STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood (GIr6525) that:
1. Carrier exceeded its authority in directing Mr. L. F. McCleery to present himself at an investigation on September 16, 1963.
2. The Carrier's dismissal of Mr. McCleery on September 19, 1963 was improper, unjustifiable, unreasonable and unwarranted.
3. Carrier be required to set aside dismissal of Mr. McCleery, with his seniority and all other rights unimpaired, and that he be compensated for all wage losses that may be sustained as a result of his improper dismissal.
OPINION OF BOARD: The issue in this case is whether an employe of a carrier, engaging in a legal strike, is subject to the discipline rules of an agreement within which he is covered.
At 6:00 A. M., January 23, 1963, employes represented by Eleven NonOperating Labor Organizations, of which Clerks is one, called a legal strike against Carrier. At all times material herein the strike continued.
Carrier having been informed that Claimant, a striking employe, while picketing, on July 16, 1963, had thrown rocks at members of a working crew, served the following charge and notice of investigation upon Claimant under date of September 9, 1963:
Rules of Conduct for Employes
Rule 27
You may have present at this investigation such representation as you are entitled to under your working agreement."
Carrier after informing Claimant, under date of September 14, 1963, that: "The existence of a legally authorized strike does not automatically excuse striking employes of responsibility for acts which might be committed against the Railway."-and-"Your failure to attend in no way lessens your responsibility should such responsibility be developed by the evidence adduced during the course of the investigation," proceeded to hold the investigation as scheduled. Claimant failed to appear. On September 19, 1963, Carrier addressed the following dismissal notice to Claimant:
Thereafter, Clerks resorted to the appeals procedure prescribed in the Agreement during which it advanced the following contentions:
of the strike and Carrier had no legal right to call and hold the investigation on September 16, 1963;
2. Under the circumstances involved Claimant could not receive a fair and impartial investigation because of animosity of those conducting the investigation, as well as witnesses;
3. The transcript of the investigation, held in the absence of Claimant, did not establish adequate proof of the charges; and
4. Upon an Information filed by the County Solicitor, and warrant issued, a jury trial was held on October 29, 1963, as to whether Claimant was guilty of "aggravated assault" for the alleged rock throwing incident. The jury returned a verdict of "Not Guilty." This court proceeding preempted the deciding of the issue as to whether Claimant had thrown rocks.
The appeals having been successively denied on the property, Clerks petitioned this Board to resolve the dispute.
The relationship between an employe engaged in a legal strike and his employer continues to be employer-employe. To hold otherwise would be to reduce the status of the striker to that of a stranger to the employer. It would have, inter alia, the effect of stripping the striker of his legally cognizable rights to return to work upon settlement of the strike.
Under the First Amendment of the Constitution an employe on strike is guaranteed the right to engage in peaceful picketing without injury to the employer-employe relationship. But, the books are full of cases, before the courts and the National Labor Relations Board, that an employer is legally justified in denying reinstatement to a striker who engages in violence on the picket line. In such cases the striker is held to have terminated the employeremploye relationship by exceeding the bounds of peaceful picketing.
For industries other than those subject to the Railway Labor Act the issue as to whether a striker has by his actions terminated the employer-employe relationship does not usually arise until settlement of the strike. This case differs in that under the Agreement, Rule 28, Carrier must furnish an employe charged with an offense with a letter setting forth the charge within sixty (60) days of Carrier acquiring knowledge and information upon which to base the charge. The only exception to this time limitation is confined to "an employe on leave of absence or vacation"-Claimant was not within either of these categories. Then, once the charge is filed, Rule 29 of the Agreement requires that as to Claimant an employe with more than sixty (60) days service the investigation must be held within ten (10) days of the date when charged and decision must be rendered within ten (10) days of the completion of the investigation. Time Imitations such as these are strictly construed by this Board in the interpretation and application of agreements. Consequently, Carrier had no alternative but to satisfy the time limitations in initiating and processing disciplinary proceedings against Claimant.
were and are involved in the dispute which remains unsettled after compliance with Section 6 of the Act. We must assume, therefore, that those Rules continue in force and effect.
The court proceeding, which we have referred to above, charged Claimant with a crime=`aggravated assault" This being a criminal offense the State had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not required in civil cases. In civil cases only a preponderance of evidence is required.
The jury in the criminal case was concerned only with whether the Claimant was guilty of the crime with which he was charged. It was not concerned with interpretation and application of the Rules of the Agreement. It was not possessed of the expert knowledge recognized as necessary by the Congress when it reserved to the parties to the Agreement the right to seek settlement of disputes on the property with appeal, exclusive, to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The jurisdiction vested in the Board cannot be preempted by the courts. We hold, therefore, that the decision of the court in the criminal case is not material.
One of the contentions of Clerks is that Claimant would not be given a fair and impartial hearing while the strike continued. This is a speculative conclusion. The Claimant had no right to prejudge the course of the hearing. He was given the opportunity to appear, to make such motions as he considered necessary, to adduce evidence in his defense, to cross-examine Carrier's witnesses, opportunity to appeal on the property, and finally, recourse to the jurisdiction of this Board. Claimant, by absenting himself from the hearing, has placed this Board in the position of determining from the transcript of the hearing whether it was conducted in a fair and impartial manner. We find that it was.
In our consideration of a disciplinary case we sit with the limited jurisdiction of an appellate forum. We do not weigh the evidence de novo. Our function is deciding whether or not the finding in the disciplinary hearing is supported by substantial evidence. Even in cases in which we find conflicting evidence the test is whether there is material and relevant evidence, which if believed, supports the finding. We find from our study of the transcript in this case that there is substantial evidence to support the findings that Claimant was guilty as charged.
1. As between Claimant and Carrier, the employer-employe relationship continued during the course of the strike unless terminated voluntarily or for cause;
2. At the time of the incident giving rise to the charge here involved, Claimant and Carrier were both contractually obligated to comply with the Rules of the Agreement;
3. Claimant received a fair and impartial hearing. His absenting himself from the hearing was at his peril. 13127-a 443
4. The record shows that the finding that Claimant was guilty as charged is supported by substantial evidence.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and
The Referee erred when he denied the claim based on the following con clusions:
Regarding the first conclusion: The Claimant was not an employe as that term is defined in Section 1, Fourth, of the Railway Labor Act, as he was not .subject to its (Carrier's) continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of hs service" (parenthesis supplied). He was not working for the Carrier inasmuch as he, along with a vast majority of the Carrier's employes, were on a legally authorized withdrawal from Carrier service in accordance with the Railway Labor Act. 13127-6 4¢4
Regarding the second conclusion: The Claimant was not performing service for the Carrier, hence the Carrier could not apply the provisions of the working Agreement to him regardless of his conduct.
Regarding the third conclusion: It was a definite impossibility for the Claimant, or any other individual under similar circumstances, to receive a fair and impartial hearing from the Carrier, inasmuch as Claimant had been on a legally authorized strike against the Carrier for nearly 6 months prior to the date of the alleged offense.
Regarding the fourth conclusion: The Carrier apparently had the Claimant arrested and he was tried in the Civil Courts. The Court dismissed the charges against the Claimant for lack of proof. How, then, can the Referee include in his Opinion statements that the Claimant was found guilty when a jury in a Civil Court returned its verdict of not guilty?
The Carrier had its day in Court and lost; thereafter, rather than appeal its case to a higher Court, Carrier resorted to the working Agreement rules and the Referee found the Claimant guilty when the record before the Referee plainly states that a Civil Court had previously found him not guilty.
It is quite evident that the Referee erred: and for the above reasons, I most vigorously dissent to this Award.