(Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen
 PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
 (Norfolk and Western Railway Company

 STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the Virginian General Committee of the Brotherhood
 of Railroad Signalmen on the Norfolk and Western Railway
 Company that:

 (a) Carrier violated the .agreement dated September 15, 1966, particularly Section 2 (a), when Signal Maintainer G. N. Lewis was improperly compensated (les
(b) Carrier should now be required to pay Signal Maintainer G. H. Lewis seven (7) hours overtime at punitive r",c, or $39.73.

 OPINION OF BOARD: Cldimant is covered by a protective allowance agreement
 resulting from a raiiroae merger and entitled Implementing
 Agreement between the parties effective September 15, 1966. The dispute here
 arises because, for the month of January 1970, in which claimant took five days
 vacation, the Carrier made a deduction from claimant's protective allowance on
 account of seven hours of casual overtime worked by claimant's vacation relief.
 The claim is for compensation for the ,seduction. Carrier asserts that the matter
 is not properly before the Board, that it is barred by time limits, and that it
 should be denied on the merits.

 Carrier's first contention is that this dispute should have been adjudicated by an arbitration committee under procedures designed for resolution of controversies arising under the merger agreements on this property. The basis for this position is the language of Section 1 (d) of Merger Agreement dated January 10, 1962, which, in pertinent part, reads as follows:



The contention discussed here has been previously urged upon this Board in Award No. 17229, which involved this same Carrier and the identical agreement provisions set out in the foregoing quotation. In ruling adversely to Carrier in that Award, this Board stated that:

        "It is clearly seen that the word 'may' is used in said Section 1(d) of said January 10, 1962 Agreement, thus making it voluntary rather than mandatory for a party machinery so provided for in said clause. Therefore, inasmuch as the Organization elected to have this claim decided by this Board, we have jurisdiction to hear this dispute."


In a later ruling on the same contention and similar language in Award No. 18071, this Board again held that the use of the term "may" rendered the provisions permissive s adjudicate a controversy. :n the record before t,s here, we find no reason to depart from these prior awards and we therefore conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the c
Carrier's time limit defense results from its granting an extension of time which it says was for the purpose of the Organization considering and conferring on certain pro reason, the Carrier says the extension is void, thus placing the Organization in violation of the time limit provisions. The document upon which Carrier relies to support this argument does show that the extension was granted for the Organization to have "an o ment says nothing about an obligation to confer on the proposals and, hence, we conclude that the time limit defense is without merit.

 With regard to the merits, both parties agree that the dispute is controlled by the Implementing 15, 1966. This Agreement provides for each covered employee to have a base month for each calendar month of the base year 1961. Instead of prescribing average monthly test periods. the agreement was geared to the conditions and work habits which prevailed for each individual,employee during each month of the base year. Thus, the number of hours worked by.a particular employee in a base month, say 200, became the protected number of hours for the corresponding month in any subsequent year. The pa Agreement is the language in Section 2(a) which reads as follows:

        "2. The Carrier shall furnish lists of employes entitled to preservation of employment to the General Chairman of the Brotherhood as soon as possible:


        (a) -One set of lists will consist of employes who, on January 10, 1962, held regularly assigned positions and will be furnished in the form specified in Attachment 'A' appended hereto. The base period for such employe:s will be the calendar Year 1961, and the total compensation and total time paid for by months, during the base period (adjusted to include subsequent

                    Award Number 19859 Page 3

                    Docket Number SC-19582


        "wage increases) will be used as hereinafter set forth to determine whether, or to what extent, such an employe has been placed in a worse position with respect to his compensation. When claim is filed by or on behalf of such an employe in the form attached hereto as Attachment 'C', within thirty (30) days following the end of the month for which claim is filed, the month for which the claim is filed will be compared with the corresponding month in his base period (adjus for in that specific month to include subsequent general wage increases), and if his compensation in filed is less than his upgraded compensation in the corresponding base period month, he will be paid the difference, less compensation for any time lost on account extent he is not available for service. However, compensation deducted for time lost by an emplove-who was not available for overtime service shall not be conside total compensation and total time paid for of the employe who did perform such service in the month in which it occurred." (Emphasis supplied)


We now come to the narrow issue of whether a vacation absence is a voluntary absence within the meaning of the underlined language in the foregoing quotation. Carrier says that a vacation is a voluntary absence by which the vacationing employee makes himself not available for service. Prom this premise it follows that casual overtime worked by the vacation relief is properly deductible from the va period. The Petitioner says that a vacation is not a voluntary absence in the present context and that the deductions were improper,

 The essence of Carrier's argument that a vacation is a voluntary absence is found in its June 8, 1970 letter. to the General Chairman which stated that:

        "You further state, 'The act of being on vacation is not an act of voluntary absence-***.' We take exception to such statement since the vacation agreement was established through actions which were voluntarily initiated by, or on behalf of, the r_mployees themselves and it was as a direct rg§ult of such voluntary actions that Lewis was entitled to said vacation.


