TRANSPORTATION-COMMUNICATION EMPLOYEES UNION
(Formerly The Order of Railroad Telegraphers)
1. Carrier violated the Agreement between the parties when it failed and refused to compensate Extra Telegrapher J. B. Kemmerer deadheading pay to and from Waterloo, Iowa, in connection with working on the position of third shift telegrapher-leverman-clerk at Waterloo on July 29 and August 5, 1960.
4. Carrier shall pay R. W. Gooding four (4) hours' pay for each deadheading trip, Marshalltown to Waterloo and return, on October 28-29, 1960, November 18-19, 1960, and November 25-26, 1960.
5. On any dates subsequent to November 26, 1960, that extra employes are used to work on the position of third shift telegrapherleverman-clerk at Waterloo, Carrier shall pay such extra employes for deadheading in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
OPINION OF BOARD: Claimants herein were required to perform socalled "tag end rest day" relief service on a position at Waterloo, Iowa when there was no regular relief employe assigned on specified dates during 1960. Claimants are extra employes, who were compensated for such relief service at the pro rata rate and each now claims an additional allowance in the form of deadhead compensation.
The issue before this Division for determination is whether or not an extra employe, who is used to perform "tag end rest day" relief service at Waterloo, Iowa, pursuant to Rule 8, Section 1 (e) (6) of the Agreement between the parties, is entitled to deadhead compensation.
Petitioner relies upon the language contained in Rule 20 of the Agreement and contends that deadheading compensation is payable to extra employes whenever deadheading is required on Carrier's business, unless such compensation would serve as a duplicate payment, or an extra employe is exercising his seniority rights. Rule 20 reads as follows:
Petitioner further contends that the issue before us previously has been decided in our Award 10030 under an Agreement containing substantially the same applicable Rules.
Carrier contends that the first clause contained in Rule 20 is of preponderant importance and that Rule 8, Section 1 (e) (4) provides that any
employes who perform relief service under Rule 8 shall not be paid expense allowance or for deadheading. Carrier avers that applicable rules involved in our previous Award 10030 were substantially different from the controlling language found in the Agreement between the parties in the instant dispute and that said award is readily distinguishable.
The parties agree that Claimants are extra relief employes, who were required to perform rest day relief service pursuant to Rule 8, Section 1(e) (6) of the Agreement which provides as follows:
Rule 20 commences with the clause "Except as otherwise provided in this agreement, . . " which language constitutes a broad limitation on its applicability and subordinates the provisions for compensation contained therein to any other provisions of the Agreement concerning payment or nonpayment for deadheading, including the clear and unambiguous language found in Rule 8, Section 1 (e) (4).
The record discloses that Rule 8 had its genesis in National Mediation Board Case A-2070 (July 13, 1945). Several years later the parties revised their Agreement and the present language found in both Rule 20 and Rule 8, incorporates the terms of Case A-2070.
In our Award 10030, the language of the pertinent Rule expressly stated that it was only applicable to employes holding regular relief assignments and we found it was not applicable to extra employes who had performed similar service to that involved in the instant dispute. Contrarily, the controlling language found in Rule 8, Section 1 (e) (4) of the Agreement involved in the present dispute is applicable to all employes, regular or extra, performing rest day relief service under said Rule and specifically precludes the payment of deadheading compensation to extra employes where the deadheading is for rest day relief service pursuant to Section 1 (e) (6) of Rule 8.
The Award cited and relied on by Petitioner is clearly distinguishable because of a substantial difference in the language of the applicable Rules. If we were to sustain Petitioner's contention such a determination would constitute a revision of the pertinent provisions of the Agreement by interpretation. We have no such authority. Awards 7296, 9198, 13310. Accordingly, the claim must be denied.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds: