change the time of this bridge and building gang from 6:00 A. M. to 10:00 A. M. your Honorable Board in many decisions, too numerous to mention, in the past has ruled that the right of management to manage should not be upset.

None of the claimants in this dispute were required to work in excess of eight hours on July 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26 and 27, 1961 and therefore any claim for overtime hours is improper.

The claim of the Organization is without merit and should be denied.

OPINION OF BOARD: On the dates in question, Carrier changed the regular hours of Claimants which were 6:00 A. M. to 2:30 P. M. temporarily to 10:00 A. M. to 6:30 P. M. The Organization charges this to be a violation of Rules 5(a) and (b), which read as follows:

"RULE 5. STARTING TIME

(a) The starting time of the work period for regularly assigned service will be designated by the supervisory officer and will not be changed without first giving employes affected 36 hours' notice.

(b) Employes engaged in regularly assigned service will not have their starting time changed for short periods unless necessary to do so to meet service conditions."

There is no dispute that the employes were given more than 36 hours' notice. The main issue involved is whether the change was "necessary . . . to meet service conditions."

Carrier states as its position, "It is a managerial function to determine when service conditions exist which would make it necessary to change the starting time for a short period." The record contains a statement that the major humping operations in this yard occurred prior to 10:00 A. M. and that the main hump lead to the yard was out of service, but no evidence upon which to make any critical estimate of the necessity for the change in hours.

Carrier said that there would be "less disruption of service" during the new hours and that the B&B gang could not have performed this work "as expeditiously, efficiently and safely" if done during the regular hours. But, the evidence upon which this Board could make an independent judgment is not present.

Carrier, in effect, invites this Board to take its word that the change was necessary. As Carrier puts it, "If Carrier, in its judgment, determined for the good of the service and operating conditions that it was essential to change the time . . . the right of management to manage should not be upset"

we do not think that the Board should support every decision of management merely because it was an exercise of managerial judgment. When managerial judgment is challenged, it is the obligation of management to supply the evidence by which this Board can decide if that judgment was proper. Carrier simply has not met that burden in this case.

Moreover, Carrier's position raises serious questions with regard to what the phrase "necessary to meet service conditions" means. It implies that

expediency, efficiency and safety make a change in hours necessary. We think the parties meant that there had to be an element of compulsion involved, not convenience or economy. If safety were involved, most certainly an element of compulsion and necessity would be introduced, but safety is a matter of degree and we ought to have evidence upon which to judge whether the change really was motivated by safety and how much more safe the change was than before. The answers to these questions Carrier asks that we accept upon faith. This we must not do.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Carrier violated the Agreement.

AWARD