-Ow- 360 Award No. 16611
Docket No. CL-17015







PARTIES TO DISPUTE:

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS,
FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC

RAILROAD COMPANY


STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood (GL-6214) that:


















EMPLOYES' STATEMENT OF FACTS: Employe B. C. Ruddy, Jr. is the regularly assigned occupant of Keypunch Operator Position 8774 at Minneapolis, Minn. in Seniority District No. 160.

OPINION OF BOARD: Employes regularly assigned to positions covered by Clerks' Agreement, other than Keypunch Operator, were allegedly transferred during their regularly assigned hours, on specified dates, to Keypunch Operator work. The transferred employes are herein called Transferees.


The theory of Clerks' case is that Carrier by requiring Transferees to vacate their regularly assigned positions during the regularly assigned hours of their positions and temporarily assigning them to Keypunch Operator work caused Transferees to suspend work on their respective regularly assigned positions to absorb overtime which otherwise would have secured to Claimant, a regularly assigned Keypunch Operator, all in violation of the following provision of Rule 32-Overtime:



It is Carrier's position that: (1) Transferees were not required to suspend work during their regular hours; (2) Transferees worked no overtime; (3) it is an assumption on the part of Clerks that Claimant would have worked overtime absent the transfers; (4) Claimant was not directed by Carrier to work overtime-an indispensable condition to working overtime, prescribed in the following provision of Rule 32:



(i) Clerks have not proven the existence of an "emergency"; and (6) Rule 17, which reads in material part, with emphasis supplied:









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is a recognition of Carrier's managerial prerogative to make the temporary assignments alleged to be violative of the Agreement.


In our consideration of this case we have studied the large number of our Awards, cited by the parties, in which provisions identical to or like Rule 32 (h) were at issue-included were denial Awards 10625 and 14480 in which the parties herein were parties therein. Any attempt, we have concluded, to distinguish or interpolate the Opinions in those Awards would only accentuate the conflicts and compound confusion. Consequently, we approach resolution of the issue as though de novo and consider it in the light of this Board's jurisdiction and the application of principles of contract construction.


Clerks would have us insert into Rule 32 (h) the phrase within the parenthesis:




This we cannot do because: (1) this Board has no jurisdiction to add to or subtract from the provisions of the Agreement; (2) in the absence of substantial probative evidence of intent of the parties to the contrary, the words in a rule must be interpreted as communicating their usual common meaning.


Rule 32 (h) is addressed to a situation consisting of two factors: (1) an employe required "to suspend work during regular hours"; and (2) the suspension of work during regular hours with the design of absorbing overtime; meaning, the holding out of service of an employe during his regular assigned hours to evade payment of the overtime rate penalties prescribed in the Forty Hour Week Agreement. Inasmuch as Clerks admit that Transferees were not required to suspend work during their regular hours its has failed to prove a violation of Rule 32 (h).


We now move to consideration of Rule 17. Clerks say this rule by its caption is only concerned with rates of pay and is not susceptible to any other concoction. We construe the Rule as prescribing the rates of pay agreed upon by the parties upon the exercise by Carrier of a management prerogative recognized by the parties-the temporary assignment by Carrier of an employe to work on a position other than one to which he is regularly assigned.


For the foregoing reasons we will deny the Claim.

FINDINGS: 'The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:




That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;


That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and


That Carrier did not violate the Agreement.

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Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 27th day of September 1968.

LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT TO AWARD NO. 16611

(DOCKET CL-17015)


The majority erred in agreeing with Carrier's contentions that:

" * * * (1) Transferees were not required to suspend work during their regular hours; (2) Transferees worked no overtime; (3) it is an assumption on the part of Clerks that Claimant would have worked overtime absent the transfers; (4) Claimant was not directed by Carrier to work overtime-an indispensable condition to working overtime, prescribed in the following provision of Rule 32:



(5) Clerks have not proven the existence of an 'emergency'; and (6) Rule 17, which reads in material part, with emphasis supplied:







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To answer Carrier's contentions in items (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), we have but to refer to Awards of this Division to dispel such drivel; for example, Award 4646 (Referee Charles S. Connell) held in part as follows:


"The intent and purpose of the Seniority and Bulletining Rules is to protect the Employes' rights to the respective positions they had secured, and not to require them to suspend their regular work to absorb overtime, which either they or other regular employes would have earned had such suspension not taken place. This Board has so held in many awards. Nos. 2695, 2823, 3417, 4499 and 4500. And the same principle applies, even if the hours worked are the same as the hours of the employes' regular assignment. The foregoing rulings are hereby reaffirmed and the claims will be sustained."




It is axiomatic that with Carrier's violative action in having required a regularly assigned employe to move off his position to work an entirely different position, there was no need for Carrier to authorize overtime, either to Claimant or to the "transferees."


Clerks never suggested that an emergency existed-and neither did the Carrier. Contrary to item (5) contention, if an emergency had existed, the burden of proof fell on Carrier, not the Employes, to prove such an emergency existed and compelled Carrier's actions.


With respect to item (6) pertaining to Rule 17-Preservation of Rates, we call attention to Award 4352 in which Referee Francis J. Robertson held in part pertinent thereto:


"Carrier advances four contentions justifying its shifting of Mr. Kramer from his regular assignment: * * * (3) That is was permissible under Rule 48 (the Preservation of Rate Rule). That contention has been advanced before and previous Awards of this Board have rejected it, said Awards holding that such a rule is purely a rating provision and not one which permits the shifting of an employe from his regular assignment." * * .


It was said in Award 2695 that regular assignments should not be disturbed except as a last recourse. There was a recourse here,-the occupants of the other positions could have been called in to work their assignments on their relief days.



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The Referee was skillfully- persuaded that the parenthesis he added in Rule 32(h) was the only way which Clerks could hope to be sustained. We use the word "skillfully" because, although nearly all Carriers have argued to that effect over the many years in which this standard rule has been in existence, we find at this late date a neutral entrapped by such persuasive mumbo jumbo.


Attention is directed to Award 5105 in which Referee Jay S. Parker held in part:











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In Award 5578, under "Position of Carrier," we find the following arguments advanced by the Carrier involved:

"The work on the position of head tabulating clerk is just as important one day as another and there was no particular circumstance at the time Mr. D. C. Brown requested a leave of absence to justify denying it without running afoul of the 'unjust treatment' rule. Therefore, carrier had no choice but to grant the request.


As pointed out above, the absence was to be such short duration that it would not have been feasible to scramble the entire office in order to fill both positions. Mr. Hyder was asked to report to the tabulating room, this situation is adequately covered by Rule 37(a), as follows:





However, Referee Dudley E. Whiting answered those assertions in the following manner:

"OPINION OF BOARD: Starting with our Award No. 2346 and continuing to the present time, we have uniformly held that to require an employe to suspend work on his regularly assigned position in order to work on another position, except in emergencies, is considered to be a suspension of work to absorb overtime in violation of the rule prohibiting such action. In some of those Awards there were differences in factual situations but the factual situation involved in Award No. 4499 is in all material respects identical to the situation involved here.


Thus in effect the Carrier here is asking us to overrule that consistent line of decisions. Certainly among the fundamental purposes


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We next refer to what Referee A. Langley Coffey stated in Award 7346, to wit:





We direct further attention to the following Third Division Awards in support of the Employes' claim in this dispute:

















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Rule 17 contains the phrase "by proper authority." But neither that rule nor any other rule in the Clerks' Agreement defines "proper authority." Lacking such definition, the Majority provided one: a Carrier officer or, as the Award holds, "managerial prerogative."


The dissenter would like to submit that "proper authority" is the authority vested in all the rules which were negotiated and consummated between the parties signatory to the collectively bargained Agreement. Carriers steadfastly hold to the proposition that any action, taken, which has not been specifically bargained away in the rules of the agreement, is "managerial prerogative." Here we find the Majority leaping to the conclusion that the language used in Rule 17, i.e., "by proper authority" gives Carrier the right, at its whim and fancy, to disregard and abrogate any and ail other rules. By so holding, the seniority of an employe is rendered null and void; bulletining of a position become a mockery since, after having been declared the successful applicant to a titled specific position, with described preponderating duties to perform thereon for which he is held personally responsible, the "proper authority" (a supervisor, for example) removes him from his contractually secured position and requires him to work another titled specific position: which, likewise, has been secured by another employe through the contractual provisions of the collectively bargained Agreement. And so the snowball rolls down a steep hill, gathering momentum and becoming impossible to stop, except by "managerial prerogative."


Such abortive power, that of elminating all other rules, was never vested in Carrier through the provisions of Rule 17. The Referee, in this Award 16611. should have stopped the snowball which was started by the decisions rendered in Awards 10625 (Levinson) and 14480 (Dugan) to which he has referred and in which he erroneously concurred.


The decision rendered is not supported by the language of the Agreement and the consistent line of Awards rejecting such construction.








Keenan Printing Co., Chicago, 111. Printed in U.S.A.
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