STATEMENT OF CLAIM: . . . for and in behalf of the sleeping-lounge car attendants and the sleeping car porters employed by the New York Central Railroad Company.
Because the New York Central Railroad Company did, through Mr. J. P. Dewey, Superintendent Dining and Sleeping Car Service, and finally through Mr. A. H. Smith, Manager Dining and Sleeping Car Service Department, deny the claim filed for and in behalf of the above named groups of employes in which it was contended that the Company was in violation of the Agreement governing the wages and working conditions of the sleeping car porters and sleeping-lounge car attendants employed by the New York Central Railroad when it required these employes to leave their jobs in the sleeping-lounge cars and proceed up to the day coaches and take charge of the handling of pillows to the passengers in the day coaches.
And further, for the New York Central Railroad Company to be directed to discontinue the requirement that the porters on the sleeping-lounge cars or on the sleeping cars handle the disposition and collection of pillows in the day coaches on the New York Central trains as being in violation of the rules of the Agreement above-mentioned.
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: Your Petitioner, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, respectfully submits that it is duly authorized to represent all employes of the New York Central Railroad System classified as sleeping car porters and sleeping-lounge car attendants, and in such capacity, it is duly authorized to file claims for and in behalf of these employes as provided for in the Agreement between the New York Central Railroad and its sleeping car porters and sleeping-lounge car attendants, represented by the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
Your Petitioner further sets forth that on or about March 10, 1962, instructions were issued to the sleeping-lounge car attendants operating in Line 191 between Chicago and Buffalo to take the responsibility for selling pillows to the day coach passengers in the day coaches on said train on which the particular sleeping-lounge car operates.
Carrier respectfully submits that the facts show conclusively it has never, either by agreement or practice, relinquished its right to assign to loungesleeping car attendants the work involved in providing pillow rental service on Train 358, that the assignment of this work is a matter for Carrier's determination and within its managerial authority to direct its business; further, that sleeping-lounge car attendants are fully qualified to perform this necessary service to Carrier's patrons. Claim of the Organization that Carrier violated the Agreement is without merit and should be denied.
All the facts and arguments herein presented were made known to the employes during handling on the property.
OPINION OF BOARD: The Carrier, on March 5, 1962, began requiring the Sleeping Lounge Car Attendant on Train 358 to rent out pillows to occupants of coaches for a charge of 35 cents each, which funds were remitted to the said Carrier at the end of the trip together with receipts for the sale of food and beverages. 12192-i4 31
The question at issue is whether or not the Carrier is violating the Agreement between the parties by requiring sleeping-lounge car attendants to handle pillows for passengers in the day coaches. The Organization contends that this requirement violates the Scope Rule which reads as follows:
In other words, Petitioner claims that since the language of the Scope Rule specifies that these new duties be performed by sleeping car porters and sleeping-lounge car attendants, the Carrier violated the Agreement by requiring the performance of duties in the day coaches. The position of the Carrier is that there is nothing in either the Scope Rule or any other rule of the Agreement nor of the practice of the parties thereunder which prohibits assigning this work to the Claimants. Petitioner further points to the fact that Claimants do not receive extra compensation for this work, but no claim is being made for compensation. Even if such claim were being made, it could not be considered because this issue was not raised by the Petitioner on the property when the case was processed.
It should be noted that the Scope Rule of the Agreement does not spell out the specific and particular duties required of the sleeping car porters and sleeping-lounge car attendants. There are numerous Awards of this Board, as exemplified in Award 1418, which hold as follows:
To the same effect, see Awards 2491, 5331, 6655, 6697, 7073, 7362, 7849, 7918, 8218, and many others. Also apposite to the instant case is Award 7172, which holds:
In a recent case, Award 11923, this Board reiterated its approval of the above line of cases by holding:
As further evidence that the Agreement between the parties in the instant case does not limit the work of Claimants to any particular type of car in the train, the record shows that in negotiating the current Agreement, the Petitioner proposed and the Carrier rejected a rule which would have confined work of the Employes covered thereby to sleeping cars and sleeping-lounge cars. It is not within the authority of this Board to grant a rule by interpretation that was rejected by the Carrier at the bargaining table. In effect, the granting of the claim advanced by the Petitioner would constitute a modification or addition to the agreement reached by the parties. Otherwise stated, this Board is being asked to grant something the agreement does not provide and which, when proposed by the Petitioner, was rejected by the Carrier. The rule that we are without authority so to do is too well established to require further comment. See Awards 4259, and 8538.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and