NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD

THIRD DIVISION

Paul C. Dugan, Referee

(1) The Carrier violated the Agreement when, without prior notice to eGneral Chairman M A. Christie as reuired by Article IV of the May 17, 1968 National Agreement, is assigned the work of spraying roofing compound on the Car Shop roof at Marshall, Texas to outside forces (System File K 310-62).

(2) B&B employes R. L. Robertson, G. B. Wilkerson, J. A. Brown, E. E. Taylor, R. J. St. Remain and L. J. Graves each be allowed pay at thei rrespetetive straight time rates for an equqal proportionate share of the total number of man hours expended by outside forces in performing the work referred to in Part (1) of this claim.

LETTER "A"

"September 8, 1969 Mr. J. C. Love

General Manager

The Texas & Pacific Railway Co. 311 T&P Building Fort Worth Texas

Dear Sir:

I am appealing to you from Supt. Conway's decision in his letters of June 16. 1969 and September 5, 1969, File: TC-18978, declining claims B&B employes R. L. Robertson, G. B. Wilkerson, J. A. Brown, E. E. Taylor, R. J. St. Remain and L, J. Graves for an equal proportionate share of the man hours consumed by the contractor beginning May 5, 1969, and continuing so long as contractor, Martin Roofing and Coating Company, sprayed roofing compound on the Car Shop roof at Marshall, Texas,

Martin on June 6, 1969 for the north half. and the roofing project was completed on June 30, 1969.

6. The First Vice General Chairman initiated claim on June 12, 1969, alleging the Carrier had viohted the Scope and Rules 1 and 2, as well as the provisions of Article IV of the May 17, 1968 Agreement in contracting the roof repair at Marshall, Texas to an outside contractor. In handling the dispute on the property, the Employes took the position that the work was within the Scope of the MofW Agreement and that the members of B&B Gang .#302 were available to perform the work; however, in the General Chairman's letter to the General Manager the distribution of work as set out by the General Chairman proves that the gang was, in fact, engaged in bridge repair work in and around Shreveport, Lou:siana.

7. In declining the elaim at the various levels on the property, the Carrier pointed out that:

1. The Scope is a general rule that does not identify work covered therein.

2. There has been a long established practice to contract both construction and repair projects on this property particularly the the car shop at Marshall.

3. The claimants were engaged in scheduled bridge repair work at another location and suffered no loss of earnings during the claim period.

4. The rules of the basic agreement cited by the Employes were not violated, and Article IV of the May 17, 1968 Agreement was not applicable even though the Carrier did discuss the proposal with the General Chairman in conference on April 3, 1969, which is twenty days prior to the making of the contract with Edward F. Martin.

OPINION OF BO71RD: The Organization contends that Carrier violated Article IV of the May 17, 1968 National Agreement when it failed to give notice to the Organization before contracting out the work of making roof repairs on the car shop roof at Marshall, Texas to an outside contractor.

It is undisputed that Carrier failed to give written notice to the Organization, as required by said Article IV of the May 17, 1968 National Agreement 15 days prior to contracting out the work in dispute.

This Board, in Award No. 18305, with the present referee sitting, refused to follow Carriers contention that the Organization must first prove that the work in dispute belonged "exclusively" to Claimants by tradition, practice and custom before Carrier is required to give the notice referred to in said Article IV. This conclusion was affirmed by this Board in later Award Nos. 18687, 18773, 18792, 18860, 18967, 18968, 18714 and 18716.

Therefore, we find that Carrier by failing to give notice to the Organization before contracting out the work in question violated the specific requirements of Article IV of the May 17, 1968 National Agreement.

In view of the facts that Claimants were working on the date in question and suffered no pecuniary loss we will deny their claim for damages.

That the parties waived oral hearing:

That the Agreement was violated in accordance with the Opinion.

AWARD