"Arrange to be present in Terminal Trainmaster's Office, Deramus Yard, Shreveport, Louisiana at 9:00 A. M., Monday, April 25, 1966, for formal investigation to ascertain the facts and determine your responsibility in connection with your violation of General Rules K, second paragraph, of the Kansas City Southern Lines Operating rules, by your removal of two railroad switch stands belonging to the Kansas City Southern Railway Lines Company without first securing proper authority. You may bring representative and/or witnesses if desired.
At the request of Mr. C. A. Lewis, Jr., General Chairman of TCU, the investigation was, by consent, adjourned to May 2, 1966. On May 2, 1966, a request on behalf of the Claimant was made for a further adjournment of the investigation, but such request was denied, and the hearing and/or investigation held.
Under date of May 6, 1966, the following communication was personally delivered to the Claimant by Mr. G. M. Switzer, Superintendent of the Carrier.
Thereafter, the claim herein was filed and progressed on the property and duly appealed to this Board.
The transcript of the testimony adduced at the investigation is made a part of the record before this Board.
An examination of the record discloses that sometime in the year 1962 or 1963, the year not being definitely established, the Claimant inquired of Roadmaster C. L. Smith, who was the custodian of the Carrier's scrap material, that he would like to acquire two discarded switch stands stating that he would like to place them on each side of the driveway to his home. Mr. Smith informed the Claimant that two broken switch stands, which had value only_as scrap, had been overlooked during the scrap drive of that year and that they could be found and/or located along that portion of Lake Shore Drive that ran parallel to the Carrier's track in Shreveport, Louisiana. The Claimant went to the location specified by Mr. Smith, found the two broken switches, loaded them into his automobile, and took them to his home. He cleaned and painted them and placed them in a poured cement foundation on either side of his driveway. They were at all times in plain view of anyone passing the home of the Claimant.
In April of 1966, a period of three or four years after these switches had been installed by the Claimant on his property, someone advised the Carrier's office that there were two switch stands located on Crawford Road, which was the location of the Claimant's home. The Carrier ordered an inves-
tigation to be made. The Investigator went to the place where the switches were located and ascertained that the location was the premises of the Claimant. The Claimant, upon being questioned with reference to the switches, did not deny that he took them, and stated the manner in which he obtained them.
At the investigation hearing while Mr. Smith denied that he gave the Claimant specific consent to take the two switches, he did not deny that he did inform the Claimant where they were and that they were scrap.
This Board has held, on numerous occasions, that in a discipline case it is not its function to determine the credibility or weight of the evidence nor will it substitute its judgment for that of the Carrier as to the degree of the discipline. We have, however, held that in view of the nature of the proceeding, that
While the Carrier might not be bound by the requirements of proof necessary for a conviction of a charge of larceny in a court of law in order to invoke disciplinary action, the Carrier must produce and submit direct, positive, substantial, material and relevant evidence to sustain its charges and actions. It is true that the letter of April 19, 1966, does not contain the word "larceny", but the law is well settled that the taking of property without the consent of the owner is and does amount to a larceny.
The burden was on the Carrier to prove by direct, positive, substantial, material and relevant evidence that the Claimant was guilty of the charges preferred against him. We have examined and carefully searched the record in this case, and find that this the Carrier has failed to do.
As to those parts of the claim numbered 1 and 2, we find and hold that the Carrier's action was arbitrary, unjust and without any foundation in law and fact, and that
With respect to Part 3 of the Claim, the record contains no showing of loss which would have been paid as contemplated by this portion of the claim. Therefore, Part 3 will be dismissed. See Award 10406.