August 21, 1954, agreement,
wherein continuing violations are recognized, defined and limited.
It provides, `A claim . . . for an alleged continuing violation .
shall be fully protected . . . as long as such alleged violation, if found
to be such continues'. This is followed by a retroactive limit of 60
days prior to filing, but the rule is silent on how long in future such
claims should be granted. Having found against the merits we
should not reverse our decision and create an absurdity."
The claim before us is a "continuing claim", there is no way under the
Agreement that the claim can be terminated, the claim would go on forever;
this we do not believe the parties had in mind when the Agreement was
entered into.
16401-36
323
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving
the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole
record and all the
evidence, finds
and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively
Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as
approved June 21,1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the
dispute involved herein; and
I. That
there is
no merit in the claim before us,
II. That a technical violation of Article V-A has been proved and
must be sustained.
III. That the violation not having been found to be a violation on
its merits, our allowance is limited to the period prior to the
late declination and is not
addressed to
the substantive merits
of the basic claim.
AWARD
Claim sustained as set out in the Findings.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of THIRD DIVISION
ATTEST: S. H. Schulty
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 8th day of March, 1962.
DISSENT TO AWARD 10401, DOCKET TE-8875
Although Award 10401 sustains the Employes' position with
respect to
the Carrier's obligation to notify them of its disallowance of a claim within
the 60-day limit the majority, composed of the Carrier Members and Referee,
has committed a number of errors harnvful to the Employes and their relations
with their employers.
The first
error-one that
may be forgivable in view of prior awards, but
error
nevertheless-lies in
the statement that:
"The record clearly shows that at South Whitley the C.T.C. has
done, what it was designed to do, that is, it has made automatic the
operation of switches and signals under the Supervisory Control of
train dispatchers."
The record shows no such thing, clearly or otherwise. The record shows
that the Carrier accomplished its design by means of the C.T.C., that is, the
transfer of the work involved in controlling operation of the switches and
signals at South Whitley from
telegraphers to
train dispatchers.
The operation of switches and signals by means of C.T.C. equipment is
no more automatic than operation of an
electric fan
. In either instance it is
necessary to
operate manually a device which completes an electric circuit
so the current can cause the unit to operate.
10401--37
324
The train dispatchers do not
merely exercise supervisory control over
operation of these switches and signals-they did that before the changes
were made-but they manually operate the devices, the levers, which complete
electric circuits that carry the current which causes the switches and signals
to perform their required functions. This is precisely the work performed by
the telegraphers before their jobs were abolished. It was not automatic then,
and it is not automatic now.
Failure of referees to recognize or accept this basic fact-and I challenge
anyone to prove that it is not a fact-has led to this glaring error. The
present award merely compounds the error.
After correctly finding that the Carrier had not complied with the
requirement that it notify the Employes of its disallowance of the claim
within 60 days, the majority then committed a second, and even more grievous
error. It accepted and considered an issue which was no part of the dispute.
The case was initially argued in panel session with the Referee on September 29, 1961. After extended consideration by the Referee further discus
sion-at his request- was held on January 19, 1962. Then, on January 22,
1962, the Carrier Member submitted a memorandum in which he raised two
entirely new issues, that is, contentions and arguments which were not made
by the Carrier itself either in handling on the property or in its submissions
to the Board. I replied in writing on January 23.
The first of these extraneous arguments, a contention that the claim was
defective because the claimants were not identified by name, was summarily
rejected without comment, and properly so.
The second, however, was entertained and was dealt with in the last two
paragraphs of the "Opinion of Board". This extraneous matter injected by
the Carrier Member consisted of a contention that the Carrier's liabilitv
ceased when the Employes finally learned that the Carrier intended to
disallow the claim, even though such notice came after expiration of the
60-day limit. No such question was ever mentioned by either party on the
property or in the record before us.
This Board has long and consistently held that it has no power to decide
questions which were never made a part of the particular dispute, and which
have not been handled "in the usual manner" by the parties on the property
in their efforts to reach a settlement. This is obviously a correct principle,
and in conformity with the Railway Labor Act. Any other course would be
to deny the parties due process.
I believe one citation is sufficient to illustrate the principle, although
literally scores of our awards have commented and approved. In Award 8484
Referee Vokoun said, after reviewing a number of prior awards on the
subject:
"From the above opinions of the Board it is apparent that the
Board has diligently protected the parties, both Carrier and Organization, in the presentation of their cases on appeal to the Board
in limiting claims to those discussed on the property and limiting
the defenses interposed so that there can be no enlargement-or in
lay language, no second look after the case is concluded on the
property."
10401-35
325
This principle and many supporting awards were brought to the attention
of the Referee. By its action of ignoring both the principle and our prior
awards, and making a decision on the improperly
injected question the
majority denied the Employes due process in that they were denied the
right to present their views. For that matter the Carrier also was likewise
deprived of its opportunity to express itself. For all we know the Carrier
might have desired to meet its problem in an entirely different manner. But
in any event the majority erred seriously and the decision on the point should
be treated as a nullity.
Then, further, after the majority had improperly
accepted and considered an extraneous issue, it made a decision which is unsupportable. In its
last paragraph the majority states that:
"The claim before us is a `continuing claim', there is no way
under the Agreement that the claim can be terminated, the claim
would go on forever . . .".
After making this interpretation, the majority went on to say:
. . . this we do not believe the parties had in mind when the
Agreement was entered into."
And then immediately after noting that
there is no way under the
Agreement that the claim can be terminated the majority proceeds to terminate it in part III of the "Findings".
Now what kind of reasoning is this? Everyone knows that this Board has
no power to change agreements. Also, everyone knows that contracts are to
be construed so as to give effect to the parties' intention as
expressed by the
language used, not so as to give effect to what someone believes or thinks
they meant.
If, as the majority found, there is no way under the Agreement to
terminate the claim it obviously would be necessary to go outside the Agreement to find some way to do so. It necessarily follows that when the majority
went outside bath the agreement and the record to relieve the Carrier of an
obligation it utterly exceeded the Board's power, which is clearly limited to
interpretation of agreements and application of such interpretations to the
question in dispute as submitted by the parties after their own efforts have
failed to resolve
their dispute.
The language of Article V which became applicable
when the Carrier
failed to notify, within 60 days, whoever filed the claim of its reasons for
disallowance is not ambiguous. It clearly provides that "If not so notified, the
claim or grievance shall be allowed as presented . '. It does not say that
the liability thus incurred will cease as of a certain time or anything of
the sort.
The attempt of the majority to add a provision which is entirely foreign
to
the language of the rule should not, and in my opinion will not stand.
Certainly further consideration of the question, if and when it properly occurs,
will result in correction of this obvious error.
For the reasons, and to the extent set out above I consider Award 10401
to be erroneous, and I hereby register dissent.
J. W. WHITEHOUSE
Labor Member
10401-39
ANSWER TO LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT TO AWARD NO. 10401,
DOCKET TE-8875
In the main, the Labor Member's Dissent simply
expresses dissatisfaction
over his arguments having been
rejected by
our finding on the merits in
Award 10401 that there was no violation of the
Agreement by
the Carrier.
In addition, the weight of authority, as well as of reason, support limitations
on the requirement for payment by default under Article V of the August 21,
1954
Agreement, which
Article Part 4 of the claim itself placed before
the Division.
/s/ W. H. Castle
/s/ P. C. Carter
/s/ R. A. Carroll
/s/ D. S. Dugan
/s/ T. F. Strunck