STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood (GL-5499) that:
1. The Carrier violated the Clerks' Agreement when on July 31, 1963, it summarily dismissed James P. Jacobs, Clerk, Washington, D. C., from service.
2. Clerk James P. Jacobs shall now be reinstated to the service of the Carrier with seniority and all other rights unimpaired.
3. Clerk James P. Jacobs shall now be compensated for all wage and other losses sustained account this summary dismissal.
4. Clerk James P. Jacobs' record shall be cleared of all alleged charges or allegations which may have been recorded thereon as the result of the alleged violation named herein.
OPINION OF BOARD: Resolution of the issues in this case involve: (1) interpretation and application of Rule 24 of the Agreement; and, Carrier's right to order an employe to submit to a physical examination and to hold him out of service until his return to service is approved by a Medical Examiner. The Agreement is silent on the subject of physical examinations.
Clerks appealed on July 19. Carrier's final decision, affirming the hearing officer's decision and Claimant's dismissal from service, issued on August 12.
As to what gave rise to Auditor Bresnahan's issuing the May 3 directive taking Claimant out of service, Bresnahan testified:
Bresnahan failed or evaded giving responsive answers to questions by Claimant or his Representative as to what were the "other incidents." There is some allusion in the record that Bresnahan had written reports on the conduct of Claimant from supervisors and fellow workers. These, which would be the best evidence, were not introduced into the record by Carrier; nor, is their substance in any manner revealed. The only probative evidence in the record as to Claimant's conduct is brief loud talking on May 3. Claimant admits to this.
It is uncontroverted in the transcript that Claimant reported to Dr. Morse on May 6, upon receipt of the direction to do so-Dr. Morse found Claimant to be physically normal-Dr. Morse, on that date said nothing about need of further examination and did not tell Claimant his diagnosis.
On May 9, Claimant being out of service and having heard nothing from Dr. Morse, called the Doctor as to his status. Dr. Morse testified that he ` suggested a psychiatric examination." It is to be noted that this was only a suggestion; it was not ordered.
Under date of May 29, Auditor Bresnahan sent the following letter to Claimant: 13126--4 436
You will recall our conversation on May 16 in which I suggested that you be examined by your family physician or a specialist and that our Medical Examiner be directly advised concerning your physical condition and prognosis with respect to resumption of service. In this conversation I told you of my sincere desire to do anything I could to bring about your early return to duty.
Pursuant to this letter Claimant reported to Dr. Morse on June 4. On this occasion, for the first time, Dr. Morse directed Claimant, without giving reasons, to submit to an examination by Dr. Shapiro, a psychiatrist, at Carrier's expense. Claimant refused to do so unless so instructed in writing. Dr. Morse informed Carrier of Claimant's reaction. In Carrier's opinion Claimant's conditional refusal was insubordinaton and it proceeded to initiate the discipline proceeding evidenced by its notice to Claimant under date of June 7, supra.
Let us now examine the testimony of Dr. Morse. We find his testimony unresponsive, confusing and unsupported by clinical records or professional diagnosis.
Dr. Morse testified that "I was requested to examine him (Claimant) as a result of unusual behavior during working hours." Also. "I had seen notes made by employes of the Audit Office regarding (Claimant's) behavior. I don't remember who made them, but they indicated that his behavior was unusual." The notes were not produced. There is no evidence in this record of unusual conduct on the part of Claimant during office hours. Indeed, the only evidence in this record as to Claimant's conduct prior to May 3 is his unchallenged testimony:
"In the past ten years and several months of working for Washington Terminal Company I have never been questioned as to my activities or my performace of work in the Audit Office and within fifteen minutes or a half hour in Doctor Morse's office he thought that I was mentally disturbed in that short time enough to see a psychiatrist."
The following testimony of Dr. Morse speaks for itself, bearing in mind that he examined Claimant only once, on May 6:
"Q. During the time that you performed your examination of Mr. Jacobs in your office, did you through your professional background detect any factors that would lead you to believe that his behavior was other than usual?
A. Not in particular, but he was, I thought, somewhat disturbed in some of his statements.
Thereafter, in the course of the hearing, when Claimant sought to have Dr. Morse give his professional reasons for suggesting a psychiatric examination, the hearing officer (Mr. Dowell) prevented the Doctor from giving a responsive answer:
1. Whether Claimant was held out of service pursuant to the May 3 notice for discipline; or, was he held out of service, in the exercise of a right of Carrier, until examination by Carrier's Medical Examiner and the Examiner's finding relative to physical qualificaton?
2. Whether Claimant, on June 4, was guilty of insubordination in refusing to submit to a psychiatric examinaton as ordered under the facts of record?
Both parties contend that the meaning of the May 3 out-of-service notice is clear. Carrier says that it clearly states that Claimant was being held out of service only until he was found physically fit, by the Medical Examiner, to perform the duties of his position. With equal certainty Clerks say the notice clearly states that Claimant was being held out of service for "recent conduct;" a disciplinary action requiring compliance with Rule 24 of the Agreement. We find the notice is subceptible to both interpretatons. Since 13126-6 438
the notice was drafted by Carrier and subject to both interpretations we apply the rule that under such circumstances the applicable interpretation is that most favorable to the addressee. Therefore, we find that Claimant was held out of service for his conduct, a disciplinary action, and Carrier was obligated to comply with Rule 24 of the Agreement. Its failure to comply was a violation of the Agreement.
We are in agreement with the principle enunciated by Carrier, citing Awards Nos. 728, 8724, 9208, 11492, 10920, that Carrier has an obligation to have in its employ those who are physically and mentally fit for the service to be performed Impliedly, this includes the right to direct its employes to submit to physical examination if it has reasonable cause to believe that this is necessary to determine whether an employe is physically fit to perform the duties of his position. But, we emphasize the word "reasonable." The principle does not give the Carrier the absolute right to invade the person and privacy of an employe. If an issue is raised the Carrier has the burden of proving that it had reasonable cause for ordering the examination. It is not enough for Carrier to say it had reasonable cause. It must be proved by a preponderance of material and relevant evidence. The facts in this case, above, paint a word picture of Carrier's failure to meet this test. The bare incident of brief loud talking on May 3, which is the only evidence of Claimant's behavior in the record, cannot be held to be a reasonable cause for ordering Claimant to submit to a psychiatric examination. Consequently, Claimant's refusal to do so cannot be held to be insubordination.
We find, from the facts of record, that the Carrier did not have reasonable cause for ordering Claimant to take a psychiatric examination.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and