DULUTH, MISSABE AND IRON RANGE
RAILWAY COMPANY
STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:
EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: During the period from January 6 through January 22, 1958, the claimants, who were regularly employed on either Section No. 51 or Floating Gangs Nos. 1 or 2, were engaged in removing track on the Eastern Mesaba Branch of the Carrier's Iron Range Division.
On each assigned workday during this period, the claimants were required by the Carrier to go from and to their respective designated assembling point or headquarters and work site via Carrier-owned buses or trucks during hours in advance of and following their regularly assigned eight hour work period. For service thus performed, the claimants were paid at their respective straight time rates of pay.
The Employes have contended and continue to contend that this time consumed by the claimants in going from and to their respective assembling point or headquarters and work site during overtime hours is time worked and should have been paid for at the time and one-half rates of pay.
Rule 16 specifically provides how employes will be paid for time worked during recognized overtime hours as stipulated therein. Rule 16 excludes travel time payment from its provisions. Rule 24 specifically provides how employes will be paid travel time. The inclusion of separate and distinct specific rules in the agreement, one covering the method of payment for time worked and the other covering the method of payment for travel time, shows without a doubt that the parties are agreed that time worked and travel time are not one and the same thing or synonymous. It is clear that travel time does not come under the provisions of the Overtime or Hours of Service Rules. If travel time was one and the same thing or synonymous there would be no need for travel rules or separate and distinct travel time and time worked during the recognized overtime hours.
The interpretation of the agreement rules which the Employes are attempting to apply and establish would, if sustained, be the equivalent to change the interpretation placed on such rules for approximately 21 years and rewrite such rules which your Board has held many times that such must be done only by conference and negotiations between the parties themselves and not by unilateral action of either party or by the Board.
In light of all facts and circumstances, the claim should be denied in its entirety.
OPINION OF BOARD: The issue is whether Claimants are entitled to pay at the overtime rate instead of pro rata rate for the time they were transported from their headquarters and their point of work and return. They were transported by Carrier owned bus and "Carry All".
Rule 24 is excepted from the time and one-half penalty pay for travel to and from an employe's point of work. It is evident that the parties negotiated special pay conditions for such travel time. If that had not been the intention of the parties there would have been no need for Rule 24 and Rule 16 (a) would not have contained such an exception. We need then to examine the language of Rule 24 (a).
Rule 24 (a) clearly and unmistakably states that travel "as passengers in automobiles . . . will be paid for at the pro rata rate." The record shows, without serious contradiction. that Claimants were transported either by a Carrier owned bus or by a "Carry All". Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "automobile" as "a self-propelled vehicle suitable for use on a street or roadway." A bus is such "a self-propelled vehicle suitable for use on a street or roadway." If the bus was operated as a public conveyance it would come under another exception to the time and one-half penalty in Rule 24 (a). Since the bus was operated by Carrier, Claimants were "passengers in automobiles" as intended in Rule 24 (a).
Carrier describes the vehicle as "similar to a station wagon, equipped with seats and used primarily to transport employes over the Carrier's property." Petitioner does not agree. It describes the vehicle as "simply a panel truck which is equipped with make-shift benches and which is used to transport employes, tools, material and equipment." There is, obviously, a difference in the description of the "Carry All" which we are in no position to resolve since the Board may not decide a disputed factual question. We may only interpret the Agreement and, in this situation, specifically Rule 24 (a). A careful reading of that Rule and the other applicable Rules of the Agreement convinces us that the parties intended to except from the time and onehalf penalty rate transportation of employes by any kind of an automobile. Even a panel truck is an automobile for this purpose. We do not believe the parties intended to confine the exception strictly to vehicles which commonly carry only passengers. 12222-16 123
Petitioner attempts to dispel this interpretation by citing statements of employes who purportedly were paid at the time and one-half rate for travel time. These statements are not in every instance specific. For example one says:
It does not say by what means they were transported. This is the essence of Rule 24. Similar language is replete in many of the quoted statements.
In support of this, Carrier has placed in the record affidavits of Track Timekeepers from 1926 to 1959 which support the above statement. Also in the record are copies of payroll records which attempt to refute the statements submitted by Petitioner. There, again, we have a conflict of facts which we may not resolve.
Petitioner also argues that Carrier's refusal to make a joint check of the payroll records is an admission that Carrier has paid travel time at the penalty rate. We have no quarrel with the general principle. But we are obliged to reiterate the fact that the language in Rule 24 (a) is clear and unambiguous. It needs no convincing evidence to give it meaning and intent. There is no merit to the claim.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and