d


"The daily benefit amount of the supplemental sickness benefit will be paid on the basis of one day's benefit for each day of sickness (but only for days on which the employe has a right to work) with a maximum of five days' benefit payable in any calendar week during a period beginning on the first date an employe is absent from work due to illness and extending in each instance for the length of time determined and limited by the following schedule:

 Length of Service Period of Payment Percent of
 Per Calendar Year Daily Rate
 Less than 3 calendar 0 Benefit Days 0
 years
 3 to 5 calendar years 5 " " 707.
 5 to 10 " " 10 " " 757,
 10 to 20 " 15 80%
 20 calendar years & over 20 " " 80%

 C. For any day for which an employe is entitled to supplemental sickness benefits under the foregoing paragraph of this rule and such days of sickness for which benefits are payable under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, supplemental sickness be payable to such employe in such amounts equal to the daily benefit amount established in paragraph B.

 D. For any day for which an employe is entitled to supplemental sickness benefits under the foregoing paragraphs of this rule and such days are also da sickness benefits are payable under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, supplemental sickness b payable to such employe in such amounts so that such supplemental benefits in connection with the benefits from the Unemployment Insurance Act shall total the daily benefit amount established in paragraph (B) above.

 F. In the event an employe forfeits sickness benefits under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act for any day of sickness because of his failure to file for such benefits, he shall also forfeit any company paid supplemental benefits due for that day.




Petitioner contends that Claimant was entitled to the supplemental sickness benefits under the provisions of Rule 55 C. It is argued that the only specific exclusion from a "bona fide case of sickness" is pregnancy, as provided in paragraph "B" above. The Organization further states that Carrier had applied sickness b were sick because of alcoholism (evidence in support of these instances was not provided to Carrier on the property although the incidents were referred to and employes named by the Petitioner). It is also argued that other Agreements specifically exclu rule, while this Agreement does not contain such exclusion. As an example, Petitioner cites Rule 55 E of the Agreement between the Carrier and the Transportation-Communication Division of the Organization, which provides, inter alia:


Petitioner contends that there is no evidence in the record that Claimant's supervisor questioned whether the sickness was bona fide and of sufficient severity to require absence from work; Claimant's hospital bill, indicated that he was confined and under doctor's care during the time in question. Recognizing that the Claim had been denied on the basis that alcoholism is not a bona fide reason for claiming sick benefits, Petitioner cited several authorities to the effect that alcoholism is a disease.

 Carrier objects to the injection of the three prior incidents as an indication of past practice by this Carrier in paying employes sick beneSts while they are underg this Board has consistently rejected contentions that local payments, such as those herein, have any precedental value (Awards 16053, 16544, 16677 and 18064 are cited). Carrier states that nothing in Rule 55 "provides sick benefits to an employe who a an employe for sick benefits: the sickness must be bona fide and disabling (of


sufficient severity to require an absence from work). Carrier claims
 that neither of these conditions was present in the instant dispute.
 Carrier contends that in lay terms, such as those used by the parties in
 negotiating the Agreement in this dispute, alcoholism is not a sickness
 and has not been recognized as an illness in the industry. Carrier con
 tends that the claim in this case is designed to reward an alcoholic for
 violating Rule G by affording sick benefits while he is drying out, which
 was clearly not contemplated when the Rule was drafted. Carrying the logic
 further, Carrier argues that the organization's position would result in an
 employee charged with drinking (Rule G violation) being able to argue that
 he was sick and hence should not be dismissed but rather should be placed on
 leave and given sick benefits under Nile 55. Finally, Carrier points out
 that Claimant prior to March 8, 1973 did not suffer from an illness of such
 severity as to require an absence from work; Carrier finds that there was no
 indication in Claimant's prior record to show-any problems with respect to
 drinking. _ _ _

 We concur with Carrier's reasoning with respect to the prior incidents raised by Petitioner; such pa this Board has held in many prior disputes.

 The issue before us is simply whether or not Claimant's absence due to treatment for alcoholism is covered by Rule 55. First it should be noted that there is no Rule "G" allegation or direct application in this dispute. Furthermore the cl per se, much less with any alleged violation of Rule G. Carrier, in its arguments noted that Petitio dates. It is noted, however, that paragraph I of Rule 55 provides that "satisfactory evidence as to physician will be required in cases of doubt". There is no indication that Carrier through any of its officers "required" any such certificate, at any time.

 Carrier raises the issue of whether or not the sickness was of sufficient severity to require an absence from work. Carrier asserts that Claimant did in fact work up to the day he entered the hospital, in a normal manner; his "illness", according to the Carrier, therefore did not incapacitate him. We wonder how s that there was no prior work absence. Similarly, corrective surgery or therapy for many conditions w cause significant absences which are probably covered by the sick benefit provisions of the Agreement, under any reasonable construction. The point is that the treatment of the disease or illness, which is bona fide, may require absence from work, even though the sickness may not in itself have caused


absence. For this reason we do not hold that the lack of prior absence for the alleged "sickness" is controlling. It is quite clear that hospitalization under recognized m of time is evidence of an illness of "sufficient severity to require an absence from work".

 The key to this dispute is in the language of the rule itself. As contrasted with other sick benefit rules, in other agreements, this rule does not exclude mental illness, narcotic addiction, or alcoholism, from payment of sick benefits, but excludes only pregnancy. This Board has no authority to create new exceptions; we can only construe the language as developed by the parties. We must conclude then, that alcoholism per se is not excluded from coverage of Rule 55. The illness, and we view alcoholism as an illness, must ho The particular circumstances must fall within the language and intent of paragraph I: it must be of sufficient severity to require an absence from work and of course a doctor's certificate may be required if the Carrier should so desire. It must be made absolutely clear, however, that we are not suggesting that excessive drinking may be rewarded by sick benefits, but rather we are stating that the treatment of alcoholism may require absence from work and be protected by Rule 55. Each case must be evaluated on its own facts and merits, however and obviously not all treatment requires absence. For example, attendi treated by a psychiatrist probably do not require absence from work, and certainly under those circumstances no benefits would be applicable. We conclude, therefore, that under the circumstances of this particular case, the Claim must be sustained.



That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

 That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and







                        By Order of Third Division


ATTEST:
        Executive Secretary


Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 17th day of April 1975.