The carrier reserves the right, if and when it is furnished with the submission which has been or will be filed ex parts by the petitioner in this case, to make such further answer as may be necessary in relation to all allegations and claims as may be advanced by the petitioner in such submission, which cannot be forecast by the carrier at this time and have not been answered in this, the carrier's initial submission.

(Exhibits not reproduced.)

OPINION OF BOARD: The occupant of the Agent-Telegrapher position at the Selby, California, station was also agent for the Railway Express Agency. For many years prior to April 29, 1952 the Agent was paid a flat rate of $80.00 per month in lieu of commissions. On the latter date the parties agreed that effective May 1, 1952 the flat rate in lieu of commissions would be increased to $100.00 per month.

On November 8, 1956, the Carrier and Petitioner executed a letter, the material substance of which read as follows:

"In view of changed conditions Railway Express Agency now desires to cancel arrangement reflected by our letter of April 29, 1952 and is agreeable effective November 1, 1956 to allowing commissions at rate of 10% on LCL revenue local, and 5% on LCL revenue interline, and $10.00 on carload traffic."

Shortly before November 14, 1956 the American Smelting and Refining Company advised the Claimant that they would have 432 bars of silver weighing 34,324 pounds for shipment to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, on November 14, 1956. Claimant reported this to the Superintendent's office of the Railway Express Agency, who advised Claimant that "shipment would move in a car provided for that purpose and should be billed on a carload waybill." The shipment was so billed on a carload waybill. The total charge was $9,048.79.

Petitioner contends that the $9,048.79 charges was computed "from the LCL value rate of $19.73 per $1,000.00; therefore, the charges of $9,048.79 are LCL revenue and are subject to the 10% rate." The amount Claimant says he should have received is $904.87. The Carrier paid him $10.00.

Petitioner argues that this was not a carload shipment because "it was billed at LCL rate of $19.73 per $1,000.00 value with no C/L commodity rate on silver being authorized by tariff." Heretofore, silver had been shipped at LCL rates and on LCL waybills. The mere fact that this shipment was billed on a carload waybill does not change the situation. It is also argued that the mere fact that the shipment of silver was the only lading in the car does not alone create a carload shipment. Further, Petitioner says that there "is no car load rate in express tariffs covering this type of shipment, and reason being that it is a `value shipment,' i.e., the rate is based upon the value, and not the weight"

The agreement of November 8, 1956 provides for compensation of "$10.00 on carload traffic." The term "carload traffic" must have had some meaning to the parties. Bothe parties are familiar with the usage of this term in the industry. While the Standard Express Operations Agreement between the Railway Express Agency, Inc., and the Railroad companies is not binding upon the Petitioner or the Claimant, the operation and term usage is known to Petitioner. Article 10, Section 2(a) of that Agreement defines "carload traffic" as follows:

"The term `carload traffic' means (1) shipments consigned from one consignor to one consignee moving under carload rates and (2) shipments described in the Money Classification section of Official Express Classification No. 35, supplements thereto and successive issues thereof, on which the transportation charges amount to $2,500 or more, consigned from one consignor to one consignee."

Whether or not the parties intended a different meaning to "carload' traffic" we do not know. The fact is that the words alone have clear and well understood meaning even without the definition above quoted. The definition clarifies the meaning and intent as it applies to the shipment of silver bars or other monetary classifications. If Petitioner intended a different meaning to "carload traffic," the agreement of November 8, 1956 should have so provided. In the absence of an accepted meaning by the parties, we may not modify the clear and normal usage of words in an agreement.

The mere fact that the shipment was billed at the LCL rate does not change the meaning of "carload traffic." The record shows that the LCL rate is the same as the rate for silver shipments of this kind.

Petitioner cites as a precedent a claim settlement made in 1946. Two hundred bags of rutabaga seed weighing 22,400 pounds were shipped in a car provided by the Carrier. It was billed at the LCL rate on a carload waybill. Carrier paid the agent the full 10% commission instead of only $10.00. The record shows that this shipment is not similar to the claim here considered. The rutabaga seed shipment moved as Second-Class. It did not come under the definition of "carload traffic" described in the Money Classification above quoted. That being the case, it could not have been considered "carload traffic" since it was not billed under "carload rates." The 1946 claim settlement is not applicable to the facts here involved and may not be considered as a binding precedent. It certainly was not a precedent which gives meaning and intent to the November 8, 1956 Agreement.

During the Panel Hearing, and subsequent thereto, the parties introduced statements, and correspondence of events which occurred subsequent to the date of the claim. These are not in the record. We have not considered them in reaching our decision. They are irrelevant. We have no right to give them any credence. They should not have been a matter of discussion or submission to the Referee.

For all the reasons previously stated, we conclude that there is no merit to the claim.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the parties waived oral hearing;

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the, dispute involved herein; and

That the Carrier did not violate the Agreement.

AWARD