THIRD DIVISION

(Supplemental)




PARTIES TO DISPUTE:

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS,
FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC

RAILROAD COMPANY


STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:





EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: Prior to October 30, 1954 the Carrier maintained a position in the Store Department at Cedar Rapids, Iowa identified as Position No. 150-Chauffeur. The occupant of that position was W. L. Leighty, whose seniority date in the Store Department, Seniority District No. 118, is February 12, 1940. Position No. 150 was assigned to work from 7:00 A. M. to 3:00 P. M., Monday through Friday, with Saturday and Sunday as the assigned rest days. The rate of pay was $15.1120 per day.


The duties normally attached to the position and performed by employe Leighty consisted of chauffeur duties in connection with the handling and hauling of material, supplies, etc., for the various departments at Cedar Rapids and Marion, Iowa as well as other incidental Store Department work.


On October 21, 1954 Bulletin No. GSK-301 abolishing Position No. 150 effective at 3:00 P. M. Friday, October 29, 1954 was issued by General Store-



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been performed by Car and Locomotive Department employes and is covered by other agreements.


There exists no basis for a sustaining award and the Carrier respectfully requests that the claim be denied.






OPINION OF BOARD: On October 29, 1954 at 3:00 P. M. Claimant W. L. Leighty's Chauffeurs' position-Number 175-was abolished in the Store Department at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and some of Claimant's truck driving duties were reportedly assigned to employes not covered by the controlling Agreement dated September 1, 1949.


The Organization in support of its alleged Agreement violation charge cites Rule 1(e)-first and third paragraphs of the effective Agreementwhich read as follows:




The record in this case is replete with naked allegations, inadmissible evidence and contradictory statements. However, we did assemble the following pertinent facts-which the parties either did not deny or successfully refute:











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From the above facts, it is obvious and undeniable that both the Locomotive Department and the Car Department performed their own transportation work prior to the time a truck was assigned to the Store Department. It must then logically follow that such transportation work was protected by the Agreements pertaining to those crafts. Accordingly, it is equally undeniable that the Store Department could not possibly have a claim on such transportation work at that time.


Now let us review the conditions that prevailed after the Store Department acquired a truck on April 1, 1943. Again referring to the above facts, the Store Department truck was initially driven by a Car Department employe for several months and then by Mr. Weldon for approximately six years. The latter stated that "I performed only Store Department work and Car Department employes continued to use the Locomotive. Departments' needs." Therefore, it must follow that up until the time in 1949 when the Claimant was assigned to the Store Department as a chauffeur-neither he, nor the position, nor the Organization had any claim whatsoever to the transportation work of other departments.


Did the Store Department subsequently acquire such rights? Did the other crafts subsequently surrender or contract away their transportation work rights to the Organization? Nowhere in the record can we find even a scintilla of evidence that this was done. In fact, we do not believe the Organization ever made such a claim. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for us to understand how-if other crafts had and still supposedly have contractual rights to their respective transportation work-the Petitioner can now lay claim to such work.

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Certainly the first paragraph of Rule 1 (e), supra, does not support the Organization's position. In fact, the part of that rule reading- , . . and does not establish the right to perform such work now covered by' other Agreements."-actually and factually bars the Organization from claiming the transportation work involved because such work is covered by other Agreements.


Turning to the Organization's claims against the H. & W. Transfer Company and the Hubbard Ice and Fuel Company, we find the following facts:






It somewhat strains our understanding to see how the Organization can have any claim to such work activities. The work performed by those Companies, supra. was not work that had issued to, passed to, or been regularly performed by Store Department employes. Consequently, Store Department employes have acquired neither active nor passive rights to that work.


The Organization did not disprove the Carrier's claim that the Local Storekeeper now performs all the remaining work duties of the abolished position.


The Carrier's refusal to join the Organization in a "joint investigation" on the property was not a material consideration in our determination.


Even the Organization's Exhibit "D"-which delineated the Claimant's work duties for a specified period and which the Claimant prepared-gave but scant support to the Organization's claim.




FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:


That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;


That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and



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Claim denied.






Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 25th day of April 1962.