        "Then, too, since the vacation agreements existed during the 'test period' years, as well as on the dates the Implementing Agreement was being negotiated, it cannot be logically argued that the granting of a vacation places an employ


i
                  Award Number 19859 Page 4

                  Docket Number SC-19582


This argument was further buttressed by dictionary definitions of "voluntary" and "absence" in Carrier's submission and by the statement that claimant "voluntarily, intentionally volition by requesting that he be permitted to schedule vacation." Carrier also asserted that other classifications of employees on this property have long ago abandoned Petitioner's position and made reference _o the following provision from its Agreement with the UTU effective January 1, 1970:

        "2. In the processing of a merger connec_ed claim for a road brakeman or yardman for a month in i.iich all or any portion of vacation is involved, neither vacation days involved nor compensation for such vacation days will be considered. The employe's 'Test Period' will be prorated to the number of days in such month, excluding the vacation davs involved."


And finally, Carrier cited the following from Special Adjustment Board No, 774, Case No. 2, which found favorably to Carrier on the question of making vacation deductions from displacement allowances:

        "The Question


        "The question, as jointly stipulated by the parties, reads: 'Does the January 10, 1962 agreement or any implementing agreement permit the Carrier to reduce the guarantee of an employee the difference between his daily pay on vacation and what he could have earned had he not been on paid vacation a portion of the month?'


        "Discussion and Findings -


        "On the basis of the entire record the Board finds as follows:


        (1) Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Understanding, effective


        January 10, 1962, provides-,t r: ,r a: ,r ,r w -x ,, ., :: ~ r.


              (b) It was further agreed that any compensation whatsoever (including vacation pay, arbitraries, pay for time lost, etc.) received from the Railway Company, but excluding payments made on account of personal injuries when such payments are for reasons other than time lost, would be used to reduce the amount of displacement allowances due any employe.


        (2) It is crystal clear from Note (b) that the Carrier had the right to make the relevant vacation deductions in calculating displacement allowances.

                  Award Number 19859 Page 5

                  Docket Number SG-19582

                  "Award


        The question is answered in the affirmative."


For its part the Petitioner asserts that neither claimant nor any other employee has the option to forego his vacation period and continue on his assignment during his vacation. Only the Carrier is afforded an option in this respect. Thus, unless the employee's vacation period is cancelled or postponed by the Carrier, the employee is required to take his vacation as scheduled. Petitioner also notes th the base year 1961 and, consequently, Carrier's deduction action amounts to taking something away from claimant which it never afforded him in the first place.

 From our study of the foregoing, and the whole record, it becomes apparent that Carrier considers it unfair, for purposes of paying protective allowances, to be required to compare a base month of 1961, during which the employee took no vacation, with a subsequent year's corresponding month which includes a vacation period. From a practical viewpoint, we recognize that Carrier has no convenient method for having employee vacations fall in the same month, year after year, or otherwise arranging for vacations to have a more equitable impact under the protective allowance pro .lave also recognized this element of equity, for the above cited t1TU Agreement, effective January 1, 1970, appears to provide for vacation deductions. Nonetheless, our function is to interpret the Agreement of the parties as written and, in this context, we are not persuaded by Carrier's arguments that a vacation absence is voluntary within the meaning and intent of the written provisions in Section 2(a) of the Implementing Agreement effective September 15, 1966. From a careful study of all material in the record, we conclude that the term "voluntary absence" in Section 2(a)means an absence which the employee has.'an'option to prevent. In such a case there is no doubt that the intent of Section 2 (a) is to reduce the employee's protective allowance employee stands on a different footing, In this case the employee does take the initiative on the timing of his vacation, and possibly other factors, so that, in a general sense, his action represents voluntary action; however, the employee has no option to take a vacation, or tq remain at work if he so chooses and, consequently, we think it cannot be said that a vacation is a voluntary absence within the meaning of Section 2 (a). Nor do we believe that this dispute is resolved in Carrier's favor by Special Adjustment Board No. 774, Case 2. The Agreement language considered in that case clearly supported the vacation deductions in issue, but that particular language has not been presented in this dispute. Moreover, we observe that the agreement language involved in that case, as well as the language in the UTU Agr provides for vacation deductions. However, no such language is contained in the agreement under consideration here, the Implementing Agreement effective September 15, 1966, and this Board is not empowered to add to or otherwise rewrite the implementing Agreement between the parties. We shall therefore sustain the claim.
                    Award Numher 19859 paste 6

                    Dot EeL Number SC-19582


        FTNDTNGS: The Third nivi:;ion of (lit! Adjustment: 1:oard, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holcln;


        'that the parties waived oral hearing;


That the Carrier and tha E%r»loycs inc,olved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Ymployrs r·ithin tli.. mv,znin.- of Llic railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

 That this Division of hhe Adjustment. Board fias jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

        That the Agreement was violated.


                      A h' A R U


        Claim sustained.


                              NIATT014AL R;A1l,1"OAD ADMIST?tENT BOARD

                              By Ordrx ^f Third Division


ATTEST: _
 Executive Secret

 Dated at MicaSo, Illinois, this 27th day of July 1973.