Had she been required to remain on duty on Job 471 eight hours past quitting time, continuing to perform the duties of that assignment, undoubtedly she would have submitted one time slip, showing thereon just one job number (471) and claiming eight hours straight time and ten hours overtime.

But the manner in which she submitted her time slips shows that she well realized that at four o'clock she finished her work as a replacement for W. R. Geary on Job 471 and started a new day's work as a replacement for W. L. Fitzgerald on Job 475.

The guarantee does not call for twelve calendar days' work-under the terms of the February 1, 1958 agreement the guarantee could conceivably (but not reasonably) be made in four calendar days by some marathon worker!

This "guarantee" obviously had for its sole purpose the provision of a floor for the earnings of the employes assigned.

(Exhibits not reproduced.

OPINION OF BOARD: The Claimant during the month of 1960, was assigned to the Carrier's extra board list. She was guaranteed "twelve work days" during the month under the following provision in the Memorandum Agreement effective February 1, 1958.

"There shall be a guarantee of twelve (12) work days per month to the employe assigned to the extra board list for Rusk Avenue Yard Office."

This employe had worked eight days through the first twenty-nine days of the month, and on September 30 was instructed to report, and did report, at 6:00 A. M. September 30 to work as a supplementary Utility Clerk, but when the regularly assigned 8:00 A. M. to 4:00 P. M. Crew Dispatcher was unable to work, Claimant was assigned to his vacancy. For this service, she was paid eight hours straight time and two hours penalty time. The second shift Utility Clerk with assigned hours 4:00 P. M. to 12:00 P. M. was unable to work on the day in question, September 30, so Claimant also filled this vacancy. For this service, she was compensated eight additional hours at the punitive rate. The Claimant's contention is that this service, aggregating 18 hours, counted as only one workday, thus entitling her at the end of the month to three days to meet her guarantee. On the other hand, the Carrier maintains that the service performed constituted 2 workdays; Petitioner therefor worked 10 days and teas entitled to 2 additional day's pay to comply with the above cited Memorandum. It is the difference of one day's pay which is the issue.

Rule 37(a) of the Agreement provides that:

' . (8) consecutive hours or less exclusive of the meal period, shall, constitute a day's work for which eight (8) hours' pay will be allowed."

Rule 37 (d-1) provides that:

11. . . Time in excess of eight (8) hours, exclusive of the meal period, on any day will be considered overtime and paid on the minute basis at the rate of time and one-half."

Carrier attempts to make a distinction between the connotation of "a day's work" as contained in Article 37(a) of the agreement and "work day"

as contained in the Memorandum of Agreement, February 1, 1958. It maintains that the letter refers to shifts and not days. We find this contention wholly without merit. The Carrier has implicitly recognized, by paying Claimant 8 hours at the straight time rate and 10 hours overtime, that the terms "work day" and "a day's work," are synonymous.

The language used in the above rules is clear, concise, unambiguous and has been subjected to interpretation in many awards emanating from this Board. Eight consecutive hours, exclusive of the meal period, constitutes a day's work. Time in excess of 8 hours on any day is considered overtime. The Claimant was paid 8 hours straight time and 10 hours punitive time. The connotation of the workday has been held to be a "24-hour period from previous starting time." (See Awards 687, 2053, 5796, and 5414).

We are of the opinion that only 1 workday can be accomplished in a 24hour period. The workday has been used consistently in the industry to mean a 24-hour period from the previous starting time. The Memorandum of Agreement covering the Claimant guarantees 12 workdays per month. It is our judgment that the Claimant worked 9 days, and since Carrier paid her only for 11 days, we must sustain the claim.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the parties waived oral hearing;

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Agreement was violated.

AWARD